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ABSTRACT
THE JUDGESHIP AND THE TWELVER SHĪʿĪ ADAB AL-QĀḌĪ GENRE,
11-14TH CENTURIES C.E.
Raha Rafii
Joseph E. Lowry
In most modern historical surveys of medieval Islamic law, Twelver jurisprudence has
been generally noted only where it intersected with what is assumed to be mainstream or
normative Islamic law, i.e. Sunnī fiqh. Nonetheless, some modern scholars have briefly
noted and occasionally commented upon the distinct phenomenon of major Twelver
scholars crossing supposed sectarian lines to participate in and contribute to Shāfiʿite
learning circles. This study analyzes the elements of legal borrowing and exchange
between Twelver and Shāfiʿite jurists through a legal genre known as “adab al-qāḍī,” or
“The Judge’s Protocol,” which has been mined by modern scholars as sources for laws of
procedure. However, this overwhelming focus on the elements of practical law and the
genre’s concerns for evidentiary standards and burdens of proof has overlooked the
sophisticated discussions found in these texts regarding the processes by which judges
come to a ḥukm, or ruling. This study undertakes an analytic comparison of Twelver Shīʿī
adab al-qāḍī texts from the 11th to 14th centuries CE with a contemporaneous Shāfiʿite
commentary tradition on al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Umm, the earliest extant adab al-qāḍī text. While
Twelver and Shāfiʿite jurists shared many judicial concerns in adab al-qāḍī texts, their
respective theological commitments and understandings of valid sources of authority
accounted for some distinct approaches to questions of evidence, court procedure, and the
vi

judge’s legal reasoning, most salient of which was the Twelvers’ discussion of al-ḥukm bi
’l-ʿilm—the judge’s personal knowledge—and Shāfiʿite jurists’ emphasis on the tension
between the judge’s ijtihād and madhhab cohesion. By undertaking an analysis of both
Sunnī and Shīʿī jurisprudential texts in a discussion of adab al-qāḍī, this study argues
against a reliance on solely Sunnī texts in an academic analysis of an Islamic legal genre.
It also argues for the value of such integrative analysis in highlighting salient changes and
developments within the adab al-qāḍī texts of both the contemporary Shāfiʿite and
Twelver Shīʿī lineages, as well as the ways in which these jurists engaged with each
other’s legal discourse.
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INTRODUCTION

In most modern historical surveys of medieval Islamic law, Twelver
jurisprudence has been generally noted only where it intersected with what is assumed to
be mainstream or normative Islamic law, i.e. Sunnī fiqh. Many modern scholars of
medieval Islamic law have briefly noted and occasionally commented upon the distinct
phenomenon of major Twelver scholars crossing supposed sectarian lines to participate in
and contribute to Shāfiʿite1 learning circles. Such scholars—such as Christopher
Melchert, Knut Vikør, Aron Zysow, and David Vishanoff—often justify their brief
treatment of Twelver-Shāfiʿite legal interaction by stating that their research focus is the
historical legal development of the four Sunnī schools of law;2 to them, a non-Sunnī legal
tradition affiliated with a “minority” group must have had a proportionally negligible
influence on Islamic legal matters and thus has no real place in the greater story of the
history of Islamic law. This assertion, based on Schacht’s depiction of Twelver law as
breaking off at the Occultation to form its own independent legal system, mostly assumes
that, barring the formative period, these schools developed independently of each other in
terms of teaching and scholarly production. Although much work has been done on the
permeability of the boundaries of legal schools, it has focused more on the formative

1

I use the term “Shāfiʿite” rather than the more consistent “Shāfiʿī” appellation in order to maintain a clear
distinction between al-Shāfiʿī and the jurists that follow his eponymous legal school; the same style is used
for the terms for members of the other legal schools.
2
Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunnī Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries CE (New York:
Brill, 1997), 84; Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal
Theory (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013), 286; Knut Vikør, Between God and Sultan: A History of Islamic
Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), 127; David R. Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic
Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law (Ann Arbor: American Oriental
Society, 2010), xx.

1

period up to the second half of the 9th c. CE,3 and later in brief mentions of the various
legal schools, or madhhabs, under which major jurists may have studied before settling
on their own.
As Devin Stewart emphasizes in the single most sustained inquiry into Twelver
membership in the Shāfiʿite school, “Twelver Shiite jurists read Shāfiʿite legal texts,
trained under Shāfiʿite professors, and studied and taught in Shāfiʿite institutions.
Moreover, they did so as part of a long and self-conscious tradition.”4 In highlighting this
important connection, modern scholarship tends overlook the fluid aspects of the
relationships between the Twelvers and the other various circles of learning and schools
of law —attending sessions on “doctrinally marked” subjects such as ḥadīth, integrating
certain legal methods, citing Sunnī scholars—to focus on how these interactions became
contested by both Sunnī and Twelver jurists starting in the 13th c. CE. These include alḤasan ibn Abī Ṭālib al-Yūsufī al-Ābī’s break in the 14th century CE from the common
Twelver tradition of citing Sunnī sources in his fiqh work,5 the structural power
differential of subsequent Sunnī-Shīʿī relations in Iraq, Iran, and the Levant,6 a period that
included heresy trials against the Twelver jurist al-Ṭūfī (d. 716 H/1316 CE) and al-Shahīd
al-Awwal Muḥammad b. Makkī (d. 786 H/1384 CE) in Mamlūk Cairo and Damascus,
respectively. However, this contestation did not simply unfold in one direction, as alĀbī’s teacher ʿal-Allāma al-Ḥillī “worked within the Shāfiʿite current and was accepted

3

Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 155.
Devin J. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System
(University of Utah Press, 1998), 63.
5
In this context, I use the term “Sunnī” as shorthand for non-Shīʿī, non-Khārijī affiliations rather than a
consciously self-identifying group.
6
The usage of the terms “Iran” and “Iraq” are shorthand for the general areas that include the modern
boundaries of the nation-states that bear these names, but should not be understood as limited solely to
those boundaries.
4

2

by them as an open Shīʿī”7 in Ilkhānid Iran and Iraq. Not only should statements like this
one raise more questions about the nature of Shāfiʿite and Twelver attribution and
learning than they have to date, but the specific historical events that led to TwelverSunnī antagonism in the 14th century and after should not be assumed to hold for all times
and places, including the earlier periods.
At the same time, it should be noted that as tempting as it would be to utilize
chronicles, bio-bibliographies, and other historical literature to flesh out the context of the
period in which these jurists lived, such texts are themselves literary constructions that
would require careful literary analytic treatment before they could be utilized for
historical information. My general refraining from relying on such texts for detailed
background information is in no way meant to support the idea that Islamic
jurisprudence, and Islamic law by extension, is somehow atemporal or that it exists
untouched by specific historical circumstances, but rather is only meant to underscore
that the proper analysis of literature to be utilized as historical sources is beyond the
scope of this work.

Twelver Shīʿite Identity

Much recent work has been done on the importance of avoiding the retrojection of
sectarianism and unchanging communal boundaries into the pre-modern period.
Stephennie Mulder’s archaeological work on the shrines of the Levant between the 11th
and 13th centuries CE shows how strictly delineating Sunnī or Shīʿī characteristics to
7

Knut Vikør, 127.

3

these sites, their visitors, and their patrons are contradicted by their histories.8 Even
religious affiliation among rulers, such as the Būyids and Ilkhānids, does not subscribe to
modern scholarly assumptions of fixed religious identity.9 In respect to Shīʿī identity in
particular, Tehseen Thaver notes that “it is more productive to imagine Shiʿism as a
dynamic discursive site whose authenticity or identity is always available for contestation
and always unavailable for disciplinary canonization.”10 While this is an important and
fundamental methodological consideration in undertaking academic research on historical
religious communities, the jurists whose works I examine in this study are very clear in
their theological commitments and outline them in the works themselves, sometimes
explicitly and sometimes implicitly, through the methodological assumptions
underpinning their discourses on substantive law. This adherence does not undermine the
possibility that these scholars, who have multiple theological, communal, and socioeconomic identities beyond “jurist,” may have understood their Twelver and Shīʿī
identities in less strictly defined terms in other contexts. However, within the
jurisprudential format of the works I examine, these jurists expressed themselves in very

8

Stephennie Mulder, The Shrines of the ʿAlids in Medieval Syria: Sunnis, Shiʿis, and the Architecture of
Coexistence (Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 2–8.
9
It appears unclear whether the Būyids were Zaydī, Twelver, or even Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs, a question that itself
may be moot since “Twelver theology was only just beginning to be elaborated” (Cl. Cahen, “Buwayhids
or Būyids,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Ed. [Brill, 2012]). Furthermore, the Būyids pledged political, if
nominal, allegiance to the Sunnī ʿAbbasid caliphate by striking the names of the ʿAbbasid caliphs on their
coinage along with their own titles (Stephen Album, Michael L. Bates, and Willem Floor, “Coins and
Coinage,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica Online, 1992). Cahen accounts for this allegiance by stating that the
Twelver doctrine of the Occultation had spread among the Būyids by the time they reached power, which
made them more amenable to a worldly ruler as long as he “tolerated” Shīʿism. Cahen does not indicate the
sources for this assertion, although a variety of ideas regarding the nature of the Occultation were in
circulation. In addition, there are issues of uncertainty regarding the conversion narrative of Uljaytu (Judith
Pfeiffer, “Conversion Versions: Sultan Öljeytü’s Conversion to Shi’ism (709/1309) in Muslim Narrative
Sources,” Mongolian Studies 22 [1999]: 35–67).
10
Tehseen Thaver, “Ambiguity, Hermeneutics, and the Formation of Shiʿi Identity in al-Sharif al-Radi’s (d.
1015 CE) Qurʾan Commentary” (PhD Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013), 4.

4

unequivocal terms as jurists committed to the idea of a Twelfth Imam as the final
legitimate successor to the Prophet Muḥammad, who remained the sole source of true
political and religious authority.
Although the idea of the total absence of the Twelfth Imam, known as the Greater
Occultation (al-ghayba al-kubra), was eventually established as having occurred in 329
H/941 CE, the acceptance of this theological concept took several generations to become
an accepted fact among the Imamis themselves.11 In an authoritative text establishing the
“semi-permanent status” for the Occultation, the major jurist al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī “cited
traditions in which the Imams branded as liars those who had set a time for the Imam’s
return,” indicating that “in al-Tusi’s own time some were expecting the Imam’s imminent
reappearance.”12 This notion was present in the adab al-qāḍī texts of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī
himself, as well as those who had studied under him or his students. I should note that
Twelver jurists throughout the periods under study do not refer to themselves as
“Twelver,” but rather as “Imamis” or other stand-in terms, such as “the People of Truth
(ahl al-ḥaqq).”13 However, I utilize the “Twelver” designation in order to distinguish
these jurists from other Shīʿīs with an imamate theological system, such as the Zaydīs
and the Ismāʿīlīs.
Furthermore, in order for any analysis of Twelver-Sunnī relations to be insightful,
the term “Sunnī,” as well as the groups that make up the term—Ḥanafite, Ḥanbalite,

11

The nature of the Occultation remained unresolved among the writings of the major Imami jurists until
al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s Kitāb al-Ghayba, which was written around 1055 CE, “the year the Saljuks took
Baghdad and twelve years before his own death” (Andrew Newman, Twelver Shi’ism: Unity and Diversity
in the Life of Islam, 632 to 1722 [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013], 92).
12
Newman, Twelver Shi’ism: Unity and Diversity, 93.
13
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Al-Nihāya, ed. al-Shaykh Aghabozorg al-Tehrani (Beirut:
Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1390), 302.

5

Shāfiʿite, Mālikite, and Thawrite, Ẓāhirite, and Jarīrite where relevant—must be broken
down into their component parts in order to avoid retrojecting a cohesive and overarching
identity that may not have been consistently shared. Although my study focuses solely on
the interactions between Twelvers and Shāfiʿites, it is an important methodology to
always take the internal distinctions of Muslim groups into account when analyzing their
interactions with each other. While comparing Twelver legal discourse with groups other
than the Shāfiʿites is beyond the scope of this study, it is my hope that this approach will
move beyond the overly generalized Sunnī versus Shīʿī dynamic to analyze interactions
at the individual level; this approach would clarify the various forms in which
competition and debate among Twelver jurists themselves manifested and why some took
positions closer to the Shāfiʿites while others resisted. Additionally, instead of assuming
that any Twelver reference to a non-Twelver group is to Sunnīs, I will retain the term
“non-Twelver” to account for the wider range of interaction Twelver jurists had with the
scholarly communities around them.

Adab al-qāḍī

In attempting to discern the elements of legal borrowing and exchange between
Twelver and Shāfiʿite jurists, I chose to examine a legal genre known in modern
academic literature as “adab al-qāḍī,” or “The Judge’s Protocol.” Adab al-qāḍī literature,
which occurs solely as works of substantive law (furūʿ), is characterized by the juristic
concern with the judge’s role and responsibilities in legal procedures of a case. However,
due to its furūʿ form, modern scholarship has utilized this legal literature merely as
6

reference works to be mined for discrete types of historical information about the
judiciary, rather than as an autonomous, comprehensive genre. In contrast to that
approach, this study is an intellectual history of a genre of substantive law rather than a
reconstruction of the ways in which courts and judges have historically functioned.
Adab al-qāḍī texts were written by jurists, some of whom had also held positions
as judges, to demonstrate their commitment to the rule of law, that is, the subordination
of the exercise of power to a well-defined legal system. “Qaḍāʾ,” a term not always clear
in its parameters, can mean adjudication, a more generalized notion of the administration
of justice, or even be shorthand for the judiciary—that is, it can be what the judge does as
well as the position of judgeship that he takes up. It is true that what binds all discussions
of qaḍāʾ, or, alternatively, “al-qaḍāyā wa ‘l-aḥkām (judgments and legal rulings)”—in
fact, what makes them identifiable as such, apart from their titles—is their concern with
procedural elements of adjudication, what Wael Hallaq says “from a modern perspective,
may be characterized as belonging to the law of procedure.”14 Hallaq further separates the
“law of procedure” into “three chapters, or ‘books,’” that make up “almost every work of
fiqh:” the “qāḍī and his adab, namely, the conditions and terms of his appointment,
conduct and work while in tenure,” a second chapter that “traditionally deals with the
obligations and rights of plaintiffs and defendants, and how a suit (daʿwā) must open,
proceed, and end,” and the third, which “addresses evidence, especially oral testimony
(shahādāt), but it also deals with written instruments, oaths, confessions, and related
matters.”15 This characterization does not account for the wide-ranging content of adab

14
15

Wael B. Hallaq, Sharī’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 342.
Hallaq, Sharī’a , 342.

7

al-qāḍī literature and its variety of stylistic formats, much of which does not adhere to
this neat tripartite order. However, my study confirms that adab al-qāḍī literature is
identifiable in its most basic form as a distinct legal genre by its inclusion of three types
of content: the qualifications of a judge, a list of appropriate judicial protocols before and
during a hearing (i.e. the “adab al-qāḍī” sub-section), and the discussions of procedures
for weighing evidence. In this way, I use the term “genre” as shorthand for identifying
this group of texts that, while containing important variations, nonetheless can be
grouped under the name adab al-qāḍī due to these thematic and structural features. The
adab al-qāḍī genre, when expressed as a chapter in a work of positive law, is furthermore
distinct from other furūʿ chapters as a result of its reflexive, “meta” nature: due to the
need for the judge to have knowledge of and enact the furūʿ through his position, the
adab al-qāḍī text became a space where jurists had to reflect on the legal system as a
whole rather than limit themselves to the substantive laws relevant to the various aspects
of judgeship.
This study undertakes an analytic comparison of Twelver Shīʿī adab al-qadī
chapters with a contemporaneous Shāfiʿite commentary tradition on al-Shāfiʿī’s alUmm,16 the earliest extant text to adhere to the expectations of the adab al-qāḍī genre. By
undertaking an analysis of both Sunnī and Shīʿī jurisprudential texts in my discussion of
adab al-qāḍī, I argue against a reliance on solely Sunnī texts in an academic analysis of
an Islamic legal genre. I also argue for the value of such integrative analysis in
highlighting salient changes and developments within the adab al-qāḍī texts of both the
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contemporary Shāfiʿite and Twelver Shīʿī lineages, as well as the ways in which these
jurists engaged with each other’s legal discourse.
It is the with the Twelver jurists of the 11th century CE that the Twelver adab alqāḍī genre is first produced. The Twelver texts I selected for this analysis center on what
jurists of later generations refer to as the early Baghdad17 school of Twelver
jurisprudence, which comprises most of the extant Twelver primary source texts of the
Būyid and Saljūq periods.18 The jurists associated with this school are al-Shaykh alMufīd (d. 413 H/1022 CE), al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460 H/1067 CE), and al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā (d. 436 H/1044 CE). Modern scholarship still privileges these “schools” and
their lineages in terms of study and publication of texts, and the jurists of the Baghdad
school, along with the later “school of Ḥilla,” dominate scholarship even with the
availability of other published texts from Twelver jurists of the early periods. This
study’s inclusion of a major Twelver jurist based in Aleppo, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī (d.
447 H/1055 CE), allows us to see the developments of the Twelver juristic networks
beyond Baghdad and how they impacted the subsequent generations of Twelver jurists.
This study then analyzes the adab al-qāḍī texts of the subsequent generation of
major Twelver jurists—Ibn Ḥamza al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Zuhra al-Ḥalabī, and Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī.
These 12th-century jurists were deeply impacted by the works of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and
Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī in their own adab al-qāḍī texts, responding in different ways. Ibn
Idrīs, a major critic of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, would go on to become a pivotal figure in
shaping the Twelver juristic tradition for the next generation of Twelver scholars, al-
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Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 676 H/1277 CE) and al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726 H/1325 CE), who
would be later known as the founding figures of “the school of Ḥilla.”
In acknowledgment of the fact that, throughout these periods, these Twelver
jurists developed their scholarly legal thought in multi-confessional environments, while
taking into account the established pattern of Twelver engagement with Shāfiʿite jurists, I
have chosen a Shāfiʿite commentary tradition in which to trace the parallel development
of adab al-qāḍī literature in non-Twelver jurisprudence. The choice of a commentary
tradition, rather than a “representative” selection of Shāfiʿite texts, allows me to
consistently follow how Shāfiʿite jurists approached their shared source-texts to develop
various aspects of their adab al-qāḍī texts. This study thus analyzes the furūʿ
commentary tradition on the Kitāb al-Umm of al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204 H/820 CE) that is
produced by al-Muzanī (d. 264 H/877 CE), al-Juwaynī (478 H/1085 CE), al-Ghazālī (d.
505 H/1111 CE), al-Rāfiʿī (d. 623 H/1226 CE), and al-Nawawī (d. 676 H/1277 CE). I
chose the particular commentary tradition as determined by al-Rāfiʿī’s al-ʿAzīz to
examine the claim that al-Muḥaqqiq’a legal compendium Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām “may be
based” on al-ʿAzīz;”19 my study, however, will show that the different genres of the two
works make such intertextual claims more complicated than that of mere comparison.
Furthermore, the Baghdadi-Khorasani Shāfiʿite lineage, as shaped by al-Rāfiʿī, would
have been well-known to the Twelver jurists of Iran, Iraq, and the Levant.20 The merit of
choosing this commentary tradition is also served by the fact that the adab al-qāḍī
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chapter of Kitāb al-Umm is the earliest extant work of adab al-qāḍī. While other Shāfiʿite
lineages may be equally fruitful as a mode of comparison, the depth of this study renders
it necessary to limit the number of lineages to one.
In tracing the development of the adab al-qāḍī genre from the 11th century to the
early 14th century CE, I also include an analysis of two works relating to judgeship and
political rulership: a treatise by al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā titled “On Working For the
Government (Fī ’l-ʿamal maʿa ’l-sulṭān),” and the chapter on judges from al-Aḥkām alsulṭāniyya of the Shāfiʿite jurist al-Māwardī (d. 450 H/1058 CE). While neither work
subscribes to the adab al-qāḍī genre, I have included them in my analysis because of the
formative impact of these works on Muslim jurists and their thinking on the nature of
judgeship as an officially appointed position. Concerns regarding the potential
illegitimacy of a political ruler would be siphoned through subsequent Twelver and
Shāfiʿite adab al-qāḍī texts in terms overlapping with al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s and alMāwardī’s texts, albeit to different degrees.
This study will thus contribute to the study of medieval Islamic law at several
important intersections. First, it analyzes the adab al-qāḍī texts, specifically those that are
chapters in furūʿ works, as a comprehensive legal genre; until now, modern scholarship
has either utilized these sections as reference works to be mined for discrete types of
information about court procedure or generalized about the genre based on a few works.21
This will be the first time adab al-qāḍī chapters will be consistently traced through works
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in two closely-related scholarly lineages for two ends: a) to redefine scholarly
assumptions about what constitutes adab al-qāḍī as a genre, and b) to analyze the judicial
concerns of these chapters and how they developed over time. Second, the selection of
sources forces the questioning of the equation of “Islamic law” with “Sunnī
jurisprudence” by integrating and highlighting Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudential
developments as crucial components of any discussion regarding an Islamic legal genre.
Third, this study focuses on texts produced in historical periods that are not typically a
focus in modern scholarship on Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence, which tends to concentrate
on the Safavid period (16th century CE) and later. This focus on the pre-Safavid period,
where long-term support by the ruling administrations was constantly shifting for
Twelver jurists, will clarify the ways that Twelver jurists wrote about the judgeship in
these circumstances.

Literature Review

Due to a predominant focus on the reconstructing of histories of judges and
courts, modern scholarship has utilized a variety of historical sources, often in
combination, to create a historical narrative regarding the Islamic judiciary. In the
process, adab al-qāḍī texts are not distinguished from historical chronicles, biographical
dictionaries, belles-lettres, fatwā collections, or other kinds of literature whose content
and presentation is determined by their genre expectations. Modern scholars particularly
rely upon this method for periods and regions for which primary documents for judicial
and court activity are minimal or unavailable; this is generally the rule for the periods
12

prior to Ottoman rule, which “kept systematic records (defters) of court activity in
regions that are today Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Greece, and Bulgaria.”22
In terms of information on the history of the Islamic judiciary from other regions,
scholars have utilized biographical dictionaries in this vein. Chibli Mallat notes that the
“earliest sample” of a body of specialized literature on the judge is the Akhbār al-quḍāt
of Muḥammad ibn Khalaf ibn Ḥayyān al-Wakīʿ (d. 330 H/941 CE), in which al-Wakīʿ,
“as narrator/compiler, juxtaposes segments of narratives associated with famous judges
from the Prophet in Mecca to remote district judges in Ahwaz (Western Iran), Palestine,
Andalus, the Iraqi city of Musil, closing the lists with judges from areas in the vicinity of
Baghdad.”23 However, Mallat acknowledges that al-Wakīʿ’s compilation of reports about
judges is heavily structured by tropes and anecdotes “adduced for their literary quality
and their illustration of some hadith,” and not any more historically accurate than stories
about judges found in other literary works.24 As a counterpoint, Mallat suggests “later
books of qadi literature” as richer sources of information, particularly those in the adab
al-qāḍī genre. Using the Shāfīʿite Ibn Abī al-Dām’s work Adab al-qaḍāʾ as his example,
Mallat asserts that such “manuals” are “important for the wealth of material it offers to
the practitioner both in terms of procedure and in terms of substance.”25 However, the
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adab al-qāḍī literature, as this study will demonstrate, is not a primary source for the
history of the judiciary, and also consists of works much more complex than manuals.
Other historians of the judiciary have utilized portions of adab al-qāḍī works
alongside other sources. Émile Tyan, in his seminal Histoires de l’organisation judiciaire
en pays d’Islam, relies on texts, such as medieval encyclopedias, histories, adab al-qāḍī
manuals, and literary works, particularly those that were written generations or centuries
after the events they purport to describe, to recreate the image of how the Islamic
judiciary functioned.26 Joseph Escovitz undertakes a similar methodology in The Office of
Qāḍī al-quḍāt in Cairo under the Baḥrī Mamlūks, and the more recent works by Matthieu
Tillier, including Les cadis d’Iraq et l’état abbaside, 132/750-334/945, also draw from a
variety of sources to create a composite picture of the history of the early ʿAbbāsid
judiciary. The contributors to the edited volume Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic
Courts utilize a variety of legal sources to address specific legal points, among them
testimony, circumstantial evidence, and judicial consultation (mushāwara),27 while Karen
Bauer, in her article “Debates on Women’s Status as Judges and Witnesses in PostFormative Islamic Law,” also draws from various sources, including ḥadīth collections,
in her analysis of the permissibility of women taking up the judgeship. However, none of
these works address a text of adab al-qāḍī as a comprehensive work on its own, let alone
adab al-qāḍī as a genre.
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Wael Hallaq’s description of the basic content of fiqh texts on judgeship in
Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformation, overlaps with the minimal characteristics I
put forth for defining the adab al-qāḍī genre as a result of this study. However, like the
previous authors, he bases his descriptions of the judgeship in his chapter “Courts of
justice, suits and evidence” on a synthesis of a selection of texts belonging to a variety of
legal genres, legal schools, and eras; he includes al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s Khilāf text as the
sole Twelver reference. As a result, his characterizations are applicable in the general
sense but contestable in their details; this is also true of his article, “The Qāḍī’s Diwān
(Sijjil) Before the Ottomans.” Furthermore, when utilizing them as historical sources,
Hallaq does not treat the adab al-qāḍī texts as a cohesive genre, viewing them as
indistinct from the wider world of jurisprudential writings on judgeship.28
As noted by the editors of Dispensing Justice in Islam, “to date, the only
comprehensive study of this genre is that of [Irene] Schneider” in Das Bild des Richters
in der “Adab al-qāḍī” Literatur; previous scholars who had written on adab al-qāḍī
literature, such as A.A. Fyzee, Tanzil Ur-Rahman, and Farhat Ziadeh, had focused on
single texts, or themes in a few texts, from a variety of legal schools and eras, from which
they drew broad conclusions regarding the genre.29 The reliance on a single text for
characterization of the genre also applies to the discussion on adab al-qāḍī in Dispensing
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Justice in Islam, which relies heavily on the 9th century Ḥanafite al-Khaṣṣāf’s work, Adab
al-qāḍī.30
Schneider focuses on works from the Shāfiʿite and Ḥanafite legal schools
spanning the 9th to 13th centuries CE. The Shāfiʿite works are the Kitāb al-Umm of alShāfiʿī, the Mukhtaṣar of al-Muzanī, the Adab al-qāḍī of al-Māwardī, and the Adab alqaḍāʾ of Ibn Abī al-Dam (d. 642 H/1244 CE). The Ḥanafite texts are the Adab al-qāḍī of
al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 261 H/874 CE) as preserved in the commentary of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370 H/981
CE),31 as well as the commentary of Ibn Māza (d. 536 H/1141 CE), and the Rawḍāt alquḍāt of al-Simnānī (d. 499 H/1100 CE). She compares various passages across these
texts, organized around rules of judicial protocols, to follow changes over time.
Schneider observes that, by the time of al-Māwardī’s Adab al-qāḍī, the rules regarding
protocol had shifted from relatively few Qurʾānic or sunnaic justifications to support
from a wider pool of traditions as well as statements from al-Shāfiʿi, the eponymous
founder of the legal school, although she acknowledges that such argumentation was less
pronounced in Ibn Abī al-Dam’s text.32 She thus concludes that such a development
demonstrates that judgeship had originated in the practice of law; as such, it did not need
to be justified in the early works of adab al-qāḍī. Later, adab al-qāḍī became fully
integrated into the “religious dimension (religiöse Dimension)” of jurisprudence through
its categorization into al-aḥkām al-khamsa, meaning that various aspects of the judge’s
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conduct and protocol would be determined to be obligatory, recommended, indifferent,
reprehensible, or forbidden.33Although Schneider characterizes adab al-qāḍī as an
idealized depiction of both the judge’s conduct as well as the judge himself, she states
that at points the literature integrates real-life concerns through case law. She also notes
parallels to references in the adab al-qāḍī literature in various kinds of historical
literature, including judicial appointment certificates from the first four centuries of the
Islamic period. However, she does acknowledge that these documents were cited in
historical texts from much later periods, such as the Subḥ al-aʿshā of al-Qalqashāndī (d.
821 H/1418 CE), and that these works preserve such documents for their stylistic rather
than historical value.34 Schneider also utilizes historical chronicles and biographical
dictionaries for historical context, such as the Tarīkh of al-Yaʿqūbī (d. after 292/905 CE),
Akhbār al-quḍāt of al-Wakīʿ (d. 330 H/918 CE), Kitāb al-wulāt wa kitāb al-quḍāt of alKindī (d. 350 H/961 CE), Tartīb al-madārik of al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544 H/1149 CE), Rafʿ
al-ʿiṣr of Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852 H/1449 CE), and Quḍāt Dimashq of Ibn Ṭūlūn (d. 953
H/1546 CE), among others. However, it should be noted that Schneider only deals with
the judge’s qualifications and the specific sub-section of these works, also confusingly
called “adab al-qāḍī,” and not the entire content of the texts themselves. In this respect,
my study is the first to analyze multiple adab al-qāḍī texts in their entirety.
According to Farhat Ziadeh, editor of the Cairo edition of the Adab al-qāḍī text of
al-Khaṣṣāf, the Ḥanafite Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 H/798 CE) was the first to write an adab al-

33

Schneider, Das Bild des Richters in der “Adab ql-qāḍī” Literatur , 147; Irene Schneider, “Fiqh,” in
Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics, ed. Emad El-Din Shahin (Oxford University Press, 2014).
34
Schneider, Das Bild des Richters in der “Adab al-qāḍī” Literatur, 174.

17

qāḍī treatise, although it no longer exists. 35 Schneider regards the adab al-qāḍī text in alShāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-Umm to be the oldest;36 it is certainly the earliest extant text. The
editors of Dispensing Justice in Islam utilize al-Khaṣṣāf’s Kitāb adab al-qāḍī list the
following topics as reflective of the adab al-qāḍī genre. Even though the list is based on a
single work, it is more comprehensive than that of Schneider, and generally overlaps with
the topics from the texts in this study:
…the procedure to be followed when a qāḍī assumes office; how a court
session (majlis) should be conducted; the composition of the court, its
personnel and the place in which it should be held; procedures for
receiving complaints and for conducting a judicial hearing; evidence,
proof, judgement, oath, guarantee and court records; correspondence
between qāḍīs; the transfer of records from an outgoing qāḍī to his
successor; successor review; the legal status of a judgment issued by a
qāḍī who has been dismissed; qāḍī error; legal representation or agency;
and, finally, cases relating to specific legal topics such as preemption,
arbitration, acknowledgment, marriage, divorce, paternity and the
ownership of property.37
In addition, all the texts from this study adhere to the following juristic procedures
of how claims are heard and adjudicated: judges preside over cases brought to the court’s
attention by a plaintiff (muddaʿī) in which the rights of two (or more) claimants are at
odds with each other and need to be resolved through the weighing of evidence according
to the proper procedures of the court of law (majlis al-ḥukm or majlis al-qaḍāʾ). In these
texts, the judge (qāḍī, also, ḥākim) is the finder of fact (along with other court personnel,
such as witnesses) as well as the finder of law, requesting evidence, hearing and directing
witnesses and claimants, and directing them to take the appropriate oaths at the
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appropriate points during the case and in the requisite circumstances, to finally arrive at a
legal ruling—the ḥukm. From here, we can outline the nature of adab al-qāḍī literature as
a genre.

Adab al-qāḍī as a Genre

Adab al-qāḍī Adab al-qaḍī chapters, so-called, are divided into discussions of
adjudication (qaḍāʾ), and the concomitant protocols (ādāb) that apply to a judge (qāḍī, or
ḥākim; the terms are used interchangeably throughout all the texts). Despite the fact that
the styles, organization of the discussions, and categories of subjects differ widely, every
text begins with the justification of the concept of adjudication and its delegation through
the specified position of the judgeship. Although the judgeship—in which a person is
designated to an office whose responsibilities consist of adjudicating cases and giving
binding rulings—is usually noted as discharging a collective duty (farḍ kifāya), the prooftexts or modes of reasoning that jurists employed to justify the institution are remarkably
varied. It is thus evident, as Schneider had noted, that the discrete rules (furūʿ)
establishing the norms of judgeship preceded their uṣūl al-fiqh justifications, following
the general furūʿ trend that Norman Calder had pinpointed: “in broad terms, and to a
considerable extent in details, the norms of the law were known prior to and independent
of the tradition of uṣūl.”38
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The modern scholarly term “adab al-qāḍī” is a synecdoche for the legal genre
itself, which has a range of names within the texts. The “adab al-qāḍī” sub-section within
so-called adab al-qāḍī works is often set apart from other parts of the text with some
variation of the title “adab,” and usually consists of a list of recommended judicial
behaviors prior to and during a hearing that have no direct bearing on evidence during a
trial or rulings, and often rarely accompanyied by any explanation or legal justification.
These protocols include where to hold court, the appropriate mental state of the judge, the
manner in which to elicit a claim from one of the litigants, the appointment and
arrangement of court personnel, and the prohibition of directly engaging in business
transactions during one’s tenure. The texts vary in including the exhortation to dress in
dignified clothes, attend weddings and funerals, visit the sick, prioritize the claims of
travelers, and manage disruptions or non-compliance in the court. As such, these limited
“adab al-qāḍī” sub-sections clearly overlap with the literary tradition of adab for certain
position-holders of status or administrative importance, which include notable examples
such as the protocols of scribes (adab al-kātib), the protocols of viziers (adab alwuzarāʾ), and the protocol of rulers (adab al-mulūk), better known in English as “the
mirror for princes” genre. These adab works appear in the form of prose belles lettres
(adab), but “due to the nature of the subject matter, it is common to find elements of the
genre in legal and philosophical works as well as in administrative manuals.”39 Thus, the
“adab al-qāḍī” sub-sections, which stipulate what the judge “should” do, or what he is
“recommended” to do, overlap with the “advice” literature aspect of this type of adab
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genre. However, the general adab genre, as exemplified by Norman Calder’s analysis of
al-Jāḥiẓ’s al-Bayān wa ‘l-tabyīn, conforms “to the pattern of educational miscellany. It
gathers under broad thematic headings discrete segments of material (poetry, tale,
anecdote, apothegm, joke) and by contrived juxtaposition (the long and the short, gross
and refined, general and particular, etc.) aims to edify, instruct, and delight.”40 In this
respect, the adab al-qāḍī legal genre diverges entirely from the adab belles-lettres genre,
since adab al-qāḍī is defined as a cohesive legal literature by its furūʿ format. This format
focuses on legal concepts relating to the judgeship and its discrete rules and protocols,
rather than any narrative context from which such rules and protocols may have been
derived; such narratives and anecdotes are features in other works, such as al-Wakīʿ’s
biographical dictionary on judges, Akhbār al-quḍāt. However, both the “mirror for
princes” and adab al-qāḍī genres aim to contain and express all relevant developments
regarding their content within a “convenient context,” although adab al-qāḍī texts, as
products of highly specialized terminology and argumentation, are not always defined by
easy access to their content.41 They both do, however, acknowledge the importance of
subsuming norms and protocols to Prophetic and Qurʾānic authority42 (as well as that of
the Imams), albeit to varying degrees.

Furūʿ al-fiqh
It is important to clarify that whenever I refer to the term “law” I am referring to a
subset of jurisprudence, or fiqh, that is, the textual tradition that falls under the
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overarching category of Islamic law. It is roughly divided by both modern academic
scholarship and medieval jurists into two categories: uṣūl al-fiqh, or legal theory, and
furūʿ al-fiqh, that is, substantive law or the legal rules that are derived by applying the
uṣūl al-fiqh. The topics found within furūʿ works are fairly standard and include the
typical ones on devotional aspects of religious life (prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, holy war,
enjoining good and forbidding wrong) as well as matters relating to contracts (deposits,
endowments, marriage and divorce, debt, oaths and vows). They also include issues
relating to property and ownership, adjudication, inheritance, and penal law.
However, as Ahmad Atif Ahmad notes, “fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh are not the only
identifiable genres of juristic Islamic writing; works on legal maxims (qawāʿid fiqhiyya),
juristic disagreement, and comparative law (ikhtilāf al-fuqahāʾ) may also be seen as
constituting juristic genres;” as such, there must be openness to “the idea of the
transgeneric, those works that defy simple classification.”43 I thus argue that the adab alqāḍī genre, although appearing as a standard topic of furūʿ works, is located at several
intersections of genres, including furūʿ and adab writings, to function as a “transgeneric”
form. As chapters in furūʿ works, parameters of adab al-qāḍī works can often be unclear,
since some of the matters relevant to adjudication, such as testimony, have their own
standard chapters in furūʿ works, and other subjects, such as the allocation of inherited
estates (qisma), can either have their own separate chapters or be subsumed entirely in
the adab al-qāḍī chapter. As such, there is often overlap in the adab al-qāḍī chapters with
other chapters of a furūʿ work. Sometimes it is not even clear at what point an adab al-
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qāḍī chapter ends, even if chapter markers are present, since subsequent chapters can still
be deemed relevant or discussions regarding the judge can continue uninterrupted into
other chapters.
The typical characterization of substantive law in its “simplest, most common
form,” is as “practical legal decisions describing actions as ‘prohibited,’ ‘reprehensible,’
‘permissible (neutral),’ ‘recommended’ or ‘obligatory.’”44 However, while the content of
furūʿ works do not solely exist as derivatives of uṣūl al-fiqh, neither do such works exist
hermetically sealed from the theoretical concerns of uṣūl al-fiqh. Instead, “the uṣūl and
the furūʿ maintain a complex relationship whereby jurists move from the realm of
theoretical reasoning to the realm of practice in order to solve real-life questions and
satisfy their concern for consistency.”45 As such, a comprehensive analysis of individual
adab al-qāḍī works demonstrates how theoretical concerns are often present, either in
brief references or extensive treatments, within these works. As Sherman Jackson
formulates it, “uṣūl al-fiqh operates as a means of imposing constraints on the creation of
meaning rather than as a mechanism for actually discovering it; ”46 as such, uṣūl and
furūʿ should not be primarily understood as opposite ends of a spectrum of legal thought
but as complementary juristic modes of approaching legal issues. The expression of adab
al-qāḍī through works of substantive law thus did not preclude theoretical discussions
regarding the judgeship in these texts, a feature that has been mostly overlooked when
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they are approached as historical sources.47 However, the extent of the presence of uṣūl
al-fiqh concerns in adab al-qāḍī texts is further determined by the intended goal of the
furūʿ work itself as a whole, which brings us to another generic intersection: legal
compendia.

Islamic Legal Compendia

Arabic-language literary compendia have long existed for “many areas of cultural
activity: belles lettres, religious sciences, history, philosophy (with the sciences), and
theology (kalām);” however, the process of creating compendia becomes systematized
with legal writing because of the role of these texts in legal study and training.48 A. Arazi
and H. Ben-Shammay, acknowledging that there is no single Arabic term for compendia,
generically refer to Arabic compendia as mukhtaṣars in their entry in the second edition
of the Encyclopaedia of Islam. They define legal compendia and their “approximately
equivalent” terms—talkhīs, muhadhdhab, wajīz, muqtaṣar, etc.—as referring to “a
handbook or an abridged manual, usually condensed from a longer work;”49 however,
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they do acknowledge that these terms are not clearly defined and that their features often
bleed into each other.
The production of compendia of furūʿ first became widespread in the 10th c. CE
and were utilized by both Shīʿī and Sunnī jurists in urban centers in Iran, Iraq, and the
Levant to establish and reinforce legal transmission and authority. Arazi and Ben
Shammay note that, in the 10th and 11th centuries CE, the use of abridgments became so
widespread that there would also appear threefold editions of them: the mabsūṭ (an
extended version), the wasīṭ (an intermediate version), and the wajīz (a single epitome);
these terms did not simply allude to the length of the texts but rather the depth with which
their authors would deal with topics. However, assuming that legal compendia were
mainly abridgements is misleading; not only could an author “bring together within a
single work several books on one and the same subject,” 50 he could include his own
commentary or integrate his own works as part of the process, or, alternatively, create an
entirely new, concise text. As Norman Calder notes, legal compendia are products of
individual jurists, who, by creating such works, attempt to impose an order on the
diversity of their legal tradition.51 As a result, the author’s imprint in these compendia go
well beyond their characterizations as “handbooks” or “abridgments,” as this study will
demonstrate.
Since legal compendia exist for both uṣūl and furūʿ works, my focus on adab alqāḍī works leads me to analyze compendia of furūʿ al-fiqh, although I will also
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occasionally refer to various forms of uṣūl al-fiqh texts for context. Compendia of furūʿ
not only function as tools for teaching and study but also for defining, as well as refining,
the legal tradition in which the jurist was immersed. Such literary intentions are reflected
“in the characteristic patterns of citation, which invariably recall the opinions and
judgments of earlier masters within the school, and the literary forms of such works
(epitome, commentary, supercommentary), all marks of hermeneutical commitment to a
particular school.”52 However, jurists were able to shape their juristic traditions in a
variety of ways that did not solely depend on including such patterns of citation, as will
be demonstrated in this study.

The Judgeship and Adjudication (qaḍāʾ)

The defining feature of adab al-qāḍī literature is the centrality of the judge and
his responsibilities. The judge may be referred to as the “qāḍī” or “ḥākim,” terms which
are applied interchangeably with no distinction in meaning, although some Twelver
jurists prefer to use the term ḥākim. While the judge is not explicitly defined in the texts
in this study, he is understood to be an official who adjudicates cases in a court of law.
The court of law (majlis al-ḥukm or majlis al-qaḍāʾ) is not a building dedicated to the
judicial administration of cases, but any appropriate location where the judge decides to
receive plaintiffs and defendants and appoints court personnel. In the texts surveyed in
this study, the jurists split along communitarian lines on the question of whether the
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mosque is an appropriate site for court: Shāfiʿite jurists state the mosque as the least
desirable place to hold a court of law, whereas Twelver Shīʿī authors overwhelmingly
prefer the mosque.
The term qaḍāʾ, when used to mean the judgeship, is associated with farḍ kifāya,
or the “collective duty,” whose performance by a few members of the community
removes the obligation of its performance from the rest. Because furūʿ works mention
collective duty “as part of broader topics like the nature of commands (amr), the typology
of knowledge (ʿilm), and the meaning of obligation (wājib),”53 its discussion within an
adab al-qāḍī texts ties judgeship to the issue of al-amr bi ‘l-maʿrūf wa ‘l-nahy ʿan almunkar, “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” This principle imposes upon the
individual believer “not only the right, but also the duty, to issue orders pursuant to God’s
law, and to do what he can to see that they are obeyed.”54
The other meaning of qaḍāʾ as a judgment, however, overlaps with the usage of
the term ḥukm for “legal ruling.” However, much like qaḍāʾ, the definition of ḥukm is
determined primarily by its context. As Joseph Schacht has noted, “in a broader sense,
aḥkām means the sum of the rules pertaining to any given subject (cf. the titles of books
such as aḥkām al-awḳāf , “On Waḳf,” al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya “On Government,” also
aḥkām al-āk̲ h̲ ira “On the Next World;” aḥkām al-nud̲ j̲ ūm “astrology,” etc.).”55 Thus, alMāwardī can use aḥkām in al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya to refer to the rules of law in the sense
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of governance, and use the same word in the text’s chapter on judges to specifically refer
to its meaning in a legal context. However, even when relating to the judge and his
activities, the meaning of ḥukm can range from “legal ruling,” to the judge’s “application
of legal rules to concrete cases” to arrive at a legal ruling, or, alternatively, the discrete
rules (furūʿ) that result.56

The Judge and the Muftī

The centrality of a judge finding and applying a legal rule to a case also overlaps
with the duties of the muftī, i.e. the jurisconsult, although the two positions were clearly
delineated as two distinct positions. The most significant of these distinctions were that
the judge presided over two-party cases, and the ruling he gave in these cases was both
binding and enforceable, whereas “the mufti’s consideration of the issue at hand was
limited to the terms in which the question was posed” 57 and his fatwā, or legal opinion,
was morally binding but non-enforceable. Furthermore, “the thrust of a qadi’s
interpretive activity was to evaluate the contested facts of a case,” whereas the mufti’s
task was “to find the applicable law on the basis of a fact scenario taken as given.”58 The
judge may request a response from a muftī to clarify a point of law in a case; however,
the judge remains the ultimate arbiter of the case brought before him. If the judge also
happened to be qualified as a muftī, then he had to give rulings in his official capacity as
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a judge—meaning in a place designated as a court of law, and during the periods that the
people know he is holding court— and not in his capacity as a muftī.

Evidence

One of the fundamental components of the adab al-qāḍī genre is the judge’s
consideration of the evidence in order to issue a legal ruling. Such evidence is referred to
as bayyina, “the evidence that renders things clear,”59 and is consistently prioritized as
the oral evidence of testimony (shahāda), oaths (yamīn), and admission (iqrār). These
sections relate to the judge as he evaluates evidence and the means by which the jurists
set the rules for the determination of legal facts, a process that is mainly channeled
through but not limited to “oral testimony predicated on eye-witnessing (shahāda),”60 the
swearing of the oath (yamīn), and admission (iqrār). These are the three main kinds of
evidence.61
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While the texts consistently underscore the necessity of the judge’s reference to
prima facie evidence (ẓāhir) as a first resort, the judge’s responsibility is to know which
evidence is appropriate for supporting the claims being made before him. Furthermore, he
must know which combinations of evidence are required from the plaintiff and the
defendant if each continues to produce evidence in favor of their respective claims. The
judge, however, may also bring other kinds of evidence into consideration, the most
prominent of which is the judge’s “personal knowledge” (referred to as al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm
in Twelver texts, or ʿilm al-qāḍī/al-qaḍāʾ bi ‘l-ʿilm in the Shāfiʿite texts). Personal
knowledge is defined as the judge’s knowledge regarding the points of a case via means
other than through bayyina evidence; it is a form of evidence that only the presiding
judge can provide and that does not need to be vetted or generally corroborated. Despite
its inclusion as a fundamental form of evidence in both the Twelver and Shāfiʿite texts in
this study, the judge’s personal knowledge has only been cursorily acknowledged in
modern scholarship.
The Shāfiʿite jurists understood “personal knowledge” much in the same way as it
was described by Brinkley Messick in his ethnographic study of Yemen: “A judge's
personal knowledge of particular people and their affairs constituted an important and
recognized basis for judicial action. Specifically, according to both Shafi'i and Zaidi
manuals, except in hudud cases, where evidence must be presented, a judge can give
judgment based on his own knowledge ('ilm) of events.”62 Within the context of Twelver
Shīʿism, however, the judge’s personal knowledge spanned a wider range of cases than in
these Shāfiʿite and Zaydī texts due to the question of delegation of authority from the
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Hidden Imam to the Twelver jurists. In the absence of the last Imam, who was expected
to return one day as a messianic figure, Twelver Shīʿī jurists had to wrestle with the
question of whether anyone could ever legitimately wield religious, political, and legal
authority in the Muslim community in his absence. However, the Twelver texts of this
period, in discussing the judge’s personal knowledge, refer to the judge as if he were the
Imam and the Imam were present. Since the Imams were considered infallible, it would
follow that the Imam-as-judge would exercise his personal knowledge in all cases;
however, the adab al-qāḍī texts then continue to refer to regular Twelver jurists in the
position and the limitations (if any) of the jurists’ use of personal knowledge. The
ostensible elision between who is under discussion—the Twelfth Imam or a Twelver
jurist—when referring to the judge is not a theological confusion, but rather
demonstrative of the fact that the delegation of judicial authority from the Hidden Imam
to the Twelver jurists was not fully resolved in these texts, a typical feature of the
epitome format of the adab al-qāḍī texts under discussion. However, this lack of an
established delegation of judicial authority to the Twelver jurist did not prevent the
Twelver authors from elaborating on the judge’s responsibilities and role in court
adjudication; in the case of personal knowledge, the Twelver jurists gave the judge an
impressively wide scope. Shāfiʿite jurists, however, placed more conditions on whether
the judge’s use of his personal knowledge may apply to knowledge acquired prior to the
case or during the case itself; furthermore, they limit it from applying to cases that fall
under penal law (ḥudūd). 63
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Ijtihād

The depiction of adab al-qāḍī texts as “manuals” and lists of rules in modern
surveys give the impression that this literature assumes that the judge has no ability
beyond “discovering” a ruling through consideration of the evidence and applying it to
the case at hand. It is true that all adab al-qāḍī texts concentrate mainly on evidentiary
procedure because they clearly lean towards it as the appropriate and sufficient constraint
on the judge’s decision-making; his ruling can thus be assured to result within the
parameters of an orderly and reasonable application of Islamic law. However, solely
focusing on this aspect of the judge’s decision-making process belies the sophisticated
ways in which the jurists understood the judge to arrive at a legal ruling, and most
importantly, how seriously the jurists considered the judge’s discretionary reasoning as
part of the adjudication process. Ijtihād—often referred to as “independent reasoning,”
but better understood as legal reasoning that did not rely on the legal opinions of another
on a specific issue—had consistently been part of the Shāfiʿite discussion of adjudication
since al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-Umm. The Shāfiʿite consensus on ijtihād, and its status as one
of the conditions of judgeship, assured that the judge would not be accused of error as
long as he undertook the individual application of the law within the proper parameters of
jurisprudence. These parameters would be discussed by the Shāfiʿite jurists within the
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context of the development of the madhhab, i.e. the legal school, and the desired balance
between adherence to a cohesive Shāfiʿite methodology and the level of independence of
the one undertaking ijtihād, that is, the mujtahid.
Twelver jurists had a more complex relationship to ijtihād, and Twelver jurists
would criticize its use until the era of al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī.64 These
critical jurists objected to the use of qiyās—the analogical process through which ijtihād
was expressed— and would instead refer to other forms of inferential reasoning they
deemed acceptable, such as ʿaql and raʾy. These jurists would also appeal in varying
degrees to ḥadīths—or khabars, as Twelvers would prefer to call them—that they
deemed reliable. In doing so they would be able to expand the pool of discrete rules, and
by extension, increase the number of cases to which they could apply, in order to
minimize the judge’s resort to analogical reasoning. The acceptance of khabar wāḥids, or
isolated reports of Prophetic action or speech, would become a matter of contention
among the Twelver jurists, who over the generations took up positions shifting between
accepting the increase of ḥadīths and rules of wider applicability that khabar wāḥids
would supply and criticizing their lack of sufficient reliability. While I refer to the
emphasis on resorting to the pool of ḥadīths, whether including khabar wāḥids or not, as
a traditionist approach, I use “traditionist” in the sense of “appealing to traditions” or
reports, rather than as a fundamentally conservative, or “traditionalist,” approach;
furthermore, it does not necessarily exclude any rationalist approaches, such as analogical
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reasoning and other interpretative and exegetical methods. As such, rather than defining
the jurists as either wholly traditionist or rationalist, as modern retrojection of the terms
“Usūlī” (rationalist) and “Akhbārī” (traditionist) has done, it is more analytically sound to
view how Twelver jurists approach specific matters of jurisprudence to observe the
dynamism evident in their juristic argumentation.
The appeal to ijmāʿ, i.e. scholarly consensus, among the Muslim jurists not only
established a sense of methodological cohesiveness—what Devin Stewart refers to as
“orthodoxy”65—but also expanded the pool of discrete rules, as well as the rationalist
methods one could apply. For the Twelver jurists, consensus limited to only their
members gave their jurisprudence a distinctly sectarian character. However, rather than
being a reactionary response to the development of consensus among Sunnīs and the
establishment of the exclusive validity of Sunnī legal schools, as Stewart puts forth,66
Calder claims it as a holdover from a period when “it was part of the polemical game,
which flourished at this time in Būyid Baghdad, that one should assert that one’s own
group had access to knowledge (ʿilm, not ẓann) whereas one’s opponent’s group did
not.”67 Consensus also held theological import for the Twelvers as an expression of the
Hidden Imam’s legal opinions as well as a way to achieve the highest level of legal
certainty. The delegation of the judgeship from an infallible Imam, who knew the totality
of the law, to the Twelver jurists, necessitated the highest levels of certainty in their
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juristic endeavors, and ijmāʿ was a consistent part of obtaining access to that level of
certainty.
Because I focus on the Twelver jurists as an understudied group in modern
scholarship, this study begins with them, their texts, and the historiographical issues
pertaining to their histories. Although the earliest extant adab al-qāḍī text is that of alShāfiʿī, the chapter on Shāfiʿite jurists comes last because of the need to move away from
the reflexive academic presentation of Islamic legal discourses as the exclusive preserve
of Sunnīs, as well as the assumption that Shīʿīs, particularly Twelvers, engaged in such
discourses in merely derivative ways. Nonetheless, the fact that multiple confessional
communities contributed to the development of the adab al-qāḍī genre renders the
Shāfiʿite jurists in the last chapter an important complement to the analysis of the
development of the legal genre within a Twelver Shīʿī context; I hope other scholars find
the reverse to be true as well.
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CHAPTER 1
The 11th Century CE: al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, al-Shaykh alṬūsī, and Abū ’l Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī
Muḥammad ibn Nuʿmān al-ʿUkbarī al-Baghdādī (d. 413 H/1022 CE), known as
al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, along with Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460 H/1067 CE),
known as Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa, or more simply, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, and ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn
(d. 436 H/1044 CE), better known as al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā—are described by subsequent
generations of jurists as constituting the early Baghdad school of Twelver jurisprudence.
Their works, which “comprise the bulk of the extant primary source materials produced
in the remaining years of the Būyid period to the capture of Baghdad in 1055 CE by the
Sunnī Saljuks,” have been preserved, studied, and privileged as the voices of Twelver
jurisprudence of this period by jurists of later generations.68 As producers of furūʿ works,
al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, and Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī (d. 447 H/1055 CE)
are the pioneers of adab al-qāḍī writing69 in the Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudential tradition.
Although al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā did not write any adab al-qāḍī texts, his treatise on
working under an illegitimate ruler would fundamentally impact the formation of this
genre.
Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd had moved as a boy from Baṣra to Baghdad, where he
studied fiqh and Muʿtazilism and learned ḥadīth from Ibn Bābawayh when the latter
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visited Baghdad in 963 and 966 CE.70 Among al-Mufīd’s students was al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā, of whom little background is known other than his list of works and that he was
born and died in Baghdad.71 Al-Ṭūsī, who had moved from Khorasan to Baghdad, first
studied under al-Shaykh al-Mufīd and then, upon the latter’s death, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā,
who then became head of the Twelver community. This student-teacher lineage thrived in
Būyid Baghdad, which was a political and cultural urban center with diverse religious
communities that regularly engaged each other in learning as well as disputation. In
addition to enjoying good relations with the Būyids, who were themselves sympathetic to
Twelver Shīʿism, al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, and al-Ṭūsī were also on good terms
with the ʿAbbāsid caliphs. As jurists, however, they were often engaged in responding to
criticisms; al-Sharīf a-Murtaḍa states in al-Intiṣār that he wrote it as a response to
accusations that Shīʿī positions were contradictory to ijmāʿ (consensus), and al-Mufīd
wrote al-Masāʾil al-ṣāghāniyya to respond to similar points on the matter;72 al-Ṭūsī wrote
al-Mabsūṭ in response to claims that Shīʿī jurisprudence was not well-developed enough
to be significant as a body of law. While Devin Stewart emphasizes that their works were
in response to Sunnī criticisms,73 these three jurists were also equally invested in the
differing legal opinions and approaches within the Twelver communities themselves and
produced works to this effect; as such, they were not solely concerned with countering
Sunnī critics.

70

Wilferd Madelung, “Al-Mufīd,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Ed. (Brill, 2012).
C. Brockelmann, “Al-Sharīf Al-Murtaḍā,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Ed. (Brill, 2012).
72
Devin J. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System
(University of Utah Press, 1998), 126.
73
Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 126.
71

37

The Baghdadi Twelver juristic lineage became such a renowned one that it
attracted Twelver jurists from other cities, like Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī. Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ,
despite being based in Aleppo, undertook several trips to Baghdad to study under alSharīf al-Murtaḍā and then later under al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, “although his studies with the
latter may not have been so influential.”74 Despite historical accounts of occasional
sectarian riots that appeared to target Twelver scholars, these jurists all enjoyed good
relations with their respective ruling powers—the Būyids in Baghdad and the Mirdāsids
in Aleppo—as leaders of their respective Twelver communities.
Twelver discursive style was fundamentally driven by concerns particular to the
Twelver Shīʿīs, who in the 11th c. CE were still dealing with the theological implications
of Shīʿī judges functioning within a non-Twelver political apparatus. The doctrine of the
ghayba, or the occultation of the final Imam, was not a metaphysical concept where the
Imam was detached from the earthly realm when treated by al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf alMurtadā, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, and Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ. Rather, they understood the Imam to be
real and alive, yet unrecognized, and thus unable to take up his rightful place. The
delegation of the Hidden Imam’s power of adjudication to the jurist is thus one that is not
fully dealt with because of the intermediate status of the Imam; as a result, while “the
Imam appears to be present in the language of the previous Imāmī authors (such as Mufīd
and Ṭūsī),”75 pragmatism led these jurists to allow Twelver jurists to be designated to
carry out adjudication in order to meet the needs of Twelver communities. Furthermore,
al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā asserts in his Rasāʾil that, while hidden and unknown, the Imam
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nonetheless “exists and mixes with us,” and develops sectarian consensus of the Twelver
jurists (ijmāʿ al-ṭāʾifa) as a means by which to have the Hidden Imam’s legal opinions
known.76 Since Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ follows these jurists in assuming the presence of the Hidden
Imam, all four jurists had to address the issue of the reality of illegitimate leaders in place
of the ruling Hidden Imam, and the status of the Twelver judges in relation to them.
The issue of working for “illegitimate” rulers was directly addressed by al-Shaykh
al-Mufīd, and later, by al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā in his treatise dedicated to the subject,
Masʾala fī ’l-ʿamal maʿa ’l-sulṭān. However, the writings of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd and alSharīf al-Murtaḍā were ostensibly not to the full satisfaction of subsequent jurists, since
their successors had to further explain and elaborate on their positions in their own
writings. These discussions unfolded alongside juristic developments in delegating the
Hidden Imam’s authority to jurists, including that of the judgeship; it was al-Mufīd in his
al-Muqniʿa who first put forth the idea of jurists performing the Imam’s duties through
tafwīḍ al-naẓar, the Twelver scholars’ “right of supervision,” as long as it did not
endanger their lives.77 Furthermore, al-Mufīd “reasserts the right of Shiʿite scholars to the
office of qāḍī with a more vigorous tone,”78 as demonstrated in his “Chapters on
Judgments and Rulings (Abwāb al-qaḍāyā wa ‘l-aḥkām).” The accommodationist
approach of al-Shaykh al-Mufīḍ and his student, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, is a major shift
from Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381 H/991 CE). Ibn Bābawayh, in his collection of ḥadīths titled
Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh, asked Shīʿīs “not to refer to non-Shiʿi jurists for judgment or
litigation,” instead exhorting them to refer “to a Shiʿi man (rajul) with some legal
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knowledge – not, as Mufīd says, jurists.”79 Of course, al-Murtaḍā’s shift consisted of
more than a change in directive; unlike Ibn Bābawayh the traditionist, “al-Murtaḍā did
not quote those sound traditions which allow Shiʿis to take charge of the administration
of justice” under certain conditions, basing his argument on rational exposition instead.80
Additionally, al-Murtaḍā differed from al-Mufīd in that he “did not rule for intervention
of learned jurisprudents except in the context of commanding right and forbidding
wrong.”81 After al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, the question of a Shīʿī judge functioning within a
non-Twelver governing apparatus did not elicit controversy insomuch as it spurred
subsequent jurists to provide a variety of justifications to legitimate the concept, and by
extension, the practice.
In his work of substantive law, al-Nihāya, Shaykh al-Ṭāʿifa al-Ṭūsī, who
compiled the two foundational Shīʿī books of ḥadīth—Tahdhīb al-aḥkām and alIstibṣar—held clear positions on the role of the scholar in a despotic government.
Identified as a major jurist in his own era as well as by subsequent scholars, al-Ṭūsī
enjoyed such eminent standing that al-Nihāya would be discussed, commented upon,
criticized, and lauded for centuries. He also played a crucial role in the reception of the
ideas of his teachers, al-Mufīd and al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, in both their legal theory as well
their works of substantive law. 82 In al-Nihāya, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī would integrate alSharīf al-Murtaḍā’s ideas about working for the government while expanding al-Shaykh
al-Mufīd’s extension of scholarly authority to the judgeship. Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī would
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also write al-Nihāya in the manner of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s articulation of jurisprudence,
that is, “from one’s own perception of the sources,” meaning without explanation or
justification from the Qurʾān, Prophetic or Imamic traditions, or any other legal sources.83
His own student, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, would also write in this style in al-Kāfī.
Although Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ is often perfunctorily addressed in modern scholarship on
Twelver jurists, his juristic influence was nonetheless pervasive. In addition to appearing
to impact al-Ṭūsī’s own juristic thinking in al-Nihāya on discrete issues such as
temporary marriage, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ would influence subsequent Twelver discourse on
adjudication through the circulation of his work al-Kāfī in Iraq and the Levant. The
jurists his work would impact include Ibn Ḥamza, Ibn Zuhra, and Ibn Idrīs in their
respective works al-Wasīla, Ghunyat al-nuzūʿ, and al-Sarāʾir, which are discussed in the
next chapter.84
Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd is the first of the Twelver jurists in this study to produce an
adab al-qāḍī work; in doing so, he reinforced a shift away from Twelver khabar
collections, which he critiqued for relying on isolated reports (khabar wāḥid), as the main
textual source of information on adjudication and the judgeship. His student, al-Shaykh
al-Ṭūsī, would produce an adab al-qāḍī work in a style that relied entirely on his own
authority as a renowned jurist, but which would later be undermined as a result of his
reliance on khabar wāḥids in his other works. However, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s
incorporation of an accommodationist approach to illegitimate government, as laid out by
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al-Mufīd’s other student, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, would fundamentally shape the adab alqāḍī works of subsequent Twelver jurists. Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ would build on the legacy of
these jurists through his distinction between the “worldly” and “religious” spheres and
their connections to the role of the judge.

al-Shaykh al-Mufīd

Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, the teacher of both al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and al-Shaykh alṬūsī, enjoys the distinction not only of having authored the earliest extant work of
Twelver uṣūl al-fiqh,85 but also the earliest extant Twelver adab al-qāḍī chapter in his
jurisprudential work al-Muqniʿa. Although al-Muqniʿa can be characterized as a work of
furūʿ, or substantive law, its first six chapters are creedal, concerned with briefly
delineating the required beliefs in God, the prophets and messengers, the Imamate and
the “close friends of God” (awliyāʾ Allāh), and heaven and hell, with short paragraphs
discussing the knowledge and action that can be derived from the laws (sharāʾiʿ) of
Islam, leading to the establishment of prayer. The first furūʿ chapter, on ritual purity
(ṭahāra), conventionally follows as a corollary to these two chapters, and the rest of the
subject headings follow in the order typically found in furūʿ works of these and later
periods. These include the adab al-qāḍī chapter titled “Adjudication (al-qaḍāʾ),
testimony, retaliation in kind (qiṣāṣ), and tort compensation (diya); it is further divided
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into several subheadings, of which “Legal judgments and rulings (al-qaḍāyā wa ‘laḥkām)” is the first.
Al-Mufīd’s adab al-qāḍī section stands out as atypical in its structure, relative to
Twelver works of subsequent generations, by bringing together several Qurʿānic verses to
open his discussion of the importance of and need for adjudication and rulings.86 AlMufīd begins with Q 38:26:
“O David [Dāwūd]! Indeed we have made you a vicegerent on the earth.
So judge between people with justice, and do not follow desire, or it will
lead you astray from the way of Allah. Indeed those who stray from the
way of Allah—there is a severe punishment for them because of their
forgetting the Day of Reckoning.”87
Al-Mufīd groups the verses into those aimed at warning prophets and those specifically
commanding “the judges of the Muslims (ḥukkām al-muslimīn),” exhorting them to
exercise caution in giving judgments as well as to not refrain from issuing them (on pain
of the judges becoming oppressors or disbelievers as a result), and to adjudicate by God’s
revelations.
Al-Mufīd then outlines the challenges of judgeship: “Adjudicating among the
people is of the utmost importance (daraja ʿāliya), and its conditions are severely
difficult.”88 He thus stipulates the requisite characteristics and skills required of a judge:
being of sound mind; being knowledgeable about the Qurʾān and sunna as well as their
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interpretation and categories; being well-versed in Arabic; and finally, acting as a
cautious person who does good works while also practicing self-restraint in worldly
matters (zāhidan fī ’l-dunyā).”89 After this explication, he further elaborates on the topic
through khabars (as ḥadīths are referred to in Twelver contexts), including one regarding
the prophet Luqmān that is similar in content to the Qurʾānic verse about Dāwūd. The
danger of judicial error is then underscored by the two other khabars that al-Mufīd
includes—one from the Prophet Muḥammad stating that “whoever is instated as a judge,
indeed he has been slaughtered without a knife (man juʿila qāḍī fa-qad dhubiḥa bi-ghayr
sikkīn)” and another one by ʿAlī narrating the famous ḥadīth of the four judges, of which
three are in hell and only one is in heaven.90 It is important to note that, unlike later
Twelver works, al-Mufīd does not deal with the complicated question of delegating the
Imam’s prerogative of adjudication at all. Rather, having established the Qurʿānic and
sunnaic bases for adjudication in general, al-Mufīd simply moves on to the next section,
titled “the Judge’s protocol (adab al-qāḍī).”
Al-Mufīd’s “Adab al-qāḍī” section is very much familiar in content and
arrangement when compared to subsequent Twelver works, although he keeps all his
sections brief. He begins with a terse description of the judge’s ideal mental state—i.e.
willing to formally hold court when giving judgements, and not preoccupying himself
with anything other than the legal matter before him—as well as his role in maintaining
the dignity of the judgeship and the court—cleansing himself with ablutions, praying two
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rakʿas in the congregational mosque, wearing dignified clothes, and sitting with his back
to the qibla, all of which are distinct to the Twelver adab al-qāḍī tradition. Al-Mufīd’s
text also stands out in that the adab section is clearly separated from the following
sections on establishing evidence; it thus concerns itself only with the logistics of lining
up the litigants (with the help of “whoever commands the one in attendance to bring up a
case”), deciding the order of cases in the courtroom, making sure that litigants are
properly identified, treating all litigants equally and getting them to begin presenting their
cases, and once they do so, determining that all parties are of sound mind and that those
who remain silent are not deaf or mute. The judge determines the validity of the cases
and then, if he suspects a litigant of not being of sound mind, does not give a ruling
(tawaqqafa ʿan al-ḥukm ʿalayhi) until he has “further investigated his state of mind (ḥattā
yastabriʾ ḥālahu).”91 Otherwise, if the defendant denies the charges of the plaintiff, the
judge determines which evidence needs to be presented by each party to be able to come
to a legal ruling. The judge also has the power to imprison a litigant who claims to have
bayyina evidence but does not produce it, in order to compel him to do so. The rest of the
chapter is divided into sub-sections concerning the procedural elements of when to
request bayyina evidence, the responsibilities of the judge in vetting and organizing the
witnesses, and how to administer oaths. It then focuses on matters relating to torts (diya)
and assault and homicide (qiṣāṣ), referencing Q 17:33 as justification,92 and lists the
evidence needed and punishments applied based on the degree of intent to murder. It also
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outlines procedures for more complicated cases, such as determining liability when a man
is killed in a crowd.
Despite the warnings at the beginning of the chapter against the danger of judicial
error for the judge’s eternal soul, the judge is understood to function in a fairly
straightforward administrative manner. Each section concludes with the understanding
that its discrete rules should be sufficient for the judge to take care of the issue at hand,
and assumes no possibility of further complication or lack of sufficient certainty. Issues
of ḥadd punishments (corporal punishments for certain categories of crimes against God),
while delineated in a separate chapter as the Imam’s prerogative and outside the sphere of
adjudication by anyone other than the Imam, are not treated within the context of
judgeship; this categorization thus allows al-Mufīd to avoid the question of delegation of
authority from the Imam to a layman or scholar.
In al-Muqniʿa, al-Mufīd does not clarify his position on the relationship of the
judge to a non-Twelver ruling power, although it appears that he implicitly
accommodates the judge working for an illegitimate ruler in rather limited capacities. He
also seems to understand the illegitimate ruler as an acceptable means for carrying out
rulings and punishments on behalf of the Imams, a point al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā would take
up in his treatise. Al-Mufīd specifically refers to a sulṭān (“ruling power”) twice in his
chapter, stating that “it is for the sulṭān to punish whoever kills a protected non-Muslim
(dhimmī) intentionally” and to take the money for the tort (diya) from the treasury to give
to the victims’ next of kin (walī).93 He refers to the sulṭān again only to point out that no
one must interfere with the Imams in their carrying out of the ḥuqūq Allāh—the rights of
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God, violation of which incurs the ḥadd punishment—because such an interloper would
be considered an apostate (murtadd). He further states that someone who kills an
interloper on behalf of the Imams does not incur punishment but has nonetheless “erred
in giving precedence to himself instead of the sulṭān (yakūn mukhṭiʾan bi-taqdīmihi ʿalā
al-sulṭān),”94 a rather vague kind of phrasing that seems to mean that the killer had
abrogated the rights of a validly-installed, non-Imam worldly ruler, presumably a just
one, to carry out an execution on behalf of the Imams.95 Although al-Shaykh al-Mufīd
does not directly link the terms sulṭān and ẓālim (an illegitimate ruler, literally
“oppressor”) in the chapter, he does warn in the section on hearing testimony that those
who give testimony “before the oppressors and immoral, deviant judges (ʿind al-ẓālimīn
wa al-quḍāṭ al-fajara al-fāsiqīn)” should fear God.96
Of the Twelver works in this study, this chapter of al-Muqniʿa conforms most
closely to the idealized format of furūʿ: initial Qurʿānic and sunnaic justifications for
qaḍāʾ and a list of derived rules in almost a handbook style, with no elaboration of the
method used, and certainly no embedded discussions regarding theoretical legal concerns.
“Ḥukm” is understood as a ruling on the facts that need to be discovered rather than
formed by any internal cognitive process by the judge. The characterization of al-Mufīd
as a rationalist would account for the minimalist use of khabars—synonymous with
ḥadīth—in his qaḍāʾ chapter, in sharp contrast to his teacher, Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381
H/991 CE), whose section on qaḍāʾ in his work Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh consisted
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solely of khabars. In fact, al-Mufīd criticized Ibn Bābawayh and other traditionists for
citing khabar wāḥids, or traditions that could only be traced back to a single authority.97
His criticism was shared by his student al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, whose rationalism would
have a great impact on subsequent jurists. Despite al-Mufīd’s rationalism, however, alMuqniʿa would be discarded as a model for the adab al-qāḍī genre by subsequent
rationalist Twelver scholars of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries CE as well as by those
with a more traditionist bent, including his other student al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. Although alṬūsī also had his own adab al-qāḍī chapter in his authoritative and much-studied furūʿ
work al-Nihāya, it was written from a set of concerns driven not only al-Ṭūsī’s
relationship to khabar collections, but also by the writings of his colleague al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā on the relationship between the Imamate and worldly ruling powers.

al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī

Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, who was born in Ṭūs and completed his studies there, moved
to Būyid Baghdad after Khorasan had become “fundamentally Shāfiʿī and to an
increasing degree controlled by the Ghaznawid Maḥmūd” (r. 399-421 H/998-1030 CE).98
He first studied under al-Shaykh al-Mufīd and then, after the latter’s death, with al-Sharīf
al-Murtaḍā. After the takeover of Baghdad by the Saljūqs and some periodic sectarian
riots that resulted in the burning of al-Ṭūsī’s home and library,99 he moved to Najaf,
where he would also later be buried. Although he maintained his own rationalist
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tendencies, al-Ṭūsī was also known to be very much in favor of khabar wāḥids, which
expanded the pool of juristic traditions from which to draw. His reputation as a
traditionist was further reinforced when he wrote al-Tahdhīb, his commentary on alMufīd’s al-Muqniʿa. In al-Tahdhīb, al-Ṭūsī’s main objective was to either reconcile or
discard the increasing number of contradictory khabars used to justify and explain
Twelver furūʿ . The method generally used in al-Tahdhīb was to cite al-Mufīd’s section
and to comment on the khabar used in al-Muqniʿa; however, due to the pointed lack of
khabars in al-Mufīd’s adab al-qāḍī chapter, al-Ṭūsī had to take on the project of adding
khabars throughout the text, which he did mostly by utilizing the khabar collection of Ibn
Bābawayh and al-Kāfī of al-Kulaynī (d. 329 H/941 CE), along with the occasional
khabar not found in these texts.100
Even though al-Tahdhīb is typically described as closely following the structure
of al-Muqniʿa,101 this description is rather misleading within the context of the adab alqāḍī genre. It would be moot to make a comparison of whether al-Tahdhīb follows any
particular order of al-Muqniʿa’s adab al-qāḍī subdivisions because of the sheer number
of khabars al-Ṭūsī compiled under the heading “Legal judgments and rulings.” His
compilation actually follows the topic order of Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh and al-Kāfī
rather than that of al-Muqniʿa; furthermore, it only overlaps with al-Muqniʿa’s topics in
the most general sense, and to the extent of the khabar collections being similarly
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ordered. Even though al-Ṭūsī’s general method in al-Tahdhīb is to cite al-Shaykh alMufīd and then comment on the traditions he used (or provide his own to contradict or
support them), he does not cite al-Mufīd at all in this chapter, and barely provides any
commentary, choosing to let the long lists of khabars make his points for him. Al-Ṭūsī
also disregards any of al-Mufīd’s Qurʿānic bases for judgeship (qaḍāʾ) that refer to preIslamic prophets such as Dāwūd and Luqmān. Instead, he includes the first three khabars
from al-Kāfī to emphasize the Imamic, rather than Qurʿānic, basis for the legitimacy of
the judgeship, particularly the khabar that states, “fear the government, for the
government is of the Imam of the world to adjudicate in righteousness for the Muslim,
[and] belongs to the Prophet or his deputy” (ittaqū al-ḥukūma fa-innamā al-ḥukūma
innamā hiya imām al-ʿālam bi ‘l-qaḍāʾ al-ʿādil fī ’l-Muslim li-nabī aw waṣī nabī).”102
The only khabar that overlaps with al-Mufīd is a tradition that states that “there are four
judges: three in hell and one in heaven,” since, as previously noted, al-Mufīd does not
integrate many khabars into his section. In contrast, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s inclusion of
khabars is expansive in scope, including traditions that take very clear antiaccommodationist positions. These include those traditions that exhort choosing a man
from among the Twelvers themselves when two men disagree over a loan or inheritance,
and those that deter bringing up a case before a despot (ṭāghūt), wrongdoer (ẓālim) or
tyrant (ahl al-jawr) whose ruling would result in ill-gotten gains (suḥt), idolatry (shirk),
and apostasy (radd).103 The traditions also address the problem of Twelver judges giving
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rulings in accordance with the legal rulings of an illegitimate ruler, which is only
permitted in situations of necessary dissimulation (taqiyya).104 These traditions allowing
Twelver judges to work for an illegitimate ruler eventually give way to those that prohibit
the judge from taking payment (rizq) from such a ruler, comparing it to suḥt, or ill-gotten
goods. Although not taken up by either al-Muqniʿa or al-Nihāya, the issue of the
permissibility of a judge receiving payment is not only a standard question in later
Twelver adab al-qāḍī chapters, but in Shāfiʿite adab al-qāḍī works as well; the main
difference, of course, is the added Twelver anxiety of the legitimacy of working for nonTwelver rulers.
Although some of the khabars in the first section, titled “He who has the right to
give rulings, and the sections on judges and jurisconsults (Bāb man ilayhi al-ḥukm wa
aqsām al-quḍāt wa ‘l-muftīn),”105 are included in al-Kāfī and Man lā yaḥduruhu al-faqīh,
the majority of the khabars on that topic cannot be attributed to these two collections.
However, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī relies almost exclusively on these two collections (in
addition to the khabars he compiled in his other work, al-Istibṣār) for the rest of the
chapter, with many of the khabars being found in those two or even all of the collections.
The rest of the chapter consists mostly of khabars delineating the hierarchies of bayyina
evidence, as well as outlining complicated or difficult cases; here, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī
includes sections on testimony and oaths that he relegates to other chapters in al-Nihāya.
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The few instances in which he interpolates a direct assessment in the text occur only in
regard to slave testimony or hearsay testimony (shahāda ʿalā shahāda).106
Al-Ṭūsī’s approach in al-Tahdhīb is to combine the relevant sections of al-Kāfī
and Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh into a single adab al-qāḍī section; in this way, he
“commented” upon al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s chapter by essentially ignoring it and going
back to what he determined were the khabar “roots” of adjudication (the irony being, of
course, that later Twelver jurists, including his students, would do the same with his own
adab al-qāḍī chapter). At the same time, by bringing together khabars that went well
beyond the scope of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s statements on judges and adjudication, al-Ṭūsī
sought to demonstrate that Twelver traditions were sufficient to cover all relevant aspects
of the law, including what a judge would need to know in order to issue rulings.
However, the qaḍāʾ chapter of al-Tahdhīb, along with the chapter of the same name in
al-Kāfī and “al-qaḍāʾ wa al-aḥkām” of Man lā yaḥḍuruhu, cannot be considered a
variation of the adab al-qāḍī literary genre. Although these aforementioned chapters
group khabars by concepts and subheadings similar to adab al-qāḍī literary works, the
khabar-only text not only does not clarify what the rule or rules derived from the
khabar(s) are, it does not consistently make clear what the issue at hand is. In this way,
this non-explanatory style reflects the khabar that exhorts the Twelvers to choose a man
from among themselves who knows the Imamic judgments and rulings to settle disputes
as an unofficial, de facto judge, a very traditionist position that seems to eschew the need
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for rationalist application of the law. It is notable that while this khabar is preserved in
al-Tahdhīb, al-Kāfī, and Man lā yaḥḍuruhu,107 it is neither included nor paraphrased in
either al-Muqniʿa or al-Nihāya, which specifically focus on the judgeship as a role at the
intersection of adjudication and public administration.
Yet despite his clear mastery of the khabars relevant to adjudication and their
general anti-accommodationist positions, al-Ṭūsī nonetheless assumes an
accommodationist position in al-Nihāya, clearly influenced by his teacher al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā, who, in his treatise on working for the government, argued for the validity of
holding office.

al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Fī ’l ʿamal maʿa ’l-sulṭān

As al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā states at the beginning of his treatise, he wrote “On
Working for the Ruling Power (fī’ l-ʿamal maʿa ’l-sulṭān)” in response to a discussion in
a salon of the Būyid vizier Abū ’ l-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Maghribī (d. 418 H/1027
CE). Asserting that rulers could be categorized as “legitimate and just” (muḥiqq ʿādil) or
“illegitimate and tyrannical usurpers” (mubṭil ẓālim mutaghallib), he wanted to address
the issue of “taking up office on behalf of the illegitimate rulers.” Observing that there
are no objections in regard to working for a just ruler, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā announces
that he will thus focus on the issue of holding office under an illegitimate ruler, which
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may be categorized as obligatory, compulsory, licit, evil, or forbidden. Al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā notes that taking up a position becomes compulsory if refusing would result in
death, whereas if the potential office-holder feared harm to himself or his property, it
would become licit but not obligatory. (Although al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā also accepts
taqiyya if the office-holder feared for his life, he states that the office-holder may not
execute someone while dissimulating since “he is not permitted to ward off harm from
himself by inflicting suffering on others in an improper way,” and that “there is no
precautionary taqiyya in matters of capital punishment [dam].”108) In arguing for the
obligation of taking up what should be considered an evil office, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā
makes a morally consequentialist argument. He does so by stating that what the good the
office-holder would do in such a position—supporting rights and rejecting false claims,
commanding right and forbidding wrong—would outweigh the impropriety of working
for an illegitimate government as long as the aspiring office-holder knew, or could be
reasonably sure, that he would be able to do these things while in office; furthermore, he
would have to be certain that holding office would also be the only way these things
could be accomplished. Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā argues that the office-holder could consider
himself to be working on behalf of the Imams instead of the worldly ruler, since the
Imams have been denied their true rights and would not have been able to exercise any
rights except by worldly, invalid means; as such, the Imams are understood to have
delegated their rights to “pious men and scholars” to do so.109 He even references the
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Qurʿānic example of Yūsuf working on behalf of al-ʿAzīz, “who was unjust,” and a
member of Pharaoh’s court, to drive home his point. Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā also utilizes
the example of Imam ʿAlī participating in the shūrā (council) to select the Prophet
Muḥammad’s successor, and accepting the council’s choice despite the denial of his own
valid claim.110 On the other hand, if the potential office-holder believed that holding
office would oblige him to do evil acts, then he would not be permitted to take up the
office voluntarily.
Whereas al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā does not specifically discuss the judge but generally
alludes to any office-holder, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī clearly integrates his thought into his own
discussions of judges specifically, and commanding right and forbidding wrong more
broadly. Although there appear to have been some precursors to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s
treatise,111 Wilferd Madelung asserts that “after al-Murtaḍā, no independent treatises are
known to have been written on the subject, but it was commonly treated in the Imāmī fiqh
works” such as al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s al-Nihāya.112 However, Madelung notes for alShaykh al-Ṭūsī, holding office on behalf of an illegitimate ruler with reasonable certainty
of doing good was desirable but not obligatory.113
Even though al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā did not produce a furūʿ work with an adab alqāḍī chapter, his impact on the Twelver genre was profound, if varied. Subsequent
Twelver scholars, including al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, followed his example of citing a variety
of Muslim opinions, including those of Sunnī jurists, instead of limiting their examples to
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khabars that were traced back to the Imams or to the Prophet Muḥammad through the
Imams and their companions. Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s jurisprudential work al-Nāṣiriyyāt,
as well as his al-Intiṣār, demonstrated his study of and familiarity with ideas and
statements attributed to jurists as varied as al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfa, Ibn Ḥanbal, Mālik ibn
Anas, al-Ṭabarī, Abū Thawr, and al-Awzāʿī, among other major non-Twelver jurists of
the previous centuries. Furthermore, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s masʿala (response) in alIntiṣār regarding al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm—adjudication on the basis of the judge’s personal
knowledge acquired before or during a case, but not with bayyina evidence—would
become integrated as a fundamental point of discussion in the next two centuries of
Twelver adab al-qāḍī works despite it not appearing in al-Nihāya, al-Muqniʿa, or the
khabar collections of Ibn Bābawayh and al-Kulaynī. Regarding al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm, alSharīf al-Murtaḍā asserts that “it is the right of the Imams and the judges on his behalf to
give rulings based on their knowledge in all rights and ḥadd cases without exception,”
even as he noted the issue as a point in which non-Twelver jurists differed, rendering it a
discrete rule specific to the Twelvers.114

Al-Nihāya

Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s Al-Nihāya fī mujarrad al-fiqh wa ‘l-fatāwā, stands in sharp
contrast as a work of furūʿ to al-Tahdhīb; it goes beyond even al-Mufīd’s Muqniʿa in
keeping textual justifications for adjudication completely out of the chapter. Although al-
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Ṭūsī discusses matters relevant to judges and adjudication in another section, he signals
the beginning of his adab al-qāḍī chapter with the heading “Legal Judgements and
Rulings (al-qaḍāyā wa ‘l-aḥkām).” However, in the first section regarding the
characteristics of the judge, al-Ṭūsī notes, “we have already clarified in the chapter on
jihād who is allowed to take up the position of adjudication and who is not,”115 an
internal cross-referencing that is an atypical feature of Twelver adab al-qāḍī works. His
reference leads to the subsection in the chapter on jihād titled “Commanding right and
forbidding wrong, and who may and may not carry out ḥadd punishments and hold the
judgeship (al-amr bi ’l-maʿrūf wa al-nahy ʿan al-munkar wa man lahu iqāmat al-ḥudūd
wa ‘l-qaḍāʾ wa man laysa lahu dhālik).”116 It is here where the concept of farḍ—
“duty”—is implicitly linked with the discussion of judgeship for the first time in extant
Twelver works of furūʿ. However, unlike later Twelver works, which discuss the
judgeship as farḍ kifāya—a collective duty that is discharged from the rest of the
community once an individual takes it up—al-Ṭūsī only goes so far as to refer more
generally to commanding right and prohibiting wrong as duties incumbent upon each
individual (farḍān ʿaynān). In this way, he implies that the justification for adjudication
and that for commanding good and forbidding wrong overlap. Thus, the authority for the
office of judge is not derivative of this duty but parallel to it; this is particularly true for
The injunction of taking up the judgeship only with the certainty of not making oneself or
“other believers” vulnerable to immediate or future harm.117 Similarly to al-Mufīd (and in
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contrast to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā) al-Ṭūsī notes that “no one is allowed to execute the ḥadd
punishments except the just ruler (literally, “the ruler of the age appointed by God”) or
whoever the Imam delegated to carry it out.” 118 In this way al-Ṭūsī glosses over the
problem of the permissibility of delegating the Imam’s prerogative to a non-Imam by
making the judgeship an issue of protecting the community in a time of denial of the
Imam’s rights. Furthermore, al-Ṭūsī designates jurists (fuqahāʾ) as the appropriate
delegates of the Imams “in circumstances where the Imams are not able to take them up
themselves,”119 although he does specify that it is not permitted for anyone to judge
among the people except via “the one the just ruler [i.e the Imam] has given permission
to in this regard.” The process by which such permission would be delegated remains
uncommented upon, since al-Ṭūsī does not deal with the absence of the Imam in this
section.120
Al-Ṭūsī further refines the accommodationist position, according to which a
Twelver judge may work within a non-Twelver political apparatus by balancing the
judge’s fears of personal and community safety, in a manner similar to al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā. Although the judge would be obligated to take up the official position (and duly
rewarded) if it allowed him to carry out rulings and settle disputes, he would not be
permitted to do so if he feared it would result in harm for him or the Twelver
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community.121 He is also allowed to take up the position while practicing taqiyya out of
fears regarding safety, although he is not allowed to dissimulate to the point of executing
people, and should not take up the position if he has reason to believe it would lead to
that point.
Unlike subsequent Twelver works of adab al-qāḍī, al-Ṭūsī has no interest in
mutual consultation with other jurists—mushāwara, a concept featured in Shāfiʿite adab
al-qāḍī texts122—particularly with adherents of other legal schools (madhhab). In fact, he
pointedly does not allow the Twelver judge to “give rulings according to the doctrines of
the dissidents (ahl al-khilāf),” contrasting such an act with giving rulings only in
accordance with the truth (ḥaqq).”123 The exception, of course, is if it is the illegitimate
ruler who demands rulings (ḥukm) to be given in accordance with a non-Twelver legal
doctrine, in which case the judge “must strive to carry out the rulings (fa’l-yajtahid ayḍan
fī tanfīdh al-aḥkām) in accordance with what the true law (literally, “law of faith,”
sharīʿat al-īmān) requires.”124 However, again, if he feared not doing so would harm him,
his community, or his property, then he may carry out the unjust ruling through taqiyya.
Underscoring a concern with the threat of dissidents (ʿalā mukhālifīn lahu),125 al-Ṭūsī
ends that part of the discussion by asserting that if the judge is able to inflict a
punishment on a dissident, he should do so through whatever means possible—
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presumably including through means considered illicit by the Twelvers if undertaken
under an illegitimate ruler—because that is “the greatest jihād.”126
Having established the parameters of the judge’s role in the chapter on jihād, alShaykh al-Ṭūsī’s “Judgments and rulings” chapter in al-Nihāya then closely follows the
organization of al-Muqniʿa, including the subheadings of “The protocols of the judge and
his required state of mind (ādāb al-qaḍāʾ wa mā yajib an yakūn al-qāḍī ʿalayhi min alaḥwāl), “Hearing evidence, the procedure for giving a ruling based on it, and giving a
ruling by lots (samāʿ al-bayyināt wa kayfiyyat al-ḥukm bi-hā wa aḥkām al-qurʿa),” “The
procedure for administering oaths” (kayfiyyat al-istiḥlāf),” and “The miscellaneous
aspects of judgments and rulings” (bāb jāmiʿ fī al-qaḍāyā wa ‘l-aḥkām). Although these
overlap with the corresponding sections of al-Mufīd’s al-Muqniʿa, al-Ṭūsī discards all of
al-Mufīd’s sections on qiṣāṣ, diya, and other topics related to tort liability; he also
relegates similar discussions of eligibility of witnesses to a separate chapter on giving
testimony that appears prior to Kitāb al-qaḍāyā; he does the same with the more detailed
discussions of which persons are permitted to give oaths, noting that he had already
clarified the issue in the chapter on oaths and vows. Al-Ṭūsī also leaves out any textual
justification for the judgeship; in fact, the chapter on adjudication is devoid of any
Qurʿānic or khabar citations until the collection of miscellaneous legal issues and rulings
at the end, which are a list of khabars mostly relating to debt and claims to and division
of property. (These lists, a common feature of Twelver adab al-qāḍī chapters, serve as
case examples or models—masāʾil—for the judge in determining how to rule in difficult
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or complicated cases.) As a result, al-Ṭūsī’s adab al-qāḍī section is a fairly short and
stream-lined chapter that carefully avoids repetition with any other section in al-Nihāya,
while otherwise closely following al-Mufīd’s treatment of the subject in al-Muqniʿa.

Abū ’l Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, al-Kāfī fi ’l-fiqh

Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ, although not often discussed in modern scholarship alongside his
teachers al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and al-Ṭūsī, was a famed Twelver jurist in the Levant and
acknowledged as such by both al-Murtaḍā and al-Ṭūsī; he went on to teach students who
became renowned jurists in their own right, such as Abū ’l-Fatḥ al-Karājakī and ʿAbd alʿAzīz ibn Barrāj al-Ṭarabulusī. 127 As a scholar based in Aleppo, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ was caught
between the Mirdāsids (with whom he maintained good relations, having “dedicated his
book Tadbīr al-ṣiḥḥa to Naṣr b. Ṣāliḥ al-Mirdāsī” (r. 421-429 H/1030-1038 CE) and their
conflicts with both the Fāṭimids and the Byzantines.128 While Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s position on
Ismāʿīlī thought, “which became increasingly prevalent in al-Shām in the second half of
the 4th/11th century,” was unclear, he viewed the Byzantines as non-Muslim enemies in a
war against the dār al-īmān, “Islamdom.”129
Although he does not appear to have studied with al-Mufīd, 130 Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s alKāfī fi ‘l-fiqh begins with a summary of the articles of faith as a precursor to his furūʿ
work, much like al-Mufīd did in al-Muqniʿa. However, the similarities end there; “earlier
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Shiʿi works, or at least those that have survived, do not provide a model that Abū al-Ṣalāḥ
could have followed, ” although “there are certain points of similarity between Abū alṢalāḥ's al-Kāfī and the Daʿāʾim al-Islām by the Ismaili jurist al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d.
363/974).” 131
Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ discusses the role of the judge in al-Kāfī in a section titled “Faṣl fī
tanfīdh al-aḥkām (Section on carrying out verdicts).” The lack of clear divisions renders
his text not as easily accessible as a handbook; it is clearly meant to be read through and
carefully studied rather than utilized as a reference. In regard to the issue of taking up the
judgeship, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ “reacted more cautiously” than al-Sharīf al-Murtāḍāʿ and alShaykh al-Ṭūsī, “reminiscent of Shaykh al-Mufīd’s approach to the office of qāḍī during
the absence of the Imam.”132 Furthermore, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s categorization of subjects
related to adjudication is different from that of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, who had closely
followed the content and order of the ḥadīth categories as set out by Ibn Bābawayh.
Instead, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s discussion of executing legal rulings lies buried deep into a text
mostly concerned with leadership of the Twelver community (riʾāsa) and its concomitant
responsibilities, which include legal aspects such as dealing with crimes such as theft or
illicit sex (zinā) and appropriate punishments, as well as undertaking jihād. In a way, it
cannot be said that Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s section on executing verdicts gives any real sense of
being an independent topic or separate chapter. Rather, it is presented as a derivation of
the Imam’s duties, with the “ḥākim” in question also being a qualified delegate of the
Imam in his absence, since “judgeship is a prerogative of the Imams and their deputies”
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and “not others who are not made to be suitable (lam yuʾahhilūhu dhālik).”133 His text
thus closely follows the ideas of his teacher al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’, asserting that even in
the context of an illegitimate ruler, one who has the appropriate qualifications must take
up the judgeship—an ethical problem that is dealt with by classifying the judge as the
deputy of the Imam rather than that of the illegitimate ruler, as al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and
al-Ṭūsī had explicitly done. However, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ stands out among the Twelver jurists
in utilizing this accommodationist position to emphasize a dichotomy between secular
and religious spheres. As Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ presents it, although the Twelver judge
participates in the “secular” world of the illegitimate ruler, he also functions as a pious
Twelver, both through his own conduct as well as through his proper consideration of
various forms of evidence, such as oaths.
Like al-Mufīd, al-Murtaḍā, and al-Ṭūsī, who “had a more immediate sense of the
presence of the Imam and described him as the ruling Imam whose power has not yet
been extended (mabsūṭ al-yad),”134 Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ speaks of the last Imam as if he were
present and active, albeit hidden and unrecognized. With Twelver acceptance of the
Greater Occultation taking place after 941 CE, it was understood that the Imam was no
longer in direct contact with any member of the Twelver community; however, jurists
like al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā still recognized that he physically dwelled among the Twelvers,
despite the fact that the communal inability to communicate with him meant that the
Twelvers would not be able to identify him, and he would thus not be able to take up his
rightful position as leader of the community. For Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ, who considers a situation
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in which the duty of judgeship becomes “difficult” for the Imams and their deputies to
handle,135 members (and only members) of the Twelver community may take on the
mantle. However, even then the Twelver candidate must be able to fulfill all the requisite
conditions of being the Imam’s delegate. These requirements consist of knowing how to
give rulings, a right derived from the Imam’s own rights (al-mardūd ilayhi), as well as
the ability to carry them out properly (wa ‘l-tamakkun min imḍāʾihi ʿalā wajhihi). The
judge must also apply reason to arrive at an informed opinion and have the ability to gain
insight into cases. All the while, he must maintain the appearance of fairness and piety
(al-ʿadāla wa ‘l-waraʿ), since his legal rulings should reflect his “religiosity” (altadayyun).136 He must also have the capacity to establish his ḥukm as a ruling on the law
and have the coercive power to carry it out.137
Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s sectarian allegiances come to the fore in his determination of the
qualifications of the judge: he must be of the ahl al-ḥaqq, “the people of truth,” and
therefore not from anyone except the Twelvers, who are the only ones who are
sufficiently knowledgeable in the law. Unlike the non-Twelvers who are tainted by their
deviance (li-ḍalālatihim), a qualified member of the Twelver community would by
definition issue only valid legal rulings.138 Thus, the role of the judge insofar as he is
described like al-Ṭūsī’s qāḍī, is explicitly noted as a form of delegation (niyāba) from the
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Imam, who is “the judge in all matters (kawn al-imām ḥākiman fī jamīʿ al-masʾala).”139
Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s linkage of ḥākim to qāḍī is made clear in the Prophetic tradition he cites to
justify his argument that Twelvers must appeal to their members alone, 140 as al-Mufīd,
al-Murtaḍā, and al-Ṭūsī had also argued in order to permit the Twelver judge to function
within a non-Twelver judicial apparatus. Furthermore, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ follows al-Mufīd’s
and al-Murtaḍā’s example of using the term ḥākim instead of qāḍī to emphasize the
judge’s position as successor of the Imam, even though the two terms are always used
synonymously by all the jurists in this study.141
Thus, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ acknowledges the possibility of being a judge under an unjust
ruler as long as the judge meets all of the necessary conditions. The abrupt transition
from conditions based on delegation to permissibility under an illegitimate ruler (ẓālim
mutaghallib) demonstrates his adherence to al-Mufīd’s position on allowing “the jurists
to act as judges while serving as functionaries appointed by an ‘unjust’ ruler,” albeit in
circumscribed circumstances,142 a position also shared by al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā.
Furthermore, in the tradition of al-Murtaḍā (and similar to the approach of his Shāfiʿite
contemporary al-Māwardī (d. 450 H/1058 CE) in al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya, as described in
Chapter Four), Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ embeds his understanding of legal rulings within a political
framework, which in turn is situated relative to the question of leadership (riʾāsa), and
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thus political legitimacy. However, his concern with legal rulings is not only a question
of delegation, but also the religious purpose of the ḥukm: “the purpose of legal rulings
that are devotional (al-aḥkām al-mutaʿabbad bi-hā) is their execution; knowledge of who
is and is not appropriate to carry out the rulings determines the validity of their being
carried out.”143
The connection between leadership and political legitimacy takes on a particularly
potent meaning within Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s distinction between the “worldly” and “religious”
spheres. He actively places what he terms “legal principles” (al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya)
within a theological framework, showing that the legal system in place functions
according to key premises regarding religious adherence and personal belief. In his
treatment of oaths as a category of evidence, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ states that it is belief in God
and eternal punishment for perjury that renders oaths an effective form of evidence at all.
Furthermore, both piety (waraʿ) and asceticism (zuhd) are prescribed as conditions for
being a judge. A person “cannot believe” when there is an absence of piety, which would
cause him to rush to issue a legal ruling out of “hope or fear of things other” than God.144
Furthermore, ascetic self-restraint would keep the judge from the temptation of bribery.
Yet at the same time Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ acknowledges that, while the judge is at the head of the
Twelver community, the act of taking up legal rulings (taqallud al-ḥukm) is also one of
worldly leadership (riʾāsa dunyawiyya) consisting of rising up in rank or receiving a
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livelihood.145 He asserts that such status would lead to oppression and harm if conducted
without professing “religion” (al-tadayyun), which he distinguishes from piety and selfrestraint. He further justifies a Twelver judge embedded in a non-Twelver context by
stating that the “people of falsehood (ahl al-bāṭil)” “have been presented with proof of
the existence of [one] of this description”—that is, the Twelver Imam, and thus by
delegation, the Twelver judge—“and are obligated to refer to him, and if they were
ignorant of his right, he must make them understand for this to become a religious
obligation for them and to prevent dissent from it.”146 In terms of judicial independence,
Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ asserts that the Twelver judge is not allowed to refrain from his own legal
preference (ikhtiyār) or from maintaining communal security (ḥuṣūl al-amn)” out of a
fear of harm from “the people of falsehood (min maʿarrat ahl al-bāṭil).”147 At the same
time, the delicate nature of his appointment requires that he also be strategic in asserting
his legal rulings: the judge must be prepared to be carry out his rulings without support
when “the people” do not acknowledge his legitimacy in religious or secular matters; he
can later examine this hostility during the times he is the preferred person in such
matters.148 This concern with shifting hostilities may reflect Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s own
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experience with the possible invasion and occupation by the Fāṭimids or the Byzantines,
and possibly his experiences as judge.
Interestingly, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ does not comment on the theological legitimacy of the
judgeship until a section near the very end of his discussion that clarifies his
understanding of its relationship to the Hidden Imam: the judge “must know that giving
legal rulings among the people (al-ḥukm bayn al-nās) is a matter of great status (rutba
ʿaẓīma) and esteemed rank (manzala jalīla), prophetic leadership (riʿāsa nabawiyya) and
Twelver deputyship (khilāfa Imamiyya) which no longer remains in our lifetimes
(ʿaṣārinā), or before it, of other than the religious leadership (riʾāsāt al-dīn).” By judging
with skill, resolution, and honesty, the judge will thus have “raised the word (kalima) of
Islam and strengthened the religion (wa yaʿizz al-dīn).”149 Furthermore, a judicial
candidate “must fear God in all matters” and not take up the position of the judgeship
unless he knew he met all its conditions, in which case it is compulsory for him to accept.
And once he takes up the position, he must maintain the common good of the Muslims
(maṣāliḥ al-muslimīn) and “the forces of truth” (quwā al-ḥaqq). Thus, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ
expects the judge to take on an active religious leadership role which goes beyond
applying the appropriate juridical methods to issue the correct legal rulings. Rather,
maintaining the order and rectitude of the Muslim community enables the judge “to strive
in reviving the traditions, suppressing innovation, commanding right while forbidding
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wrong, and preventing what he can of any illegitimate rulings arising from said evil while
carrying out the truth.”150
As noted earlier, there is no separate chapter on adjudication in Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s alKāfī fī ’l-fiqh. Rather, the relevant section becomes recognizable as one pertaining to
judgeship only through the section heading titled “carrying out rulings” (tanfīdh alaḥkām), in which Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ begins by stating that “the carrying out of legal rulings, as
well as the rulings that are devotional, are among the prerogatives of the Imams (tanfīdh
al-aḥkam al-sharʿiyya wa ’l-ḥukm bi-muqtaḍāʾ al-taʿabbud fīhā min furūḍ al-aʿimma
ʿalayhim al-salām al-mukhtaṣṣa bi-him).” Through this prerogative, judgeship is thus
categorized as delegated in the same manner as waging jihād, collecting khums and zakāt,
giving legal opinions (iftāʾ), and leading congregational prayer, all of which relate to
religious and political leadership, and which had been part of discussions about juridical
mandate (wilāya) in the absence of an Imam since al-Mufīd’s al-Muqniʿa.151 The
connection of the judgeship to the Imam’s prerogatives renders it closely connected to the
notion of divine appointment: “the judge is the transmitter (mukhbir) of rulings from God
Most High, praise be upon Him, and a representative (nāʾib) of the Prophet through the
binding nature of the legal ruling.”152 Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ then notes that such a lofty position
does not allow for an ignorant person to take up the judgeship, an observation that segues
into discussions of the judge’s required level of knowledge, equating “the illegitimate
legal ruling” (al-ḥukm bi ’l-jawr) with an ignorant ruling (al-ḥukm bi-ghayr ʿilm).
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Avoidance of such rulings thus requires a person of the appropriate background who is
capable of utilizing both ʿaql and raʾy,153 “without which the correct ruling would be
difficult.”154 Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s insistence on ʿāql and raʾy is directly related to his entire
framing of knowledge (maʿrifa) of how to apply the legal sources as the foundation for
properly giving rulings, even as he bases this requirement on a “ḥadīth” from al-Ṭūsī155
regarding eternal punishment for giving legal opinions without knowledge. Abū ’lṢalāḥ’s justification also refers to another ḥadīth where al-Ṭūsī states that there are only
two kinds of legal rulings: the ruling of God, and the ruling of the jāhiliyya, which
consists of doubtful rulings without knowledge.156 Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ further interprets the
prima facie meaning of another ḥadīth to state that a judge who needs to ask others for
guidance on legal matters is ignorant in giving rulings, because receiving an answer is not
equivalent to gaining reliable knowledge. Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ thus portrays this deficient judge
as being “among our opponents (ʿind mukhālifīnā),” whether he was a layman (ʿāmmī) or
from the “ahl al-ijtihād.”157 In either case the judge would have been equally damned:
had the judge been a layman, he would not have been permitted to give a ruling based on
taqlīd, and had he been capable of ijtihād he would have been “without need of anyone
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else” and thus not allowed to rely on someone else’s legal opinion (taqlīd), positions
readily recognizable from Shāfiʿite discourse on mujtahids.
Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ thus de-emphasizes the probative force of evidence—especially
oaths—by his emphasis on the judge’s personal knowledge as a key factor in determining
the validity of both the consideration of the evidence and the ruling itself. His emphasis
on the judge’s personal knowledge and its reliability closely ties in with the judge’s main
role of maximizing certainty and minimizing ambiguity. As previously noted, Abū ’lṢalāḥ considers three different components in the judge’s decision-making process: the
extent of equanimity (ḥilm) which he must express through his reasoning (al-ʿaql wa ‘lraʾy), the general knowledge obtained through his experiences as a judge, and the
discrete personal knowledge he might have of one or both of the litigants. The distinction
here is between the ruling being based on the evidence from the litigants versus the ruling
of what the judge “knows of what is not based on admission, oral evidence (bayyina), or
oath,”158 that is, the judge’s personal knowledge (“al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm”).
For Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ, a judge’s personal knowledge, where applicable, is another
valid way of minimizing uncertainty in a case besides basing a ruling on evidence. This
in no way undermines the judge’s weighing of evidence so much as it adds to his arsenal
of methods in minimizing the ambiguity of who is in the right. In this way, if the judge
had personal knowledge of the defendant relevant to the case in terms of what was
admitted, attested, or sworn to, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ takes great pains to note that he must give a
ruling even if he was the only one with this knowledge, and may not refrain “out of fear
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of accusation” of bias.159 The question is thus not merely whether the judge may act but
when he must act, indicating a stronger sense of legal constraint on the judge’s discretion.
The Twelver judge must also know when a case does not warrant acting on his
finding of the law and when to refrain from issuing a ruling; in other cases, he must stand
firm on his own ruling even when his personal knowledge appears biased. Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ
thus subtly reinforces the ways in which a Shīʿī judge can function without non-Twelver
judicial pressure through two forms of knowledge: by using his personal knowledge to
give rulings that only a Shīʿī judge would be able to validly give, and to use his legal
training to know when to avoid a non-Twelver judicial apparatus in the first place.
Perhaps in a bid to constrain the judge’s expansive use of personal knowledge, as
a deputy of the Imam, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ states that a ruling can only have coercive power—
prohibiting, transferring ownership, compelling, nullifying, etc.—either on the basis of
the judge’s general knowledge of what compels enforcement of a ruling (illā ʿan ʿilm bimā yaqtaḍī dhālika) or as dictated by the evidence.160 However, the judge’s personal
knowledge of which rulings must be carried out is sufficient on its own and has no need
of admission (iqrār), bayyina evidence, or oath (yamīn) because it is more certain than
these kinds of evidence.161 This knowledge may occur during the case (ḥāl), or be
generated from past similar cases (mutawallidan ʿan amthālihā al-māḍiya) or from a
case-by-case analogy. 162 In short, the judge can be reassured of the certainty of his
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personal knowledge in determining when legal rulings should be carried out to a greater
degree than other forms of evidence.
However, in contrast to his in-depth discussion of the necessity of relying on he
judge’s personal knowledge in adjudicating a case, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ has a very brief note on
the experience a judge should obtain through adjudicating cases. In addition to making
time to study on his own, the judge must also make time for “ḥadīth study (mudhākara),”
whose content may serve as an aid for legal rulings, and “disputation (munāzara),”
through which he could anticipate what may not have occurred to him regarding a
ruling.163 Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ thus sidesteps the standard Shāfiʿite exhortation to judicial
consultation (mushāwara) in which the judge may consult legal scholars to hear their
opinions and help clarify his own rulings, by reclassifying it as study and disputation. In
this way he allows Twelver judges to benefit from engagement with other scholars
without acknowledging a possible non-Twelver component to it. There is no further
comment regarding the judge’s process of advancing his own learning or even
understanding the possible wider effects of his legal rulings; it is clear that Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ
is much more concerned about kinds of knowledge regarding evidence being introduced
into a legal case rather than parsing ideas about legal training.
In further elaborating on when the judge is compelled to give his ruling based on
his personal knowledge, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ assumes that the infallible Imam is still present.
Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ thus poses the legal question of whether the infallible Imam, or the judge
(who may exist coterminously) must give a ruling based on their witnessing of an illegal

163

…li-yakuna dhālik ʿawnan ʿalā mā yalī bihi min al-ḥukm bayn al-nās wa mā laʿallahu yaḥduth mimmā
lam yataqaddam lahu ʿilmuhu (Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, al-Kāfī, 451).

73

act, such as that of a man engaging in illicit forms of sex, speech (i.e. qadhf), divorce
(ṭalāq and ẓihār), or purchase, all of which are carried out through contracts (ʿaqd) or
unilateral pronouncements (īqāʿ).164 The answer depends on whether his personal
knowledge related to the legal aspects of the contract or pronouncement,165 if his
knowledge was only partial, he would not be able to give a legal ruling.166 However, if
someone else acting as judge had personal knowledge regarding a penal case (ḥadd), then
the Imam could compel him to give a ruling because of the Imam’s own infallibility.167
This reference to the infallible Imam shows that, for whatever reason, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ was
not interested in arguing for the delegation of the Hidden Imam’s prerogatives even as he
felt compelled to include them in his section.
Ultimately, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s discussion of adjudication demonstrates that, for him,
legal rulings are not limited to being ascertained by bayyina evidence alone. While he
asserts that correctly obtained knowledge—such as through admission, oaths, and
bayyina evidence168—is the basis for a correct ruling, it must also be obtained through
personal knowledge. Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ asserts that if the judge arrived at a ruling by
admission, bayyina (testimonial evidence), and oath without recourse to his personal
knowledge, then later found out about the dishonesty of a witness, the swearer of an oath,
or of a person who made an admission, he would not be able to nullify the ruling, since
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he had already decided to give a ruling based on those kinds of evidence instead of his
personal knowledge.169
In this way Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ establishes al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm as a legal principle (aṣl).
This focus on the judge’s need for certainty in legal rulings is underscored in Abū ’lṢalāḥ’s discussion regarding reconciliation (ṣulḥ) as a possible tactic for a judge to
employ in cases where ambiguity persists. The certainty/uncertainty dichotomy in regard
to the judge is most clear in Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s explanation of why reconciliation in a case of
ambiguity is no longer under the judge’s purview: “the judge settles a dispute and
determines rights through a legal ruling, whereas the mediator is an intercessor, and what
is prohibited for the judge is permitted for [the mediator] regarding human welfare
(liʾanna al-ḥākim naṣaba li ’l-qaṭʿ bi ‘l-ḥukm wa batta al-ḥaqq wa ‘l-wasīṭ shāfiʿ wa
yajūz lahu fī ’l-iṣṭilāḥ mā yuḥram ʿalā ’l-ḥākim).”170 By acknowledging certain types of
external factors in the process of producing a ruling, Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ thus deems them valid,
and indeed, necessary constraints on a judge’s decision-making in order to render him an
independent judicial figure.

Conclusion

The adab al-qāḍī sections of the legal writings of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Shaykh
al-Ṭūsī, and Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ are distinct from Twelver adab al-qāḍī chapters of the 12th
century CE and later in that they do not argue for the legitimacy of judges who are those
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other than the Hidden Imam himself. They simply take the jurists’ access to the office of
the judgeship for granted. These works are structured as concise, accessible texts,
although al-Ṭūsī’s and al-Mufīd’s texts are more easily accessed as reference works than
that of Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ. The minimalist use of khabars by al-Ṭūṣī and al-Mufīd are functions
of the epitomizing style they employ in both al-Muqniʿa and al-Nihāya. However, even
compared to other chapters in the same work, the adab al-qāḍī chapters have remarkably
few textual references, showing that both al-Mufīd and al-Ṭūsī recognized adab al-qāḍī
chapters as part of a literary genre in which such a style was both acceptable and
expected.
The lack of citations in al-Nihāya’s adab al-qāḍī chapter serves as a reminder that
the authority behind al-Nihāya’s assertions concerning adjudication is al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī
himself, rather than any Qurʾānic or sunnaic source. Al-Ṭūsī is able to assert his authority
on points of adjudication without further explication in al-Niḥaya through having
demonstrated his command of khabar wāḥids relating to adjudication in his other works,
like al-Khilāf and al-Mabsūṭ, as well as demonstrating his mastery of the khabar
justifications in al-Mufīd’s adab al-qāḍī chapter in the latter’s al-Tahdhīb. However, alṬūsī’s acceptance of khabar wāḥids in legal theory works like ʿUddat al-uṣūl ultimately
led to the discarding of his adab al-qāḍī style, as subsequent generations further
developed the rationalism of al-Mufīd and al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, characterized by a
“refusal to relay āḥād traditions as a source of law.”171 In fact, khabar wāḥids would
become a major point of contention for subsequent Twelver scholars, of which Ibn Idrīs
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would become the most famously critical. Even so, khabars remained a crucial aspect of
the continued legitimation of the adab al-qāḍī genre—as long as they were reliable. AlṬūsī’s stature as a jurist was so great that even as Twelver jurists set aside his al-Nihāya
as a literary model for legal writing about the judiciary, they mined his other works—
such as al-Khilāf and al-Mabsūṭ—to create new justifications for the judgeship as they
expanded the genre through new questions as well as the exploration of persistent
concerns. As a result, al-Mufīd’s al-Muqniʿa became eclipsed as a model, perhaps
partially due to its overlap with Shāfiʿite adab al-qāḍī literature. Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s Kāfī,
however, would enjoy a high status among subsequent Twelver jurists, and discussion of
the judge’s personal knowledge would both enshrine al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s legacy while
establishing al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm as a predominant legal concern for Twelver jurists.
It is of note that the appearance of adab al-qāḍī texts among the Twelvers
coincided with the rise of treatises on the relationship between the ruling power and the
interpreters of the law, such as the jurists and judges. While the matter of the illegitimacy
of non-Twelver government is not a new one and Twelver jurists have been “known to
have held office in the caliphal government throughout the formative period of Imāmī
doctrine in the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries,”172 the writings of al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā and the Shāfiʿite al-Māwardī impacted the formulation of the judge’s
relationship to rulers in Twelver, as well as Shāfiʿite, adab al-qāḍī discussions. Although
the issue of such a relationship was never a major focus of such adab al-qāḍī texts, it
would persist in questions of valid delegation of the judgeship and judicial independence,
such as certain applications of the judge’s personal knowledge (al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm) and
172
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the permissibility of ruling in accordance with other legal schools.
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CHAPTER 2
The 12th Century CE: Ibn Ḥamza al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Zuhra al-Ḥalabī, and Ibn Idrīs alḤillī
The next set of extant Twelver legal compendia—those of Ibn Ḥamza al-Ṭūsī, Ibn
Zuhra al-Ḥalabī, and Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī—appear a century later, during the period of
Saljūq rule in Iran and Iraq. The Saljūq period, often referred to as “the Sunnī revival,” is
characterized as a period of Sunnī patronage and rapid madrasa building in order to
“reclaim” Islamic institutions from the age of powerful Fāṭimid and Būyid rulers that
modern scholars named “the Shīʿī Century.” However, most modern historians, rather
than critiquing this depiction as part of the Saljūqs’ own program of political ideology
and legitimation, have instead mainly accepted it at face value.173 Furthermore, the
assumption of a general Sunnī “revival” masks the uneven power dynamics among the
Sunnī legal schools resulting from Saljūq prioritization of patronage of Ḥanafite, and
later, Shāfiʿite madrasas over Ḥanbalites.174 Although Ḥanbalites would eventually gain
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As Vanessa Van Renterghem points out, the term “Sunnī revival” is both problematic and vague: “When
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movements such as the ‘Assasins’ of Alamut), the supposed sultans’ desire to eradicate Shiʿism as a
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Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 92.
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Van Renterghem, “Controlling and Developing Baghdad,” 122. Although Van Renterghem states that
Shāfiʿite and Ḥanbalite madrasas were eventually patronized by Saljūqs, some would not survive more
than a few years due to insufficient endowments.
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access to endowments to establish their network of institutions, it would not be for
another half century after the Shāfiʿite and the Ḥanafite madrasas were built. In the
meantime, “the transmission of Ḥanbalite fiqh continued to take place mainly in private
circles or inside local mosques and oratories (masjids), and some families, such as the
Banū al-Farrāʾ, maintained an important role in this process.”175 However, despite the
narrative of the decline of Shīʿī knowledge production after al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī,176 there
has been no similar narrative of decline regarding Ḥanbalite scholarship, even though the
Twelvers would have also been able to continue their scholarship and teaching activities
in this way, especially since neither the madrasa nor Saljūqs were the sole source of
patronage for teachers and institutions of learning, which included notables as well as
local inhabitants.177 Furthermore, in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, not only did the
ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Nāṣir (r. 575-622 H/1180- 1225 CE), and the Ayyūbid sulṭān of
Aleppo, al-Ẓāhir (r. 589-613 H/1193-1216 CE) “welcome Shiʿi scholars at their courts,
they also maintained cordial, at times even warm, relationships with Shiʿi urban notables
in Baghdad and Aleppo.”178 There thus does not appear to be any compelling reason to
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assume that Twelver jurists were not able to continuously maintain their institutions of
learning any less than other juristic communities.179
As both the major jurists of their times and responders to the formative influence
of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Ḥamza, Ibn Zuhra, and Ibn Idrīs were instrumental in shaping
the adab al-qāḍī genre prior to al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, although they were not limited to
the influence of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī alone. While they write in the tradition of legal
compendia as established by al-Mufīd and further shaped by al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, they are
actually more similar to the less-structured discursive style of Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s al-Kāfī,
although each jurist emphasizes various aspects of substantive law. The sections on
adjudication in their furūʿ works are reflective of how these works responded to al-Ṭūsī’s
apodictic approach to judgeship in al-Nihāya: Ibn Ḥamza’s al-Wasīla and Ibn Zuhra’s
Ghunyat al-nuzūʿ do not conform to the topic headings or even order of discussion as laid
out by al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī; as such, these works are not abridgments or commentaries, but
independent, original works themselves. Even Ibn Idrīs’ Kitāb al-Sarāʾir does not always
maintain the structure of its source-text, retaining a high level of originality even as a
commentary. All three disregard al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s statements on accommodating an
illegitimate government, and present a discourse on judgeship completely disconnected
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from any worldly political apparatus; furthermore, the Hidden Imam is spoken of as
present, whether in or out of power. All three works also emphasize the wide-ranging
competence of the judge’s personal knowledge, with Ibn Zuhra’s conception being its
most unrestricted form. However, Ibn Zuhra’s lack of acknowledgment of a political
framework in which the judge operates renders the judge’s personal knowledge a means
to attain certainty in the objective truth of his rulings rather than to achieve judicial
independence in an antagonistic system. Nevertheless, evidentiary procedure remains a
priority for Ibn Ḥamza, Ibn Idrīs, and even Ibn Zuhra, despite the latter’s emphasis on the
obligation of the judge to apply his personal knowledge.

Ibn Ḥamza al-Ṭūsī, al-Wasīla ilā nayl al-faḍīla

Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Ḥamza al-Ṭūsī, known as “the Second Abū Jaʿfar” (after
the first, Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī),180 died in the second half of the sixth
century/twelth century CE.181 He granted particular attention to the procedural aspects of
weighing evidence in his chapter titled, “Kitāb al-qaḍāyā wa ‘l-aḥkām (The Chapter on
Judgements and Rulings),” whose focus was in line with al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s treatment of
judgments and rulings. (However, like Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, Ibn Ḥamza only uses the
word “ḥākim” for judge.) He begins his chapter by delineating the five legal categories
(aḍrub) of adjudication: farḍ ʿayn or farḍ ʿalā’l-kifāya—individual or collective duty—
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and mustaḥabb, makrūh, and maḥẓūr—recommended, detestable, and prohibited. Rather
unusually in Twelver discussions on adjudication, Ibn Ḥamza categorizes adjudication as
possibly either farḍ ʿayn or farḍ ʿalā’l- kifāya—like waging jihād, another sphere of
delegation to the jurists— although his understanding of farḍ ʿayn is such that it is not an
imposition on each individual Muslim. He then briefly describes the type of person for
whom the categories would apply in regard to taking up the judgeship: it is farḍ ʿayn for
“the individual who is a reliable [member] of the scholars (ahl al-ʿilm) if the Imam does
not find anyone but him;” the ability to discharge the position as a collective duty is “for
whoever is proficient and whomever the Imam wishes to [take it up],” even if the Imam
found someone else who was better suited.182 However, Ibn Ḥamza then lists “the scholar
who does not have economic self-sufficiency (li-man lā yakūnu lahu kifāya fī ’l-maʿīsha),
or alternatively, has self-sufficiency but whose merits are not sufficiently attested to, as
recommended. Finally, the one who has self-sufficiency as well as the properly attested
merits for the judgeship is detestable, while “the unreliable scholar, and the reliable yet
ignorant person (jāhil)” are prohibited from holding the judgeship. There thus appears to
be a scribal error183 regarding who falls into the third and fourth categories, and it is safe
to assume that Ibn Ḥamza lists the fully qualified and well-recognized scholar as the
recommended choice, while the scholar who is neither qualified nor sufficiently
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renowned is begrudgingly allowed (makrūh) if there are no alternatives. Furthermore,
like Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ, Ibn Ḥamza emphasizes the necessity of the moral probity and piety of
the judge.184
In asserting the right of Twelver jurists to take up the judgeship when the Imam is
“indisposed” (fī ḥāl inqibāḍ yad al-Imam), Ibn Ḥamza follows al-Mufīd and quotes the
same line as Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ in presenting his position: “whoever takes up the judgeship
(taqallada al-qaḍāʾ) must strive (ijtahada) to establish the truth, and act in accordance
with the Book of God and the sunna of his Prophet, peace be upon him, and with
consensus (ijmāʿ), [and] nothing else (lā ghayr),”185 implicitly rejecting analogic
reasoning as articulated through qiyās. Ibn Ḥamza continues:
And if he was doubtful regarding a rule (fa-in ishtabaha ʿalayhi) he must
withhold [judgment] until it becomes clear to him. And if the judge gives a
ruling contradicting the truth (ḥaqq), either carelessly or in error, and it
was made clear to him, then he must take back and revoke the ruling he
had given (rajaʿa wa naqaḍa mā ḥakama bihi).”186
The other three categories—mustaḥabb, makrūh, and maḥẓūr—describe the
desirability of a candidate based on his combination of merit and reliability, or lack
thereof. Ibn Ḥamza also defines, among other things, the kind of knowledge (ʿilm) that a
person engaged in adjudication should have: “knowledge of the Book (al-wuqūf ʿalā’lkitāb), attention to the sunna, moderation in expressing legal disagreement (al-tawassuṭ fī
’l-ikhtilāf), knowledge of consensus (al-wuqūf ʿalā’l-ijmāʿ), and attention to language
(al-tanabbuh ʿalā ’l-lisān),” meaning command of Arabic lexicography and its legal
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effects.187 This concern with scholarly knowledge of consensus and moderation in legal
disagreement appears to reflect his position on the necessity of the judge adhering to the
Twelver juristic community, similar to Shāfiʿite insistence on the judge adhering to their
legal school.188
Once appointed, while holding court the judge must also be free of hunger, thirst,
fear, sadness, and any other preoccupations, in addition to the typical recommendation of
wearing dignified clothing as befits a person of his station. Ibn Ḥamza states that the
judge should hold court in a spacious and easily accessible area; although he does
indicate the preferability of the mosque as the site for court to be held, he notes that the
judge should perform two rakʿas of prayer if it is held in a mosque, and sit with his back
to the qibla. While Ibn Ḥamza outlines the judge’s receiving of the litigants later in the
chapter,189 here he details how the judge should appoint the various court personnel,
including “three reliable people” to sit at the head of the court with him and organize the
entry of the litigants, along with a fair and knowledgeable secretary with a juristic
background to write down the information a judge may need to examine. He must also
have reliable estate distributors (qussām) to apportion people’s property. Witnesses must
be present to help establish litigants’ rights, and to sign legal documents190 as well as
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court notes and records (al-ḥujaj wa ‘l-maḥāḍir wa ‘l-sijillāt).191 The judge must also
take the court register (dīwān) of his predecessor to check on the validity of the claims of
prisoners, whose cases have priority in case they were unjustly imprisoned. Ibn Ḥamza
then outlines the procedures for successor review. He also delves extensively into the
procedure for determining the status of witnesses, until he reaches the section on dealing
with litigants and weighing evidence to ascertain their claims through admission, oath, or
bayyina evidence.192 Unusually, Ibn Ḥamza also includes a discussion of utilizing these
kinds of evidence alongside court records, legal documents, or other writings relating to a
plaintiff’s case (kitāb bi-ḥaqqihi).193 Similarly, in regard to judge-to-judge
correspondence, Ibn Ḥamza states that the judge is not allowed to rule on the basis of the
correspondence from another judge except by relying on bayyina evidence that has been
attested to “in detail (shahadat al-bayyina ʿalā ’l-tafṣīl).” He is very detailed in his
discussion of what kind of evidence the judge should expect and utilize, perhaps most
obviously in his listing of the six types of oral evidence, which consists of various
combinations of witnesses and other forms of evidence for specific cases. He also
discusses the case of giving a ruling based on lottery in situations of equally contradictory
evidence.194
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In his section titled, “Hearing evidence (samāʿ al-bayyināt) and the method of
giving a legal ruling (ḥukm) based on it,” Ibn Ḥamza parses the process of ḥukm that
belies a simple definition of “legal ruling,” distinguishing between establishing rights—
that is, giving a ruling based on the facts—and giving a ruling on the law: “and if a right
was established, he should not give a legal ruling to that effect unless requested by the
one whose right it is” (wa idhā thabata al-ḥaqq lam yaḥkum bihi illā bi’iltimās
ṣāḥibihi).195 For Ibn Ḥamza, the distinction is that to give a ḥukm is to express it verbally,
that is, “to say, ‘I gave a legal ruling (ḥakamtu),’ ‘I adjudicated against you based in such
a way (qaḍaytu ʿalayka bi-dhālik),’ ‘I infer from what was established in favor of the
other against you (ukhriju mimmā thabata lahu ʿalayk),’ or ‘I compelled you
(alzamtuka).’” 196 Thus, from Ibn Ḥamza we can draw out the discrete parts of a court
case: the claim (daʿwā), determining the evidence, establishing rights (thabata al-ḥaqq),
giving a legal ruling and carrying it out. A legal ruling is thus not equivalent to
establishing rights; it is the judge’s verbal acknowledgment which necessitates judicial
action, i.e. its execution. This statement reflects the distinction between engaging a
judicial apparatus and refraining from doing so.197 By distinguishing between
establishing rights and giving a ruling, however, Ibn Ḥamza nonetheless conflates giving
a ruling with carrying it out.
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Ibn Ḥamza’s adab al-qāḍī chapters, much like al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s al-Nihāya,
give no sources for any of his discussions. It is thus written much like a collection of
fatwās, with prescriptions for what the judge should do in the situations and cases he
finds himself dealing with as part of his office. In many ways, Ibn Ḥamza’s writing also
conforms more closely to the pragmatic expectations of contemporary texts in the
Shāfiʿite adab al-qāḍī genre, such as al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz,198 and the level of detail
regarding the hierarchies of evidence follows from Ibn Ḥamza’s consideration of as many
sides of an issue as possible. The many subsections of his chapter—“Evidence and the
method of giving a verdict based on it,” “The principles (aḥkām) of evidence and their
methods,” “The amount of evidence [needed],” “Contradictory evidence and verdict by
lottery,” “Claims to inheritance,” “Genealogy,” “Mutual claims to household objects,”
“Oaths,” and finally, “Testimony”—demonstrate his main concern with evidentiary
constraints on the judge’s decision-making process. They also reflect the practical issues
that a judge would expect to deal with, as also demonstrated by the list of explanations of
types of bayyina evidence that Ibn Ḥamza includes.
Yet, in line with the Twelver jurists, Ibn Ḥamza still acknowledges the judge’s
discretion as part of the process of giving a ruling, including his personal knowledge: “it
is permitted for the reliable judge (al-ḥākim al-maʾmūn) to give a ruling based on his
[personal] knowledge regarding civil matters (ḥuqūq al-nās);” of course, the Imam, in his
infallibility, is allowed to do so “in all the ḥuqūq,” including in crimes classified as
crimes against God.199 Nonetheless, in practical terms, the judge must allow scholars to
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attend (wa yaḥḍur al-ʿulamāʾ) his court sessions, “for him to consult them in whatever he
needs (li-yushāwirahum fīmā yaḥtāju ilayhi), so that they may direct his attention to the
correct view (wa yunabbihūhu ʿalā wajh al-ṣawāb).200 Here Ibn Ḥamza uses the same
terminology as the Shāfiʿites regarding judicial consultation and debate and their benefits,
rather than alluding to it through other means like Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ.201

Ibn Zuhra, Ghunyat al-nuzūʿ ilā ʿilmay al-uṣūl wa ‘l-furūʿ

Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī ibn Zuhra (d. 585 H/1189 CE), a prominent critic of al-Ṭūsī,
wrote Ghunyat al-nuzūʿ ilā ʿilmay al-uṣūl wa ‘l-furūʿ with a chapter titled Kitāb al-qaḍāʾ
wa mā yataʿallaqu bihi, “Chapter on adjudication and that which relates to it.” What is
notable about Ibn Zuhra’s discussion of the judge and adjudication is his explicit
permission for the judge’s personal knowledge to apply to cases of penal law (ḥadd). Ibn
Zuhra relies on dalīl ijmāʿ al-ṭāʾifa, or the “legal indicant of the consensus of the
community,”202 for supporting the stances he takes on adjudication; indeed, a discussion
on this type of dalīl is how he opens his chapter. However, Ibn Zuhra does add that this
community consensus on the judgeship is reinforced through what he deems as the
relevant Qurʾānic verses. These include Q 5:42, “But if you judge, judge between them
with justice (wa-in ḥakamta fa’ḥkum baynahum bi ‘l-qiṣt),”203 and the verse addressed to
Dāwūd: “O David! Indeed we have made you a vicegerent [khalīfa] on the earth. So
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judge between the people with justice”204 (Q 38:26). Ibn Zuhra also cites the verses that
stipulate the punishments for the adulterer and the thief, 205 presumably because they
require the highest level of certainty to be carried out, a level of certainty which Ibn
Zuhra believes is supplied by the judge’s personal knowledge.
Ibn Zuhra leaves no ambiguity regarding his stance on the judge’s personal
knowledge, expanding on the reference to “whoever gives a ruling based on his
knowledge” to drive home his point: “it is permitted for the judge to rule according to his
knowledge in all matters regarding property, penal law, retaliation in kind (qiṣāṣ), and
others.”206 This position closely aligns with that of the Ẓāhirite jurist Ibn Ḥazm of a
century earlier, according to whom “a qadi’s knowledge is the best evidence whatever the
case.”207 This assertion is also highly reminiscent of Ibn Zuhra’s idealized description of
the judge, referred to as the ḥākim, who is “ the transmitter (mukhbir) of rulings from
God Most High, and the representative (nāʾib) of the Messenger, peace be upon him and
his family.”208 What is unclear, however, is how Ibn Zuhra connects a judge to this kind
of personal knowledge when the judge is not the Imam himself. Regardless, he links the
judge’s prerogative of al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm to a tradition in which ʿAlī (amīr al-muʾminīn)
admonished Shurayḥ for requesting evidence in addition to ʿAlī’s ḥukm bi ‘l-ʿilm.
Shurayḥ is made to admit that he “transgressed the sunna in requesting evidence from the
Imam of the Muslims.”209 Rather than merely being an option, however, the judge’s
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personal knowledge becomes a foundational principle of determining truth in a case,
which Ibn Zuhra asserts is more certain (ākad) than the probability (ghalbat al-ẓann)
obtained through other evidence.210 Indeed, “if the judge does not adjudicate according to
his knowledge, it will either lead to his depravity (fisqihi)”—through which the truth that
he knows will be suppressed, or through which something whose status is unknown will
be awarded (ʿaṭāʾ mā lam yuʿlam istiḥqāqahu)—“or to a suspension of his ruling (īqāf
al-ḥukm),” as well as the revocation of his legal rulings in the future.211 Similarly, Ibn
Zuhra refers to the undesirability of a judge relying on someone else’s legal opinions
(taqlīd), which Ibn Zuhra defines as adjudicating by fatwās and thus “in ignorance
(jahl),” as opposed to making “a conclusive decision on a legal ruling through what God
has revealed.”212
Ibn Zuhra is not concerned with a judge’s errors so much as accusations against
the judge when he stands firm on his legal ruling, since he is made particularly vulnerable
through the application of his personal knowledge. Referring to al-shurūṭ al-murāʿa—
rules to be observed—this is the only time in this section that he seems to implicitly
acknowledge the reality of a Twelver judge being embedded in a non-Twelver Islamic
system.213 For Ibn Zuhra, the rules to be observed are assuming the good faith effort
(ḥusn al-ẓann) of the judge, not only for rulings based on his personal knowledge but also
in the judge’s declarations regarding what has been confessed or established as evidence
before him, even if he was the only one to witness them. Furthermore, “it is not for
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anyone to prohibit (an yamnaʿa) the judge’s personal knowledge if this includes an
accusation against the judge,” just as it is “forbidden (ḥarām) to refrain from [giving] a
legal ruling because of an accusation” of bias.214
The rest of the section involves procedural details regarding testimony, oaths, and,
like Ibn Ḥamza, reconciliation (ṣulḥ), much of which is underpinned by constant
reference to dalīl ijmāʿ al-ṭāʾifa. In most cases, the legal indicant established by
consensus is sufficient to justify a discrete rule (farʿ) on its own, as in the testimony of
four women not being allowed in regard to divorce initiated by the husband (ṭalāq), in
sighting the new moon (hilāl), or the acceptance of the testimony of a slanderer who
repented and did good works. In other cases, the legal indicant is reinforced by other
legal sources, such as the consensus of the Companions, narrations from the Prophet, or a
prima facie reading of the Qurʾān (ẓāhir al-Qurʾān). As such, Ibn Zuhra presents the
rules regarding evidence as decisive, only very rarely citing an alternate juristic position.
Although Ibn Zuhra does not organize his evidence in list form in the manner of Ibn
Ḥamza, he does detail the combinations and procedures for evidence for each type of
case very extensively, which accounts for the majority of his chapter. In a discussion of
the procedure for swearing oaths, Ibn Zuhra briefly digresses to note that a legal ruling is
only permitted through the judge’s personal knowledge, lawfully established evidence
(thubūt al-bayyina ʿalā’l-wajh illadhī qarrarahu al-sharʿ), or by admission (iqrār) of the
defendant, and not “qiyās, raʾy, or ijtihād.”215 Although not the main objective of his
chapter, Ibn Zuhra manages to assert Twelver opposition to non-Twelver, including
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Shāfiʿite, legal methods through this brief but cogent assertion. Ibn Zuhra’s emphasis on
sectarian consensus as the overriding legal principle also puts him in opposition to Ibn
Ḥamza’s position on accepting the legal ruling of another judge through correspondence;
Ibn Zuhra states that even bayyina evidence concerning the judge’s correspondence, or
the judge’s oral confirmation corroborating the legal ruling, is insufficient. He further
confirms his position with the Qurʾānic verse, “do not follow that of which you have no
knowledge (wa lā taqfu mā laysa laka bihi ʿilm).”216
Courtroom protocol—such as when to hold sessions, the appropriate state of mind
of the judge, his reception of the litigants, etc.—are briefly outlined towards the end of
the section.217 The mosque as the site of the courtroom is not stated but assumed, as Ibn
Zuhra only states that the judge’s back must be to the qibla. Ibn Zuhra then details how
the judge is to induce the litigants to begin their claims, how to weigh their evidence, and
how to compel the one ruled against to give the claimant his due through imprisonment if
necessary (and which must be recorded in the court register, the dīwān), as well as how to
obtain an oath from a secluded woman.
Although the concept of consensus that excludes non-Twelvers is not a new
idea—al-Mufīd refers to ijmāʿ al-shīʿa, “Shīʿī consensus,” in his Awāʾil al-maqālāt, and
al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-Murtaḍā refer to ijmāʿ al-firqa in the same way. However, alShaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-Murtaḍā developed the idea more fully than al-Mufīd in that “they
accepted consensus not only as an authoritative argument (ḥujjah) but also as an aṣl or
dalīl, one of the sources from which legal rulings could be derived, thus incorporating
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consensus into a more developed theory of jurisprudence.”218 Ibn Zuhra, however, takes a
firm stand in siding with al-Murtaḍā rather than al-Ṭūsī through his overwhelming
reliance on ijmāʿ al-ṭāʾifa. As Devin Stewart notes, al-Murtaḍā uses the term ijmāʿ altāʾifa in his Rasāʾil, where he explains it as a way for the Imam’s opinions to be known
when he is hidden and unidentifiable, since a consensus through his community is sure to
contain his legal opinion.219 Since Ibn Zuhra began his section on adjudication by
asserting that the judge and the Imam were both representatives of the Prophet, along
with asserting that legal rulings must be given in accordance with “what has been passed
down,” we can thus see the particular appeal of community consensus to Ibn Zuhra.
Furthermore, as someone clearly invested and engaged in dialectical theology (kalām) in
the Ghunyat al-nuzūʿ itself, community consensus provided further appeal, since “one
major reason for the development of ijmāʿ al-firqah, was, it appears, the need to use it as
a supporting proof in arguments against Sunnī opponents.”220 This may account for the
overwhelming dominance of sectarian consensus in a discussion on adjudication.

Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī, Kitāb al-Sarāʾir al-ḥāwī li-taḥrīr al-fatāwī

Ibn Zuhra’s student, Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī (d. 598 H/1202 CE), authored his Kitāb alsarāʾir al-ḥāwī li-taḥrīr al-fatāwī towards the end of his life. His staunch criticism of his
peers and teachers, as well as his lament regarding the deplorable scholarship in regard to

218

Devin J. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System
(University of Utah Press, 1998), 160–61.
219
Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 161.
220
Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 161.

94

“Islamic law (sharīʿat al-Islām),” contributed greatly to the idea that the Saljūq period
was one of Twelver decline.221 His Kitab al-Sarāʾir was particularly focused on
critiquing the madhhab, or legal methodology, of Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa al-Ṭūsī, particularly
regarding the khabar wāḥids, that is, traditions that were not attested to by a sufficient
number of independent narrators.
The relevant section in Ibn Idrīs’ work has the same title as al-Ṭūṣī’s: “The Book
of Judgments and Rulings (kitāb al-qaḍāyā wa ‘l-aḥkām): The protocols of adjudication
(ādāb al-qaḍāʾ) and the required mental state of the judge (wa mā yajib an yakūna alqāḍī ʿalayhi min al-aḥwāl).” Although more explicitly demonstrating knowledge of the
Sunnī adab al-qāḍāʾ genre in name as well as partially in content, Ibn Idrīs stays well
within the particularly Twelver liminal style of discourse about judgeship. The section is
a sustained critical analysis of al-Ṭūsī’s methodology that seeks to highlight al-Ṭūṣī’s
contradictory positions among his various books on substantive law. As such, this chapter
does not strictly function as a commentary (sharḥ) on al-Nihāya as much as it
reconstructs—or reimagines—a sound al-Ṭūsī methodology. Ibn Idrīs’ commentary thus
runs more like a list of points where Ibn Idrīs takes opportunities to discursively critique
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s approaches to various legal questions, to harmonize some disparate
points across al-Ṭūsī’s texts, and, on rare occasions, to agree with him. Although
commentaries tend to serve as a means to subtly yet squarely situate the commentator as
the heir to the source-author’s authority (here, that of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūṣī), Ibn Idrīs does
not do so in order to depict himself as a loyal adherent to al-Ṭūsī’s legal methodology nor
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does he wish to place himself outside of it; instead, his project is to create an acceptable
methodology, based on al-Ṭūsī’s work, by purging the elements of al-Ṭūsī’s approach
that he finds objectionable. To this end, Ibn Idrīs attacks the very foundation of al-Ṭūsī’s
legal methodology while laying out his own acceptable boundaries for the “Imāmīs.”
Ibn Idrīs’ main concern is with harmonizing seemingly contradictory juristic
khabars, or historical reports that have legal force, regarding the judiciary. Having moved
al-Ṭūsī’s relevant discussions on judgeships from the jihād chapter to the chapter on
adjudication, Ibn Idrīs begins with what appears to be an ambivalent approach to the
taking up of judgeship; he first discusses the judgeship (qaḍāʾ) as “permitted” and
“perhaps obligatory” (rubbamā kāna wājiban), and “if not obligatory, perhaps
recommended” (rubbamā kāna mustaḥabban).”222 Like al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, he
references the Qurʾān verse on Dāwūd and Sulaymān, as well as a few other verses
referring to judges and adjudication.223 He also includes a ḥadīth depicting the act of
adjudication, as established by the Companions and the Successors, as sunna; thus, the
delegation of adjudication to the judge means that when the judge engages in
adjudication, he is practicing the sunna. However, even though he asserts that the
judgeship is considered part of commanding right and forbidding wrong and is supported
by “the consensus of the community (ijmāʿ al-umma),” Ibn Idrīs nonetheless states that it
is “detestable (makrūh)” to take up the position, likening it to being “sacrificed without a
knife.”224 He also refers to the Prophetic ḥadīth that a judge’s reckoning in the afterlife
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would be so severe that he would “wish that he had not been a judge between two people
for [even] a date (tamra),” meaning that even adjudicating an object of trivial value
would jeopardize his soul because of the possibility of issuing an incorrect ruling.
Regardless, Ibn Idrīs notes that the judgeship is a collective duty, and if a group of people
(qawm) take it up the burden it is no longer incumbent upon the rest.225 Ibn Idrīs explains
these variant positions as pertaining to different categories of people: “whoever is one of
the specialists (ahl al-ʿilm) in adjudication and adjudicates correctly (yaqḍī bi ‘l-ḥaqq), is
rewarded; but whoever is one of the specialists but does not adjudicate correctly, or is
ignorant” has sinned. However, his section completely excises al-Ṭūsī’s references to the
ruler (sulṭān) in discussing the taking up of the collective duty and commanding good and
forbidding wrong. Furthermore, Ibn Idrīs removes all of al-Ṭūsī’s statements concerning
the carrying out of capital punishment under a ruler, whether illegitimate or not, and also
those concerning the usurpation of the Imam’s rights.226 The sole exception is the
generalizing statement that the judgeship is not validly conferred unless it is by the
authority of the Imam of the Muslims, and by his permission (bi-idhnihi).227 In effect, Ibn
Idrīs ignores the entire political apparatus that frames the judgeship, and by extension, he
leaves out the factors that drive al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s accommodationist positions. By
doing so, Ibn Idrīs also ignores al-Shaykh al-Ṭusī’s enjoining of the judge to strive to
have his rulings carried out in the situation in which a Twelver undertakes to “issue legal
rulings under the wrong-doers.”228
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Ibn Idrīs then interjects his definition of the key terms qaḍāʾ and ḥukm, an
unusual thing for a jurist to do in works of substantive law: “the difference between ḥukm
and qaḍāʾ is that the ḥukm is the bringing about of a legal opinion which decides between
the two litigants, and the qaḍāʾ is the consummation of an action obligated by the
ruling;”229 in short, the ḥukm is the ruling on the facts while the qaḍāʾ is the ruling on the
law. However, what appears to be a significant conceptual distinction is later curiously
dismissed by Ibn Idrīs when he repeats the statement again later in the chapter: “this is
the difference between the two for the lexicographers (ahl al-lugha); as for those who
know the sharīʿa, there is no difference between the two.”230 We are then left with no
further discussion of the matter.
Ibn Idrīs retains al-Ṭūsī’s section on the judge’s qualifications regarding his
knowledge of the sources, i.e., that of the scriptural proof-texts and their hermeneutical
categories, almost verbatim. However, he finds it necessary to go into detail regarding the
requirement of a solid grasp of Arabic lexicography (muḍṭaliʿan bi-maʿānī kalām alʿarab). In doing so, Ibn Idrīs takes this prescription beyond its linguistic element to
render it a statement on legal principles. His focus on the jurist’s skill in Arabic
lexicography allows him to criticize the jurisprudential credentials of non-native speakers
like Abū Ḥanīfa,231 and by extension, the Ḥanafites, even as he cites figures traditionally
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lauded by Sunnīs to make his point, particularly ʿUmār ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the second Sunnī
caliphal successor to the Prophet. Ibn Idrīs thus cites traditions that make proficiency in
Arabic a fundamental requirement for the jurist, and another that renders ḥadīth narration
null if the narrator made grammatical mistakes. He illustrates this principle with an
example of a jurist being asked a question by a petitioner in which the jurist quoted the
Prophet. The petitioner asked the meaning of the words in the jurist’s fatwā, but the jurist
said he did not know. The fatwā petitioner then asked in exasperation, “what is this that
you prohibit me from doing something according to your statement of ‘I don’t know’?”232
Ibn Idrīs thus demonstrates the absurdity of a jurist prohibiting and prescribing actions to
petitioners without being able to fully justify all elements to a petitioner, an ability that
would only be possible through skill in Arabic lexicography. Ibn Idrīs drives this point
home by citing a tradition about ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, in which ʿUmar admonishes a
group of people to “go learn Arabic, since it is that which fortifies reason (taʿallamū alʿarabiyya fa-innahā tuthabbitu al-ʿaql).”233
Ibn Idrīs does not utilize al-Ṭūsī’s subtitles in his chapter, and in fact does not
divide his chapter into subtitles at all. However, he does generally cover the same topics
specifically relating to judicial protocol, such as how the judge should prepare himself for
court, how he should receive the litigants, how to hear their claims, how to compel a
litigant to give the other litigant his due, and refraining from giving a ruling when
doubting a litigant’s state of mind; Ibn Idrīs paraphrases al-Ṭūsī’s positions on these
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matters.234 Like all jurists in this study, Ibn Idrīs does not provide any legal sources to
justify their validity, as the customary nature of these protocols likely made such
justification difficult. Ibn Idrīs, although taking care to not be explicit in doing so,
demonstrates good knowledge of the Sunnī-Shāfiʿite adab al-qaḍāʾ genre. He notes that
some “people of adjudication” (qawm al-qaḍāʾ) detested the mosque as a place to hold a
court session while others permit it; indeed, all the Shāfīʿite texts surveyed in this
dissertation listed the mosque as the least desirable place to hold court. He then contrasts
it with “our madhhab,” stating that the mosque is the most suitable place for a court since
ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib “used to adjudicate in the congregational mosque in Kūfā.”235
The rest of the chapter then follows a clearer arrangement: Ibn Idrīs cites the
relevant section of al-Ṭūsī’s al-Nihāya, pointing out discrepancies of opinion in al-Ṭūsī’s
other works—usually between al-Khilāf and al-Mabsūṭ—and then notes the
shortcomings in al-Ṭūsī’s method for deriving discrete rules. This section is essentially a
survey of the reliability of ḥadīths and khabars (Ibn Idrīs uses both terms236) that are
traced back to the Imams and utilized by al-Ṭūsī; whenever Ibn Idrīs disagrees with alShaykh al-Ṭūsī’s use or rating of a tradition, he then details the reasons why al-Shaykh
al-Ṭūsī’s method goes against the principles of the “madhhab,” or why he applied the
tradition incorrectly. Such discrepancies are explained as emanating from al-Ṭūsī’s
concern with citing in order to obtain a particular legal end rather than from devotion to
the legal principle (īrādan lā iʿtiqādan).237
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Among al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s faults, Ibn Idrīs lists deriving rules that do not
properly rely upon a khabar with a reliable chain of transmission,238 as well as utilizing
khabar wāḥids to justify a derived rule to which they do not apply.239 Since Ibn Idrīs’
traditionist method relies on the khabar wāḥids to expand the pool of traditions available,
he is most critical of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s inappropriate vetting of weak khabar wāḥids. 240
Ibn Idrīs also criticizes al-Ṭūsī for marking certain khabar wāḥids as weak and demoting
them to mere narrations (riwāya) when al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, and
their peers had no objection to them. As such, Ibn Idrīs includes these particular khabar
wāḥids under the title al-nawādir fi ‘l-qaḍāʾ wa ‘l-aḥkām, “Rarities (nawādir) pertaining
to judgments and rulings.”241 Ibn Idrīs’ own criterion of a weak khabar wāḥid is when the
narrator of the report himself has not heardthe Imam say it, with no witnesses having
testified to the Imam having said it “or given fatwās according to it.”242 He is adamantly
critical of referring to khabar wāḥids that are merely found in texts rather than being
heard from narrators themselves. He analogizes such weak traditions to the situation of a
petitioner and a muftī to make his point: “it is not permitted for a petitioner for a fatwā to
refer to anything except to the legal opinion (qawl) of the muftī, not what he had found
elsewhere in his handwriting.”243 Ibn Idrīs also utilizes consensus when vetting ḥadīths,
based on whether a ḥadīth was also mentioned by al-Shaykh Mufīd and al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā.244 Indeed, Ibn Idrīs points out that in al-Nihāya, al-Ṭūsī states that “our legal
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indicant is the consensus of the community and its khabars (dalīlunā ijmāʿ al-firqa waakhbārihim).”245 Ibn Idrīs also criticizes al-Ṭūsī’s own characterizations of his approach
to various issues. Regarding al-Ṭūsī’s chapter on vows and oaths, Ibn Idrīs asserts that alṬūsī claims to have already addressed the issues of what a person is and is not allowed to
swear by, when he had not actually done so. Clearly irritated, Ibn Idrīs asserts that al-Ṭūsī
should have to “apologize” for leaving out such important information, indicate the
statement (jumla) that he wants to employ, and to categorize it properly, just as other
scholars have done in their writings.246
While Ibn Idrīs “is the first Shiʿite jurist who clearly gave an independent
authority to ʿaql as a category of Sharīʿa sources in the place of qiyās,”247 he also lays
great emphasis on consensus as a source of community cohesion, bringing himself closer
in line to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā even as he criticizes al-Ṭūsī. Ibn Idrīs refers to “the right
opinion (ṣaḥīḥ) of our madhhab”, “the legal statements of our companions (aqwāl
aṣḥābinā)”, and “what the madhhab requires (yaqtaḍī).”248 By “madhhab” Ibn Idrīs
means legal doctrine rather than school, as when Ibn Idrīs refers to “the madhhab of our
Shaykh Abū Jaʿfar [al-Ṭūṣī] in the legal issues (masāʾil) of his Khilāf.”249 Furthermore,
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Wa li-qāʾil an yaʿtadhira wa yaqūla ashāra ilā al-jumla illatī yurīdu an yuʿmilahā wa yuṣannifahā wa
dhālika jāʾiz wa kathīran mā qālat dhālika al-ʿulamāʿfī taṣnīfihim (Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī, Kitāb al-Sarāʾir,
2:182).
247
Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the
Institution of Marjaʿ (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996),
165.
248
Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī, Kitāb al-Sarāʾir, 2:163, 166.
249
Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī, Kitāb al-Sarāʾir, 2:168. Unlike its use by contemporaneous Shāfiʿits, the Twelver
jurists’ use of the term madhhab does not refer to a legal school, but is “intended merely to indicate the
opinion or opinions of an individual jurist, such as in the pronouncement that the madhhab of so-and-so in
a particular case is such-and-such” (Wael B. Hallaq, “From Regional to Personal Schools of Law? A
Reevaluation,” Islamic Law and Society 8, no. 1 [2001]: 23). However, the Twelver jurists also utilize the
term to mean something approximating a legal school with shared legal principles and whose boundaries
246

102

he analyzes ḥadīths according to whether they are in contradiction with the principles of
the madhhab and the “consensus of the Muslims.”250
In his discussion of weighing various kinds of evidence to arrive at a legal ruling,
Ibn Idrīs takes the opportunity to remind the reader that “qiyās, istiḥsān, and ijtihāḍ are
void (bāṭil) for us”251 since they had been rejected (taraka) by the madhhab.252 As a
result, Ibn Idrīs combed through the legal examples (masāʾil) of al-Ṭūsī’s Khilāf, “which
are [taken] from the works of substantive law of the dissenters (al-mukhālifīn) and their
doctrines (madhāhibihim),” in order to determine the ones al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī selected to
narrate. Ibn Idrīs declares these masāʾil, which are supposed to serve as legal examples,
as not containing
our madhhab, or from any of our shaykhs; it did not contain our khabars,
nor did any of our scholarly companions incline toward it except our
Shaykh Abū Jaʿfar [al-Ṭūsī] in his books of substantive law— his Mabsūṭ
and the legal examples of his Khilāf. His custom in these two books is to
cite the legal opinions (aqwāl) of the dissenters, and then choose some
from among them to consider.253
Ibn Idrīs thus makes it clear where his position differs from al-Ṭūsī’s as often as
he can. A terse section he included on his commentary—on a judge’s mistakes—is an
opportunity for him to proclaim that “there is no ijithād on our part, nor qiyās, and not
every mujtahid is correct.”254 The attack on the famous juristic maxim “every mujtahid is
correct” works on several levels. First, it serves as an indication of Ibn Idrīs’ familiarity
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with Sunnī, particularly Shāfiʿite, texts. Second, it does away with the concept of the
infallibilism of the judge in his exercise of ijithād. As will be seen, in the adab al-qāḍī
texts of Shāfiʿite jurists the ability to undertake ijithād in an individual application of the
law was a requirement for the judge. It is this ability that ensures that the judge’s ruling is
not tainted by error in interpreting the divine law, because of the skill and legal
knowledge needed to reach the rank of a mujtahid. It is also this process of ijithād that
protects the judge from accusations of error, regardless of whether another mujtahid
comes to a different or contrary ruling in a similar case; thus, all rulings by mujtahid
judges are valid. However, Ibn Idrīs’ response wrests away this infallibilism from the
judge. His traditionist position, which argues that a properly knowledgeable judge should
be able to find and apply the relevant legal principles without recourse to ijtihād, supports
his assertion that only one truly legitimate community can derive God’s laws without
error. In Ibn Idrīs’ adab al-qāḍī discussion, Twelver juridical consensus plays a major
role as a source for the theoretical principles underpinning the judge’s decision-making
process. Furthermore, because of Ibn Idrīs’ sectarian commitments, this rejection of
infallibilism thus narrows the pool of judges who give validly derived rulings from all
qualified Muslims to only those who adhere to Twelver Shīʿī legal methodology. Ibn
Idrīs thus gives a rather convincing elaboration of al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s permission for
Twelver judges to function within a non-Twelver judicial framework while maintaining
their exclusive legal and theological legitimacy. He comments that “the judgeship is not
validly conferred unless by appointment by the ‘Imam of the Muslims’ and by his
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permission,”255 whereas al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī has no such caveat in his corresponding
chapter nor in his section on jihād in al-Nihāya.
Ibn Idrīs’ understanding of the general raison d’etre of the judgeship is cobbled
together from al-Ṭūṣī’s statements, which he cites without disagreement and therefore
with implicit approval. He thus relates a narration from the Prophet alluding to the
judge’s role: “God does not make a community holy which does not have someone who
advocates for the rights of the weak (laysa fīhim man yaʾkhudh li ’l-ḍaʿīf ḥaqqahu).”256
After characterizing the desired fear-inducing qualities in the judge,257 he then describes
the process that precedes giving the legal ruling: “whenever his case takes place and he
wants to give a legal ruling regarding it, if it has [an applicable] legal indicant from a
scriptural proof-text, conclusive tradition, or consensus, he must act in accordance with
it.”258 Ibn Idrīs comments on al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s text in this section as “the correct
[opinion] that our madhhab requires:” “if we have all the ḥadīths, we have their legal
rulings.”259 Here, Ibn Idrīs underscores his traditionist method, which argues that the pool
of reliable and relevant traditions accepted by Imāmī consensus were sufficient to cover
all legal cases without the use of analogy or other inferential techniques. However, he
also criticizes references to khabar wāḥids on legal matters that are clearly addressed in
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the revealed texts (ẓāhir al-tanzīl), such as a spouse’s share of inheritance after death,
noting that the legal principle (aṣl) has to be in accordance with the Book of God as well
as the consensus of the Imams.260 Besides appropriate khabar wāḥids, Ibn Idrīs notes that
Twelvers may rely on consensus and “tawātur al-nuṣūs,” to analogize without recourse to
qiyās and ijtihād.261
However, like the jurists before him, this traditionist bent stands in tension with
the judge’s personal knowledge. Ibn Idrīs reiterates Ibn Zuhra’s position that the judge
must rely on his own knowledge without restriction, even repeating Ibn Zuhra’s
statements on the ignominious result of not doing so: “For us, the judge must adjudicate
according to his knowledge in all matters because if he does not adjudicate according to
his knowledge, he will bring about (afḍā) a suspension of legal rulings or corruption in
legal rulings […] and if he does not give a legal ruling then he has suspended the legal
ruling.”262 Ibn Idrīs takes the opportunity in the section regarding judge-to-judge
correspondence to refer explicitly to the basic procedure of how a judge adjudicates: he
must find the legal indicant (dalīl sharʿī), for it is not allowed for “the second judge to
follow the first by means of taqlīd; rather he is obligated to give a correct legal ruling
[and] determine the bayyina evidence or admission (iqrār).”263
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Conclusion
Whereas Ibn Ḥamza writes a fairly prescriptive work of adab al-qāḍī that does
not deviate from its presentation of discrete rules, Ibn Zuhra and Ibn Idrīs utilize concepts
that lend a strongly sectarian framework to the legal sources they use to justify the
judgeship, even as they study and remain familiar with a variety of non-Twelver
jurists.264 Ibn Zuhra’s constant recourse to dalīl ijmāʿ al-firqa indicates the immediate
possibility of certainty in determining substantive law, since consensus among the
Twelvers is understood to contain the opinion of the Hidden Imam himself. Since such
consensus-based certainty also applies to understanding the Hidden Imam’s interpretation
of Qurʾanic verses on adjudication, it is thus extended to the judge’s personal knowledge
and expanded to its utmost extent, even as Ibn Zuhra recognizes the need for the
weighing of evidence as part of the judge’s responsibilities. Ibn Idrīs, a student of Ibn
Zuhra, also allows for the judge’s personal knowledge “in all matters,” whereas Ibn
Ḥamza limits its scope to civil matters (ḥuqūq al-nās). Interestingly, both Ibn Ḥamza and
Ibn Zuhra make fine distinctions between ruling on the facts and ruling on the law,
perhaps indicating a theoretical awareness of a distinction between ḥukm and qaḍāʾ. Ibn
Idrīs initially appeared to make a similar observation, although he later dismissed it as a
distinction only of interest to lexicographers.
Although they were but brief interjections in their chapters, Ibn Zuhra and Ibn
Idrīs explicitly denied a role for the judge’s ijtihād as well as analogical reasoning. In
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doing so, they draw strong sectarian boundaries between themselves and the proponents
of ijtihād like the Shāfi’ites. Because the Twelvers did not appear to have legal schools in
the same vein as the Sunnīs of this period, Ibn Idrīs implicitly argued for a community
legal cohesiveness that was based on consensus as well as the pool of properly-vetted
Twelver traditions; for him, all legal matters could be addressed through Twelver
khabars and consensus as legal sources. 265 Ibn Idrīs, having successfully rehabilitated alṬūsī’s traditionist methodology in the Twelver juristic canon, fundamentally contributed
to the theoretical foundation of Twelver juridical autonomy and legitimacy through his
critique and refinement of Ṭūsī’s methods. Furthermore, even though he would be
heavily criticized by later Twelver jurists for his antagonistic approach to al-Ṭūsī’s
methodology, he would nonetheless impact how later jurists, particularly al-Muḥaqqiq alḤillī, would shape the reception of al-Ṭūsī’s works.
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CHAPTER 3
The 13th and 14th Centuries CE: al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī and al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī

The jurists al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 676 H/1277 CE266), and his student alʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726 H/1325 CE and also known as Ibn al-Muṭahhar), are lionized as
two of the major Twelver scholars of the Ilkhānid period by Twelver and Western
scholars alike267 and are unilaterally depicted as ushering in a new stage of legal
development in both content and theory. The status of al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma as
major jurists is also tied to the rise of the “school of Ḥilla” in Twelver Shīʿism, starting a
tradition of scholarship that established the Iraqi city of Ḥilla as the “unmistakeable
center of Twelver Shīʿī scholarship.”268 The mythos of the “school of Ḥilla” was further
tied to the two jurists’ pioneering acts: their integration of the Sunnī conception of ijtihād
as a fundamental Twelver legal principle, in spite of a history of Twelver juristic
resistance, and their roles in the conversion of the Ilkhānid Mongol rulers to Islam.
However, despite the heady possibilities of converting the Ilkhānids to Twelver
Shīʿism269 and finally granting a Twelver legal system coercive power through a state,
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their furūʿ works on judges and judgeship maintained the conservative genre expectations
of adab al-qāḍī texts as well as the judicial concerns of preceding Twelver jurists.
Furthermore, al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma’s production of their own furūʿ works as
mukhtaṣars, or practical summaries,270 rendered their discussions of judges and
adjudication even more truncated despite the rich new political landscape that was
purportedly laid out before them. However, despite these stylistic restrictions, the subtle
changes effected in al-Muḥaqqiq’s and al-ʿAllāma’s writings on judges still managed to
reflect some of their contemporary concerns in significant ways.
Despite the designation of al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma as watersheds in Twelver
legal writing, their integration of Sunnī literary styles like mukhtaṣars and theoretical
concepts like ijtihād should not be considered an uncharacteristic break from Twelver
juristic learning. Like many Twelver jurists before them, al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma
studied under Sunnī teachers; as Kazemi Moussavi notes, al-ʿAllāma even “wrote a

the Ilkhānid court is problematic, since the roles attributed to al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma are either traced
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commentary on his teacher Ibn al-Ḥājib’s Mukhtaṣar, which was described as expository
by Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī (d. 825/1449).”271 However, despite these kinds of linkages,
Gleave observes that “the early Imami jurists did not accept ijtihād, considering it
epistemologically suspect (based on ẓann) and introduced by the Sunnis in order to
overcome their lack of a sinless Imam.”272 It should be kept in mind, however, that
Twelver engagement with Sunnī juristic training was complex. While some major
Twelver scholars, such al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, incorporated certain Sunnī juristic literary
practices,273 such elements in their works would be both rejected and later reinforced by
Twelver jurists. As such, this dynamic evolution of engagement with Sunnī juristic
thought often reflected Twelver juristic support in favor of or against those of other
Twelver jurists. However, al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma overcame the general Twelver
refusal to fully incorporate ijtihād by separating it from raʾy (personal appraisal) 274 and
qiyās (analogic reasoning), which were considered methods that could not obtain
reasonable degrees of juristic certainty. Instead, they adopted “a new conception of
ijtihād similar to that formulated by Sunnī scholars such as Ghazzālī and Fakhr al-Dīn alRāzī,” the latter of whom had “composed one of the most extensive works on the legal
methodology in which the concepts of ẓann and ijtihād are clearly defined.”275
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According to Kazemi Moussavi, the most salient feature of the juristic tradition
established by the writings of al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma in Ḥilla was infusing the
concept of ijtihād with this new meaning and wider scope.276 However, rather than
postulating a solely Sunnī influence on this development, Kazemi Moussavi asserts that
al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma also built on the Twelver jurisprudential tradition to do so:
“The works of Mufīd, Murtaḍā, Ṭūsī, and Ibn Idrīs prepared the ground for the
development of Shiʿite law with a wider scope for substantive law (furūʿ) in which the
ʿulamāʾ were able to apply their Uṣūlī inferences to the details of cases,” even as they
diverged from these jurists in their treatment of uṣūl al-fiqh, which was based on alGhazālī and al-Rāzī.277 They also established juristic authority, delegated from the
Hidden Imam, in cases of the khums-tax, zakāt-alms, the giving of fatwās (iftāʾ),
congregational prayer, and the judgeship.278 It is this intersection of the wider scope of
substantive law with the judgeship with which this chapter concerns itself.
This trend of engaging with previous Twelver jurists while creating stylistic
breaks in legal writing is also evident in the “adab al-qāḍī” chapters (titled kitāb alqaḍāʾ in these texts) of the works of al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma, actively referencing alShaykh al-Ṭūsī’s legal opinions and reinforcing his preeminent status among Twelver
jurists. Despite the emphasis on their integration of identifiably Sunnī concepts and
models, it is key to note here that the incorporation of elements of Sunnī jurisprudence

276

Kazemi Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam, 165.
Kazemi Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam, 165, 170. The term Uṣūlī (“or mujtahids, who
sought to maintain al-ʿAllāma’s juristic system”), which is applied to opponents of Akhbarī jurists, is
anachronistic when utilized for these periods; the term Akbharī in its consistent form as “traditionalist”
cannot be traced back to earlier than the Safavid jurist Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (11th c. H./17th c.
CE) (Robert Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbārī Shīʻī School [Leiden:
Brill, 2007], xix).
278
Kazemi Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam, 151.
277

112

did not develop in a linear fashion; rather, the internal dynamics among rationalist- and
traditionist-leaning Twelver jurists also accounted for the different trajectories of furūʿ
writings after al-Ṭūsī. However, the Twelver jurists prior to al-Muḥaqqiq did not reject
al-Nihāya because of its Sunnī influence but rather because of its purported lack of
methodological rigor in its use of khabar wāḥids, as established through the criticisms
made by Ibn Idrīs. Instead, they often referred to al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s al-Mabsūṭ, which
“treated many cases which Shīʿī jurists had not dealt with previously,”279 as well as his
other major works as evidence of his scholarly authority. Thanks to the impact of Ibn
Idrīs’ criticisms of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s juristic methods, the approach of referring to alṬūsī’s other works in the creation of Twelver adab al-qāḍī, rather than al-Nihāya, was
fairly consistent in the subsequent adab al-qāḍī chapters of jurists of the 11th and 12th
centuries CE. It was al-Muḥaqqiq who differed from these post-Ṭūsī jurists in his aim of
maintaining al-Nihāya as the most authoritative Twelver work of substantive law. AlMuḥaqqiq succeeded in this endeavor by authoring a clarification on the text titled Nukat
al-Nihāya,280 which, as Etan Kohlberg noted, “defend[ed]Ṭūsī against the critique of Ebn
Edris (d. 598/1202) in his Sarāʾer, while refining and systematizing Ṭūsī’s legal
doctrine.”281

Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām and al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ
An analysis of the kitāb al-qaḍāʾ chapters in al-Muḥaqqiq’s Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām and
al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ reveals Sunnī, particularly Shāfiʿite, forms, although the
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intertextual integration of such forms into Twelver writings is more complex than mere
borrowing. Although Devin Stewart suggests the possibility that the Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām is
modeled on al-Rāfīʿī’s al-ʿAzīz,282 the basis for such a comparison is difficult, particularly
because of the very different forms the two works take. Al-Rāfiʿī’s al-ʿAzīz is a multivolume commentary that quotes its source text—al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz fī ’l-fiqh al-Imām
al-Shāfiʿī—in full. (The Wajīz was al-Ghazālī’s work on substantive law with his own
legal opinions regarding views from al-Shāfiʿī, al-Shāfiʿī’s student al-Muzanī, and Abū
Ḥanīfa,283 the eponymous madhhab “founder” who is cited by name in almost all
Twelver furūʿ works). In contrast, Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām is organized as an epitome, the
organization of which appears to come closest in form to al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz rather
than al-ʿAzīz. Al-Muḥaqqiq even occasionally asserts positions that appear to reflect
those of al-Ghazālī, although without explicitly attributing them to him. Furthermore,
there appears to be a Twelver juristic phenomenon in which Twelver jurists indicate
familiarity with their Shāfiʿite (as well as other) contemporaries, but do not attribute their
ideas to them, preferring to refer to positions of Shāfiʿites of much earlier eras. Both alMuḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma quote ideas found in al-Ghazālī, but not those of his later
Shāfiʿite commentators al-Rāfiʿī or al-Nawawī when their views differed from alGhazālī’s position. Regardless, al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma may have been guided
through al-Ghazālī’s ideas by al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī: al-Nawawī, whose Rawḍat alṭālibīn was itself an abridgement of and commentary on al-Rāfiʿī’s al-ʿAzīz, was a
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renowned Shāfiʿite jurist who was also “involved in a process of sorting through and
interpreting the Baghdadī and Khorasani Shāfiʿī heritage.”284 His work was thus an
important repository of Shāfiʿite ideas and texts for the Twelver jurists. Both al-Rāfiʿī
and al-Nawawī wrote extensively on issues of the judge’s ijtihād in their kitab al-qaḍāʾ
sections of al-ʿAzīz and Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, which would have been of interest to alMuḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma. Furthermore, their substantial discussions of the judge’s status
as muftī clearly shaped the Twelver jurists’ own kitāb al-qaḍāʾ chapters. This influence is
particularly true of al-Nawawī’s Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn as well as his al-Majmūʿ, whose
chapter on iftāʾ constituted “one of the most important and influential statements, within
the tradition of Shāfiʿite jurisprudence, of a theory that explained and justified the
activities of muftīs.”285 The greatest distinction between the Shāfiʿite commentators and
these Twelver jurists, however, was the context regarding judicial independence and
loyal conformity to a legal school, a concern al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma did not share.
As a result, discussions of the judge’s ijtihād for these two Twelver jurists occurred only
in questions of the process of independently giving a ruling.
The focus of modern secondary literature on al-Muḥaqqiq and his incorporation
of both Sunnī models286 and ijtihād in his legal works is due to the fact that the “earliest
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possible gloss on the controversial term ‘ijtihād’” in the Twelver juridical texts was in alMuḥaqqiq’s Maʿārij al-uṣūl.287 However, despite the well-documented integration of
Sunnī legal terms in al-Muḥaqqiq’s works of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), ijtihād is not
used to justify the concept of judgeship in his adab al-qāḍī chapter. Rather, ijtihād
appears merely as a technique to be utilized by the judge himself when dealing with
evidence in order to issue a ruling. Furthermore, although Modarressi notes that it is alĀbī, al-Muḥaqqiq’s student, who was the first to remove Sunnī opinions from legal
texts, 288 al-Muḥaqqiq’s narrowing of his sources of authority firmly embeds his kitāb alqaḍāʾ within an exclusively Twelver context, rendering al-Ābī’s project moot in respect
to the judgeship. As a result, al-Ābī reproduces the entirety of al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfi’s
section on qaḍāʾ with no further edits.289 Notably, al-Muḥaqqiq appears more concerned
with narrations of traditions that are traced back to the Prophet or ʿAlī in his Sharāʾiʿ, and
in both kitāb al-qaḍāʾ chapters of the Sharaʾiʿ and Mukhtasar only cites either legal
opinions by al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī or a narration leading back to either ʿAlī, the first Shīʿī
Imam, or Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the sixth Imam of the Twelvers who was acknowledged by both
Sunnīs and Shīʿīs as a jurist in his own right. However, “the new identity and scope of
ijithād was so evident for Muḥaqqiq and ʿAllāma that they did not bother to explain why
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they had abandoned the approach of the Twelver precursors such as Mufīd and Ṭūsī.”290
Yet they were able to firmly plant themselves within the recognized lineage of Twelver
scholars in multiple ways—refraining from applying their ijtihād to expanded areas of
juristic authority such as the judgeship, heavily relying on Twelver ḥadīths instead, or
granting licenses (sg. ijāza) for the practice of ijtihād, which “regulated access to the
ulema circles, and further strengthened the process of internal stratification.”291 This kind
of access was further reinforced through the production of condensed works or epitomes
of substantive law, particularly mukhtaṣars. As Norman Calder describes them,
First, they are authored texts. They represent the effort by particular
named individuals to bring the inherited tradition, with all its diversity of
oral and written sources, to order. None would doubt that the
responsibility for that ordering belongs to the individual in question who,
in undertaking the task, is making some sort of claim to a personal literary
achievement.292
Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām and al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ, as the latter’s title suggests, are
variations of mukhtaṣars, meaning that they were written with the goal of easier
accessibility for learners of the law and thus “relieved the educated readers from all the
lengthy discussions, chains of transmitters and endless appendices” of other legal
works.293 Al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ, al-Muḥaqqiq’s own abridgment of his already
condensed Sharāʾiʿ,294 is an even terser form of the epitome. The utility of this condensed
form was further underscored by its translation into Persian twenty years after his
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death295 and its own abridgment by Ibn Dawūd al-Ḥillī, a contemporary of al-ʿAllāma,
titled Muqtaṣar al-Mukhtaṣar.296
Both Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām and al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ are meant as study texts for
students, and al-Muḥaqqiq states in his introduction that al-Mukhtaṣar was intended as a
“summation of the authoritative doctrine (khulāṣat al-madhhab al-muʿtabar),”297 while
the Sharāʾiʿ was written in response to a request from a student who wanted a mukhtaṣar
of the rules (aḥkām) “as if it were a muftī which issued [legal opinions] (yakūn ka ’l-muftī
illadhī yaṣdur ʿanhu).”298 The Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām’s terseness as a summary work is due to
this particular form, serving as a rich source text for later commentaries. As Calder
observed, these types of works were clearly meant for educational purposes; they “were
the earliest constituents of a formal curriculum, and they mark, accordingly, the transition
from the world of the jurist who gained his knowledge through experience of life and
participation in the process of juristic discussion, to the world of the academic trainee
who, embarking on a course of study, required formal classes, text books, and literary and
hermeneutic skills.”299 This concept of furūʿ as the gateway to further theoretical study
thus reflects the pedagogy of teaching Islamic jurisprudence, which appears to have even
survived into the modern period.300 As such, the kitāb al-qaḍāʾ sections of Sharāʾiʿ and
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al-Mukhtaṣar contain not only what al-Muḥaqqiq deemed the most essential information
regarding judges and judgeship that a student of jurisprudence would need to master, but
the entire foundation of their conception of judgeship.
Yet despite its popularity as a work of substantive law, the Sharāʾiʿ is not a
prescriptive list of discrete rules organized by topic that was meant to be memorized.
Although it does contain procedural rules and protocols, it, as well as al-Mukhtaṣar alnāfiʿ, also presents multiple opinions for the various topics at certain points, leaving the
rule regarding some issues not fully resolved; the format of this text meant that these
unresolved issues served as points for further discussion and even elaboration among the
students who were learning the text.301 While not concerned with demonstrating the
reasoning behind the rules, al-Muḥaqqiq will note conflicting views (without further
elaboration), sometimes (but not always) adding his own legal opinion, and sometimes
declare a lack of a clear juristic position on an issue.302 Calder understands this mode of
furūʿ writing as a reflection of al-Muḥaqqiq’s conviction that legal doctrines can only be
stated on the basis of certainty rather than probability: “That the law was doubtful and
that scholars should be cautious in expressing their views or should suspend decision
(tawaqquf) were opinions that reflected Muḥaqqiq’s careful mediation of past and
present, his justification of ikhtilāf, his balancing of continuity and flexibility.”303 Thus,
the discrete rules of the text are presented as both a result of certain types of acceptable
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methods of legal argumentation as well as bases for discussion of further possible
derivations among the students themselves.
Unlike previous Twelver adab al-qāḍī texts, the Sharāʾiʿ uses a dividing header
scheme that employs language familiar from ʿilm al-jadal, or the field of dialectics,
which is “much preoccupied with the exposing, and avoiding, of self-contradiction and
larger doctrinal consistency.”304 Its main sections are generally divided into parts (sg.
qism) and sections (sg. faṣl) with subsets of masʾalas—usually case studies or legal
examples in previous Twelver adab al-qāḍī sections, such as that of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s
al-Nihāya, but here appearing as additional discrete rules. The larger divisions are
sometimes further apportioned into “maqṣid,” “naẓar,” and “baḥth,” whose content belies
their typical definitions of “purpose,” “examination,” and “inquiry,” respectively. Rather,
al-Muḥaqqiq employs these terms in order to present discrete rules as the result of proper
argumentation that took into account “the exposing of absurd or impossible
consequences, rejected propositions, and inconsistency.”305 Here, again, although the
application of ijtihād is implied in the titular sub-headings, it is not integrated into the
content or even organization of the adab al-qāḍī discussion itself. At the same time, the
inclusion of these terms—especially maqṣid—demonstrates al-Muḥaqqiq’s ties to
Shāfiʿite juridical thinking while maintaining his connection to foundational Twelver
texts. 306
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In terms of the Sharāʾiʿ’s content, its adab al-qāḍī section—titled kitāb alqaḍāʾ— is set after kitāb al-farāʾiḍ (chapter on obligatory duties), and in turn is followed
by kitāb al-shahādāt (testimony), kitāb al-ḥudūḍ wa ‘l-taʿzīrāt (obligatory and
discretionary punishments), kitāb al-qiṣāṣ (retaliation in kind), and kitāb al-diyāt (torts),
whose subjects were often treated within the adab al-qāḍī chapters of earlier texts. The
first maqṣid is divided into naẓars, of which the first two are the characteristics of the
judge (fī ’l-ṣifāt) and his protocols (fī ’l-ādāb); the protocols are further apportioned into
“preferred” and “detested” actions (al-mustaḥabba and al-makrūha). Each section
contains masāʾil at the end which, in the first two sections, constitute the vast majority of
the discrete rules. The “Second Maqṣid” outlines the proper way for claims to be brought
before the judge, and the rest of the kitab al-qāḍāʾ chapter consists of “the Third
Maqṣid,” the various responses that a defendant can give in response to a claim:
admission (iqrār), denial (inkār), or no response (sukūt). The “Fourth Maqṣid, On the
method of eliciting oaths (fī kayfiyyat al-istiḥlāf),” contains a long section on adjudicating
on the basis of the testimony of a single witness supported by an oath (al-yamīn maʿa ’lshāhid), a major point of difference between the Shāfiʿites and the Ḥanafites in which the
former permit it and the latter do not. While al-Muḥaqqiq treats the matter as a derivative
rule of oaths in general, the discussion of a single witness and an oath occurs in Shāfiʿite
adab al-qāḍī texts within the context of a Ḥanafite judge appointing a Shāfiʿīte judge as
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his representative in a specific legal matter and ordering him to rule according to the
Ḥanafite doctrine on the issue. While Shāfiʿites, such as al-Muḥaqqiq’s contemporary alRāfiʿī (d. 623 H/1226 CE), were pragmatically concerned with delineating boundaries in
multi-confessional judicial systems, 307 al-Muḥaqqiq simply notes the acceptance of the
procedure without indicating any political or sectarian concerns. While the procedure of a
single witness with an oath ostensibly paves the way for Twelver judges to be appointed
by Shāfiʿite judges as their representatives, al-Muḥaqqiq does not mention this point, or
the fact that this is a Shāfiʿite position in contrast to that of the Ḥanafites.
After beginning with the typically required characteristics of the judge—maturity,
soundness of mind, belief, righteousness, purity of birth (ṭahārat al-mawlid),308
knowledge (ʿilm), and maleness (dhakūra), al-Muḥaqqiq responds to the question of
whether adjudication (qaḍāʾ) is stipulated for the judge by “kifāya” (meaning farḍ kifāya,
the collective duty that is discharged by each individual or on behalf of a group) by
stating that there is uncertainty (taraddud) regarding it because “no one except the
Prophet can take up general leadership (riʾāsa ʿāmma) without possessing literacy
(kitāba).”309 However, we see the context underlying this assertion become slightly
clearer in the text of his al-Mukhtaṣar on whether women were allowed to take up the
judgeship; in al-Mukhtaṣar, al-Muḥaqqiq asserts that literacy (kitāba) is a condition of
being a judge except when a woman is being considered,310 despite the fact that he had
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earlier stated that “maleness” was a condition and in the Sharāʾiʿ that “no woman can
take up adjudication, even if she fulfilled the conditions.”311 In light of these
contradictory approaches between the two heavily-studied texts, the characterization of
al-ʿAllāma as systematizing some of al-Muḥaqqiq’s less cohesive positions certainly
applies here. This characterization also remains true, despite al-Muḥaqqiq’s use of
dialectical vocabulary in his headings, to impose a clearer organization of the judicial
ideas put forth by al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī.
Like the Twelver jurists before him,312 al-Muḥaqqiq acknowledges the possibility
of the presence of the Shīʿī Imām313 and of authority being derived from him. Since the
distinguishing feature of Twelver Shīʿism is the idea that the “Imam of the Age” has been
absent since the late 9th century CE,314 from a modern scholarly perspective this premise
may appear rather jarring and out of place. However, al-Muḥaqqiq’s persistence in
maintaining this premise without any further elaboration would nonetheless fit into
Calder’s characterization of him as choosing legal silence where he could not establish
certainty in the furūʿ, leaving it an open question for students and later commentators. As
such, in the Sharāʾiʿ’s discussion of the appointment of a judge (thubūt al-wilāya), alMuḥaqqiq states that it is “conditional upon permission of the Imam, peace be upon him,
or whomever the Imam has delegated; and if the inhabitants of a jurisdiction (ahl albalad) have instated a judge, his appointment is not valid” unless their nominees defend
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their nominations before the Imam.315 In that case, “the conditions that apply to him [the
judge appointed by the locals] are those that apply to the judge instated by the Imam (alqāḍī al-manṣūb ʿan al-Imām).”316 It is only later in al-Mukhtaṣar that al-Muḥaqqiq
stipulates that “it is not conferred upon one who is instated by laymen (al-ʿawāmm),” to
maintain the Shīʿī character of the judgeship.317
The centrality of the Imam in questions of delegation of authority and the
appropriate appointment of the judge appears to have severely limited al-Muḥaqqiq’s
integration of ijtihād in the context of the judgeship; al-Muḥaqqiq cites several Twelver
texts in the masāʾil part of the first section that are rather equivocal in regard to
permitting the judgeship, despite having just indicated that adjudication is considered “of
the category (bāb) of enjoining the good (al-amr bi ‘l-maʿrūf).”318 Al-Muḥaqqiq is
clearly not willing to have theoretical methods such as ijtihād replace the legal force of
khabars in his assertion of the permissibility of judgeship, a legal question he
acknowledges as unresolved among the Twelver jurists. As such, al-Muḥaqqiq states that
it is only “perhaps obligatory (rubbamā wajaba)” at best. It is through a quoted fatwā of
Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq319 (“they made him a qāḍī, so I made him a qāḍī, so bring yourself
to court before him”320) that the judgeship is deemed doctrinally acceptable; however, it
is only acceptable if it was delegated to the “jurists of the Ahl al-Bayt” in the absence of
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the Imam.321 Through this delegation of authority the position of the judge is deemed as
sometimes necessary, and it is on this basis that the chapter on judgeship continues with
the presumption of an appointed judge (or judges).322
However, fatwās are not only utilized as sources of the Imam’s legal dicta; in alMukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ, al-Muḥaqqiq states that adjudication “is not to be carried out except
by one with the capacity of giving fatwās; the fatwā of the scholars (ʿulamāʾ) is not
sufficient,”323 meaning that an appointed judge could not rely on the fatwās of others. It
was not merely that “for Muḥaqqiq, the sharīʿa was not a structure, easily known, of
order and stability;” the muftī, as a legally better-theorized articulator of the divine law,
had the best skills to impose order on such a structure.324 It thus made sense for alMuḥaqqiq to make giving fatwās an obligatory skill for the judge, the interpreter of laws
and giver of sentences.
Al-Muḥaqqiq concludes that the authority (wilāya) of the judge may be confirmed
by istifāḍa, a term used for the first time in a Twelver adab al-qāḍī context to refer to the
judgeship,325 just like other matters whose status was dependent on wide social and
juristic acknowledgment: genealogy (nasab), property rights, death, marriage,
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endowments (waqf), and the emancipation of slaves (ʿitq).326 Istifāḍa, although also
known as a type of ḥadīth/khabar category, in this case simply means widespread,
reliable confirmation of an event which has occurred, and which can thus be legally acted
upon; in this context, it is a form of confirmation of an individual judge’s authority.
However, if the judge’s authority could not be widely attested to—whether due to the
distance of his jurisdiction from the place of his appointment (li-buʿd mawḍiʿ wilāyatihi
ʿan mawḍiʿ ʿaqd al-qaḍāʾ lahu) or for other reasons—al-Muḥaqqiq asserts that judge’s
authority can be established in ways other than istifāḍa. In this case, the Imam (or his
delegate) can have two witnesses testify to the judge’s authority. Otherwise, without
testimonial evidence (bayyina), the local appointers (ahl al-wilāya) do not have to accept
the judge’s claim to authority even if the local rulers (imārāt) testified to it, because the
appropriate level of certainty would not have been attained.”327
Although al-Muḥaqqiq gives no details, he vaguely acknowledges the reality of a
politically marginalized Imam having little control over judicial appointment by stating
that if public welfare (maṣlaḥa) “required” the appointment of a judge who did not meet
all the conditions for judgeship, his authority is conferred in the eyes of the Imam. AlMuḥaqqiq refers to agreement among “some of the judges of the era of ʿAlī, peace be
upon him” that public welfare must be determined by the Imam; however, he again
acknowledges that the Imam may be prohibited from exercising his right.328 As an
alternative, al-Muḥaqqiq posits the idea that the illegitimate judge who was confirmed by
istifāḍa and tacitly approved by the Imam may not be in fact understood as the Imam’s
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own delegate, but rather that the Imam associates with the judge’s adjudication (bal
yushārikuhu fīmā yunfidhuhu), so that the Imam “becomes the judge in reality” instead of
the currently installed judge. 329 This strategy of distancing the Imam’s authority from
that of an unworthy appointee is necessary since al-Muḥaqqiq had brought the judge’s
own deputy directly under the Imam’s authority: “deputyship is on condition of the
permission of the Imam, peace be upon him, so his deputy is like the deputy of the Imam,
so that he is not dismissed upon the death of an administrative intermediary (wāsiṭa)” of
the ruling political apparatus.330 In al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ, al-Muḥaqqiq also takes into
account a political apparatus in which the Imam is not in power, stating that it is preferred
(mustaḥabb) that the Twelver jurists take up judgeships offered by a legitimate
government (literally, “the just ruler, al-sultān al-ʿādil),” meaning one that acknowledges
the Imam’s rights. Indeed, in that case, it “may be even obligatory” for the Twelver
judges to accept,331 although accepting official payment from the treasury to do so is still
viewed with some trepidation.332 Although the Twelver adab al-qāḍī texts never define
the term al-sultān al-ʿādil, it is clear that such a ruler wields authority distinct from that
of the Imam, “whose permission is mandatory”333 according to al-Muḥaqqiq.

329

al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām, 4:71. Al-Muḥaqqiq uses qaḍāʾ as the object of yunfidhu in
another sentence in al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ, 279.
330
al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām, 4:71. The term wāsiṭa most likely refers to a Fāṭimid
administrative term that “denoted an intermediary between the Fāṭimid ruler—the Imam—and the ruling
establishment and people”, even though the term fell out of favor in historical sources in the 11th c. CE (Y.
Lev, “Wāsiṭa,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Ed. [Brill, 2012]). Despite (or perhaps, because of) the
historical equivocation previous Twelver jurists had regarding the administrative nature of the judge, alMuḥaqqiq defers to Fāṭimid terms to position the Twelver judge within a Shīʿī political framework that
could be resurrected for the potential Shīʿī administration under the Ilkhānids.
331
al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ, 279.
332
al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām, 4:69.
333
al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, al-Mukhtaṣar al-nāfiʿ, 279.

127

Al-Muḥaqqiq then has a separate section titled “ādāb (protocols),” which is
divided into two parts: the recommended (al-mustaḥabba) and the detested (al-makrūha).
The recommended protocols include the judge holding court in a central area, and in a
courtyard or wide space, in order to become easily accessible to the population of his
jurisdiction. If he arbitrates in a mosque, he must sit with his back towards the qibla so
that the litigants would be facing it, citing a saying by the Prophet that “the best
gatherings are those in which one is made to face the qibla (khayr al-majālis mā
ustuqbila bihi al-qibla).”334 However, in the list of “detestable” actions, al-Muḥaqqiq
states that court must only occasionally be held in a mosque, it is not completely
reprehensible, on account of ʿAlī having adjudicated in the congregational mosque of
Kufa; perhaps this is a middle ground between the Shāfiʿite position of detesting the
mosque as a place for court, and the Twelver preference for it. The judge must announce
his presence, check on his predecessor’s portfolio regarding deeds and deposits in court
(literally, mā fī yad al-ḥākim al-maʿzūl min ḥujaj al-nās wa wadāʾiʿhim) as well as those
he is responsible for, such as prisoners and orphans.335 The prohibition of adjudicating
while angry and administering sales and purchases in the judge’s own favor is placed
within the list of detestable actions, while other issues usually organized under “adab alqāḍī,” such as receiving litigants in court, treating them equally (except when one of
them is a non-Muslim), inviting them to state their claims, and prioritizing travelers’
claims, are discussed in the section titled “Regarding the procedure of giving legal rulings
(fī kayfiyyat al-ḥukm).”336 However, there is also some overlap with a subsequent section
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titled “Masāʾil,” which includes appointing court personnel and the procedure of taking
oaths from secluded women (mukhaddara), that is, women who are not accustomed to
leaving their homes.337 The means of weighing evidence (admission, oaths, testimony) is
then spread across multiple sections with differing organizing principles—for example,
one division is organized by types of evidence that a defendant may give, while another is
on various procedures of swearing an oath for different cases, and another is a list of
various kinds of cases and the evidence required for them. Al-Muḥaqqiq even has a
section titled “regarding the oath with a witness,” a legal point where the Shāfiʿites and
Ḥanafites had significant differences in legal approach.338
The last portion of the recommended protocols discusses the judge’s errors and
judicial consultation with other scholars. Whereas the ijtihād of the mujtahid judge of the
Shāfiʿite jurists al-Māwardī (d. 450 H/1058 CE) and al-Ghazālī (d. 505 H/1111 CE)
protects the judge from accusations of error,339 al-Muḥaqqiq does not concern himself
here with the judge’s ability to employ ijtihād at all. Although al-Muḥaqqiq starts from
the premise that “the correct person among us is one,”340 the judge must protect himself
from error by obtaining a scholar from among “the men of knowledge (ahl al-ʿilm)” to
witness his legal ruling, “so that if he made a mistake they would notice it.”341 If the
judge does err, his erroneous ruling then becomes a liability of the Treasury; there is no
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further discussion or trepidation about the impact of such an error on the case itself.342
Despite al-Muḥaqqiq’s general integration of ijtihād into his legal theory, its impact on
the figure of the judge favors Ibn Idrīs’ traditionist position of the judge as fallible.
Within the context of the judgeship in the Sharāʾiʿ, however, al-Muḥaqqiq leaves room
for the wider possibility of a judge coming from a non-Twelver or even non-Shīʿī
background, even as he argues for the predominance of Twelver authority, as was seen in
his aside regarding the use of maṣlaḥa as a basis for permitting the appointment of a
judge.
The discrete rules that relate to the judge’s knowledge, his ability to determine
facts, and the correlation of the ruling (ḥukm) with the “correct” view of legal doctrine
are curiously placed under the “masāʾil” heading. In this section, al-Muḥaqqiq concerns
himself with the issues that preoccupied the Twelver jurists of the preceding periods, that
is, the nature of the judge’s knowledge as it pertains to the details of a case, and the
nature of legal rulings that can invalidate preceding rulings, both of which fall under the
main concern of certain (qaṭʿī) versus probable knowledge (ẓann). As in the qaḍāʾ
discussions of the previous Twelver jurists, al-Muḥaqqiq begins with the assertion that
the Imam adjudicates according to his full knowledge (bi-ʿilmihi muṭlaqan), without
restriction in all matters. The judge, understood as enjoying the delegated authority of the
Imam in matters of adjudication, “adjudicates according to his own knowledge in civil or
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penal matters (yaqḍī bi-ʿilmihi fī ḥuqūq al-nās wa ḥuqūq Allāh),”343 meaning in regard to
the facts of the case. Yet, much like Ibn Zuhra and Ibn Idrīs, al-Muḥaqqiq has no concern
about such unrestricted knowledge of the judge regarding evidence in cases that fall
under the sphere of penal laws (ḥudūd). He does, however, distinguish between
knowledge (ʿilm) relevant to particular cases and the judge’s lack of knowledge
concerning the procedural aspects of establishing evidence, which at no point is
understood to undermine the judge’s authority or capability in adjudicating. In a situation
where a (dismissed) judge had given a ruling against someone found to be financially
liable (gharīm) and ordered his arrest, a second judge is required to examine his ruling to
see if it was “consistent with the ḥaqq (established fact)”344 in what appears to be a
variation on the protocol of a newly installed judge checking in on prisoners and the
statements of their accusers as soon as he took up his position.345 If the previous ruling
was found to be inconsistent with the evidence, “it is voided, unless the ruling was
derived qaṭʿiyyan [i.e. it was absolutely certain and not open to debate, in contrast to
ẓannī, or probable] or through ijtihād.”346 Ijtihād is explicitly mentioned for the first time
in the chapter, although distinguished from certainty established by fact.
However, when it comes to knowledge of the status of other key court personnel
involved in establishing the facts of a case,347 such as witnesses, certainty, while desired,
is not always necessary, due to pragmatic reasons. The judge who knows the reliability of
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his two expert witnesses in his court may rely on them to give a ruling, but if he knows of
their depravity he must throw out their testimony. Unsurprisingly, al-Muḥaqqiq comes
out against reliance on “untrustworthy narration (riwāya shādhdha)”348 even if the judge
lacked knowledge of the reliability of two witnesses after looking into the matter. This
assertion is a subtle criticism of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s acceptance of khabar wāḥids in his
al-Khilāf, which al-Muḥaqqiq cites explicitly.349 Al-Muḥaqqiq drives home his point by
emphasizing the superiority of the prima facie (ẓāhir) meaning of evidence, which is
favored as the strongest form of evidence. However, unlike the position of al-Shaykh alṬūsī, which al-Muḥaqqiq cites from al-Khilāf, al-Muḥaqqiq does not command that the
judge suspend his judgment in the case where two forms of factual evidence (bayyinatān)
regarding the reliability of witnesses contradict each other; presumably, suspending a
judgement would create an undue burden on the timely processing of cases in the
judiciary, and by extension, on the litigants themselves. Thus, if the judge must
ultimately operate based on unreliable information, “then it is fine (kāna ḥasanan).”350
Furthermore, al-Muḥaqqiq depicts the legal ruling as both a process of
discovering the law as well as one fundamentally shaped by the judge’s personal context.
His emphasis on prima facie evidence creates instances in which the ruling is “clear,” i.e.
discoverable. In such a case it becomes compulsory for the judge to give a ruling when
two claimants bring the case before him. Al-ʿAllāma repeats this assertion in Qawāʿid alaḥkām: “If the ruling was clear (wāḍiḥ), he is bound to adjudicate (lazimahu al-
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qaḍāʾ).”351 Here it appears that both al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma view the judge’s role in
giving a ruling similar to that of the muftī giving a fatwā, in the sense that it is
compulsory once requested. Although al-Muḥaqqiq deems it “preferable to invite them to
mediation (ṣulḥ)”, a ruling must be given to the litigants if they refuse to do anything but
fight (fa-in abayā illā al-munājaza).352 However, any ambiguity regarding the ruling
causes the ḥukm to be delayed until it becomes clear, with “no limit” to the delay until
clarity has been reached. Thus, the ruling, for al-Muḥaqqiq, is something that may also be
discoverable.
The discussion is also extended to the judge and the resulting of his rulings in
punishment, with awareness of the judge’s power of amelioration in such cases.
Amelioration is understood here as part of the fundamental process of giving a ruling and
is contingent on the judge’s personal interaction with the defendant. As such, the judge is
not allowed to rule against a defendant in absentia in matters pertaining to ḥuqūq Allāh
(“the rights of God”, which require a penal sanction353) such as adultery (zināʾ) and
sodomy (liwāṭ), “because they are based on amelioration (takhfīf)” and not automatic
capital punishment.354 If a ruling involves both civil matters (ḥuqūq al-nās) and penal
matters (ḥuqūq Allāh), “he adjudicates over those claims that affect people (yakhtaṣṣ alnās), so theft is adjudicated as loss/damage (ghurm); regarding cases of amputation (of
the hand for theft, al-qaḍāʾ bi ‘l-qaṭʿ), there is uncertainty (taraddud)” from the Twelver
jurists.355
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In the “Conclusion,” al-Muḥaqqiq addresses the issue of judge-to-judge
correspondence (kitāb qāḍī ilā qāḍī), which he defines as the “transmission of the ruling
of one judge to another, whether by writing, speech, or testimony (inhāʾ ḥukm al-ḥākim
ilā al-ākhar immā bi ‘l-kitāba aw al-qawl aw al-shahāda).”356 Considering each type of
correspondence on its own, al-Muḥaqqiq notes that there is no advice (ʿibra) regarding
transmitting rulings by writing,357 and that al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī had not accepted oral
transmission of a ruling in his Ikhtilāf. As such, al-Muḥaqqiq focuses on examining
whether the transmitting of a ruling by testimony is permissible, in which witnesses can
be dispatched to attest to a judge’s ruling. However, al-Muḥaqqiq does discredit a ḥadīth
that claimed that ʿAlī had prohibited judge-to-judge correspondence, thus allowing it, but
only in regard to civil matters.358 Al-Muḥaqqiq then goes into further detail regarding
exactly what can be communicated to the judge, that is, a ruling or the validity of a claim
against an absentee.359 The entire discourse is notable for its detail, whereas the sections
on judge-to-judge correspondence are cursory at best in prior Twelver texts. He notes the
importance of recording witnesses for the purpose of correspondence; al-Muḥaqqiq also
details the importance of proper documentation in judicial procedures in general.360 After
some discussion regarding judge-to-judge correspondence at the end, he moves on to the
second half of the conclusion: the distribution of inherited estates (qisma), another
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section that is notable for its sheer amount of detail, which includes the qualifications of
the distributor, the methods of distribution, and cases of disagreement or error.

al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, Taḥrīr al-aḥkām

In the kitāb al-qaḍāʾ of Taḥrīr al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya ʿalā madhhab al-Imāmiyya
is al-ʿAllāma’s engagement with al-Muḥaqqiq’s discourse on judgeship in both of his
works. Al-ʿAllāma’s general format is to combine sections from al-Muḥaqqiq’s Sharāʾiʿ
and al-Mukhtaṣar, as well as briefer segments from the writings of jurists from previous
eras, and add his own elaborations and justifications to create a new dynamic epitome.
The Taḥrīr al-aḥkām’s major divisions are labeled “arguments” (sg. mabḥath) and
“sections” (sg. faṣl), with subdivisions of “inquiries” (sg. baḥth), “matters” (sg. maṭlab),
and “viewpoints” (sg. naẓar), of which the last three can alternatively be subdivisions of
each other. Similar to the Sharāʾiʿ and al-Mukhtaṣar, these terms function as organizing
divisions rather than reflections of the content or style; the content is clarified by the
headings, which closely follow that of al-Muḥaqqiq (“On Appointment and Dismissal,”
“On Protocols,” etc.).
In Taḥrīr al-aḥkām, al-ʿAllāma begins his section on kitāb al-qaḍāʾ by justifying
the concept of the judgeship by using both scriptural proof-texts (sg. naṣṣ) consisting of
Qurʾānic verses interpreted as the Prophet Muhammad judging among the people 361 and
consensus (ijmāʿ). Al-ʿAllāma relies on the strong support for the judgeship found in
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ijmāʿ,362 stating that “enough Muslims have reached consensus (ajmaʿa) on the
lawfulness (mashrūʿiyya) of establishing the judgeship (naṣb al-qaḍāʾ) among the people
and the giving of rulings among them.”363 He further buttresses his argument with the
specific practice of the Prophet dispatching ʿAlī as a judge to Yemen,364 a tradition also
found in the Shāfiʿite jurist al-Rāfiʿī’s qaḍāʾ section in al-ʿAzīz,365 and ʿAlī himself
dispatching ʿAbdullāh ibn al-ʿAbbās as a judge to Baṣra, a tradition preserved in alShaykh al-Ṭūsī’s Mabsūṭ.366 In the context of judge-to-judge correspondence, al-ʿAllāma
also repeats al-Muḥaqqiq’s statement that “our scholars have reached consensus that no
account (iʿtibār) is taken of judge-to-judge correspondence, and acting on [such
correspondence] is not permitted” unless the judge had already given a ruling to which
two witnesses had testified.367
Al-ʿAllāma holds that the judgeship is a farḍ kifāya while also giving the
definition of farḍ kifāya —not a typical inclusion but unsurprising since he wrote a
volume on legal definitions in Tadhkirat al-fuqahāʾ (“Memorandum for Jurists”)—and
lists the purpose of adjudication as facilitating “the functioning of society (al-qiyām bi-
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niẓām al-ʿālam), enjoining right and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi ‘l-maʿrūf wa ‘l-nahy
ʿan al-munkar), and recourse for the wronged (maẓlūm).”368 Not only does al-ʿAllāma
state that the idea of the judgeship was supported by the fact that the Prophet, as well as
the prophets before him, gave legal rulings to their communities, but al-ʿAllāma also
emphasizes the necessity of the judgeship as a fundamental aspect of public welfare
(maṣlaḥa) with the Prophetic statement that “God does not bless the community that does
not have one who advocates for the right of the weak.”369 Al-ʿAllāma further elaborates
on the communal standing of the judge in his section on appointment and dismissal,
adding that “the judge (ḥākim) must be strong without violence, mild without weakness”
so that “the weak does not despair of his justice.”370 In this case, however, he draws from
a wider pool of narrations from ʿAlī that are also recorded by the Ḥanbalite jurist Ibn
Qudāma (d. 620 H/1223 CE) in his al-Mughnī and Sharḥ al-Kabīr and al-Bahūtī (d.
11th/17th c. CE) in Kashshāf al-qināʿ.371
However, even after categorizing the judgeship as farḍ kifāya, al-ʿAllāma still has
to address the same issue as his predecessors: the delegation of the judgeship to those
other than the Imams. He lists a series of prophetic statements, as well as those from the
Shīʿī Imams al-Ṣādiq and al-Bāqir, ominously warning of the eternal punishment that lies
in store for the person who does not meet all the conditions for adjudication and thus
makes errors in judgment. To this effect, al-ʿAllāma includes the famous narration
fromʿAlī, as preserved in al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s Muqniʿa, regarding the four judges, out
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of which three are in hell and only one is in heaven.372 He also adds the famous statement
that “whoever is made a judge, it is as if he has been sacrificed without a knife,” alluding
to the difficult nature of attaining correct rulings. One of the statements from al-Ṣādiq is
particularly cogent, in which he asserts that “there are two rulings: the ruling of God and
the ruling of the people of the jāhiliyya [the pre-Islamic period in Arabia]; whoever errs
[in identifying] God’s ruling has given a ruling according to the people of the jāhiliyya,
and whoever gives a ruling [even] on two dirhams by anything other than what God sent
down has committed disbelief (kufr) against God.”373 On the other hand, the one who
meets all the conditions of adjudication is obligated to become a judge, “for the people to
benefit from him.”374
Indeed, throughout the chapter, al-ʿAllāma emphasizes the communal benefit of
having a worthy judge who meets all the conditions. However, his elaboration of the
activities of the judge is not limited to the judge as finder of law or finder of fact; the
judge is also a giver of fatwās,375 a teacher, and an explainer of rulings.376 Al-ʿAllāma
also specifies the kind of knowledge the judge must have—not merely concrete
knowledge of the rulings and their sources (sg. maʾkhadh) but the theoretical method of
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their derivation.377 It is only after laying out the significance of the judge’s role that alʿAllāma finally lists the necessary characteristics of a judge in the section on appointment
and dismissal, adding that he must be “a scholar independent in fatwā-giving, having
reached the rank of ijtihād.” Whereas al-Muḥaqqiq referred to ijithād within a
circumscribed context in his kitāb al-qāḍāʾ, al-ʿAllāma is the first to explicitly state it as
condition for taking up the judgeship, just as al-Rāfiʿī, citing al-Ghazālī, does in his
corresponding chapter in al-ʿAzīz.378
Al-ʿAllāma establishes his position on several key issues early on: that the Imams
are infallible, that consensus and qiyās379 are valid legal methods, and that ijtihād can be
divisible, an issue that was taken up by al-Ghazālī and his commentators al-Rāfiʿī and alNawawī. However, al-ʿAllāma traces the idea of divisibility of ijtihād back to the Sixth
Imam, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq.380 Even al-ʿAllāma’s justification of why women could not be
judges “in penal law (ḥudūd) and other areas”381 directly reflects the statement made by
al-Ghazālī: “because judgeship is one of the honored positions (al-manāṣib al-jalīla), so
[she] is not appropriate for it.”382 Regarding al-Muḥaqqiq’s competing claims regarding
the proscription of women being judges, al-ʿAllāma clarifies the issue for his
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contemporaries by giving his own view that women are allowed to be judges in certain
prescribed legal areas.383
Although al-ʿAllāma explicitly refers to the (greater) occultation of the Imam, like
al-Muḥaqqiq he also refers to the Imam as one whose presence was also equally possible
and even anticipated. Furthermore, he acknowledges that determination of the state of
occultation can differ among jurists.384 Unlike al-Muḥaqqiq, al-ʿAllāma strictly requires
that judicial authority be directly delegated from the authority of the “infallible Imam” if
he is present (ẓāhir); the Imam would enjoy a monopoly on such delegation. However, if
he was not present, whoever had been deputized by him would have the authority to
delegate judicial authority. In the absence of the Imam, “one of the reliable jurists from
the ahl al-bayt who fulfills all the conditions of [giving a] fatwā” takes up the judgeship,
citing Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq’s legal opinion (qawl) just as al-Muḥaqqiq does: “they made him a
judge (qāḍī) so I made him a judge, and they brought their affairs to him.”385 However,
unlike al-Muḥaqqiq, al-ʿAllāma does not allow local rulers of a jurisdiction to install their
own judge if their delegation of authority does not stem from the “infallible Imam;” he
asserts that the legal rulings of such a judge would never be carried out.386 He
furthermore quotes other narrations from Imam al-Ṣādiq that any believer who presented
himself to an illegitimate judge or ruler (sulṭān) “has been adjudicated according to a
legal ruling other than that of God.”387
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Al-ʿAllāma appears to be a great restorer of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s positions
regarding the judgeship,388 citing him throughout the chapter and agreeing with his alNihāya on some key positions, like the dismissal of all judges upon the death of the
Imam,389 in stark contrast to al-Muḥaqqiq. He makes reference to al-Mufīd’s al-Muqniʿa
as well.390 However, al-ʿAllāma also references positions taken up by al-Ghazālī in his
discussion of whether ijithād is divisible,391 including its justification for women being
judges only in matters involving women, as well the permissibility of installing two
judges in one jurisdiction.392 This referencing is most salient in al-ʿAllāma’s use of the
term rutbat al-ijtihād, or the rank reached by a judge in his ability to undertake ijtihād,
which occupies such a prominent position in al-Rāfiʿī’s chapter.393 At the same time, alʿAllāma depends mainly on ḥadīth and narrations to outline and justify the judge’s roles,
including his protocols (ādāb).394 In short, much like al-Muḥaqqiq, al-ʿAllāma does not
utilize ijtihād in his argument for the validity of the judgeship; his discussion of ijtihād is
limited to expecting the judge to be able to avail himself of ijtihād when appropriate to
arrive at a legal ruling.
Like previous Twelver jurists, al-ʿAllāma affords the judge wide latitude in the
ways he may arrive at a legal ruling; the integration of judicial consultation, which he
refers to as “muḥāḍara,” and not “mushāwara” like the Shāfiʿites, renders the process of
issuing rulings an undertaking best supported through discussion with other legal
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scholars. For al-ʿAllāma, the judge must consult “the people of expertise” (ahl al-ʿilm) so
that if he errs the “correct” view will be made clear to him; for this reason the judge must
also have “someone whose intelligence (fiṭna) he trusts” witness his ruling. However, alʿAllāma makes it clear that the judge is not permitted to follow any of these other
consulting scholars through taqlīd; “rather, the benefit in consulting with scholars is
deriving the legal indicants (istikhrāj al-adilla) and coming to know the truth via ijtihād,”
a connection he makes more explicit than al-Muḥaqqiq.395 It is clear that the goal of
consultation is to examine arguments similar to those applicable to the judges’ case, but
only to aid the judge’s own ability to find the legal ruling; he is thus prohibited from
giving a ruling based on the legal opinion (qawl) of another scholar, just as “it is not for
the muftī to give fatwās based on taqlīd.”396 Judicial error, in al-ʿAllāma’s passing
treatment of the topic, is barely a concern other than judicial error becoming a liability of
the Treasury; like al-Muḥaqqiq he is more concerned about who would be deemed liable
for the error rather than the impact of the judge’s errors on the case at hand. The issue of
a bribery claim against a judge is dealt with in a similarly perfunctory manner.397
Al-ʿAllāma, like previous jurists, brings up reconciliation (ṣulḥ) as an option
when the plaintiffs bring up a case. However, unlike those jurists, al-ʿAllāma emphasizes
that there is a “correct” action to be undertaken in reconciliation, in which the judge must
exercise his patience until his ijtihād uncovers a ḥaqq,398 or objective truth. However, if
he reconciled the two parties to their satisfaction without uncovering a ḥaqq, it would be
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permissible. His transition here from reconciliation to adjudication is made clearer in the
analogous section in his Qawāʿid al-aḥkām, where al-ʿAllāma states that if reconciliation
is difficult, then the judge must give “a ruling according to the dictates of the revealed
law (bi-muqtaḍā al-sharʿ).”399 However, had the judge undertaken ijtihād, it would have
been “obligatory for him to give a ruling according to what his ijithād indicated.”400 AlʿAllāma takes a position opposite to that of al-Ghazālī, however, in stating that if the
judge changed his mind according to what his ijtihād indicated, then it would not be
permitted “for him to give a ruling according to the first ijithād, because it had become
void.”
Al-ʿAllāma takes on the issue of a judge’s personal knowledge in his section
titled, “On the duties of giving a ruling (fī waẓāʾif al-ḥukm).”401 Like al-Muḥaqqiq, for alʿAllāma “the Imam may adjudicate using unrestricted knowledge;” the judge’s own
unrestricted knowledge is unreservedly applied to the civil matters (ḥuqūq al-nās), with
the “strongest” support for also applying to the penal matters (ḥuqūq Allāh); he repeats
this assertion even more explicitly in his Qawāʿid al-ahkām.402 He further elaborates on
its unrestricted nature: “it is not a condition of knowledge that it be obtained during the
time or area of his authority (fī zamān wilāyatihi); rather, he gives a ruling based on
however he obtained it.”403 The question of whether the judge must account for the time
or location of the nature of his personal knowledge is a persistent Shāfiʿite concern; al-
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ʿAllāma’s phrasing shows that he is both aware of it and has a definitive position
regarding it.
Later in the same section al-ʿAllāma introduces another procedure for giving a
ruling, which is the re-issuing of a forgotten ḥukm when two witnesses had witnessed that
the judge had indeed adjudicated.404 He records a view that states that it is acceptable to
re-issue the ḥukm, since the judge is able to regain his knowledge by repeating his actions
(min imkān rujūʿihi ilā’l-ʿilm li-annahu yarjaʿu ilā fiʿlihi), thus applying his own
personal knowledge, just as in testimony, which does not permit uncertainty (ẓann).
The section titled “Regarding Unusual Issues of Adjudication and Rulings (fī
nawādir al-qaḍāʾ wa ‘l-aḥkām)” is mainly comprised of cases (masāʾil) accompanied by
narrations, which can mostly be traced back to the sixth Imam, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, or the first
Imam, ʿAlī. Approximately half are ḥadīth found in al-Tadhhīb al-aḥkām, al-Shaykh alṬūsī’s commentary on al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s Muqniʿa, and the rest are preserved in the
17th-century Twelver text Wasāʾil al-Shīʿa.405 Buried at the end of this section is a
question-and-answer narration of whether it is permissible for the Shīʿīs to bring up a
dispute concerning loans or inheritance to a political ruler (sultān) and his judges, to
which the answer is no: “whoever gives a ruling to them, whether valid or not (fī ḥaqq aw
bāṭil), has given a ruling for idols (ṭāghūt).”406 In support of this response, al-ʿAllāma
cites the Qurʾānic verse407 “I have given you your own ḥākim,” which he interprets to
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mean that going to non-Twelver judges or rulers for their adjudication “is on the level of
idolatry (shirk).”

Qawāʿid al-aḥkām

Al-ʿAllāma’s Qawāʿid al-aḥkām was most likely written around 1300 CE, and
thus after his Taḥrīr al-aḥkām, which is considered to have been written shortly after his
first legal work, Muntahā al-maṭlab.408 Despite its title, 409 this work does not conform to
the qawāʿid genre that had become extremely popular in Sunnī jurisprudence in the 13th
and 14th centuries CE. Such works were comprised of legal maxims that were formulated
as rules specific to the individual legal schools in order to differentiate them from each
other.410 Qawāʿid al-aḥkām is an abridged version of the Taḥrīr; for al-ʿAllāma’s
purposes; he acknowledges an outside political apparatus into the text as well, which he
utilizes to balance the legal problem of working for an unjust government as long as it
was with the intention of carrying out good works, a point he also makes in the Taḥrīr.
After asserting that the competence of a specific judge is confirmed by widespread,
reliable reports (istifāḍa), he states that a judicial nominee may not spend money in order
to be appointed. However, al-ʿAllāma states that it is acceptable when “the one
nominated knows that the illegitimate ruler (ẓālim) will not appoint him except for
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money.”411 He also specifically refers to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s accommodationist
position412 by stating that appointment by an illegitimate ruler is not permitted unless the
judge is sure that he can give his rulings “in accordance with truth (bi ‘l-ḥaqq).” If the
judge cannot be assured of this outcome, it would then be unlawful for him to accept an
appointment “except through coercion (illā maʿa al-ilzām).” Yet, if the judge knew the
appointment was for the purpose of giving a legal ruling to execute someone, it would
again be unlawful for him to be appointed by coercion.
Al-ʿAllāma’s pragmatism is again on display in the case of a nominated judge
fearing that he may betray the Imamate. Rather than asserting that the nominee must
refrain from the judgeship, al-ʿAllāma states that it is obligatory for him to request the
position, and even if a more suitable (aṣlaḥ) judge was later found it would be forbidden
(ḥarām) for the other candidate to request the position, reflecting an overriding concern
for judicial stability. These concerns—the judge’s fear of committing malfeasance, the
impermissibility of a more suitable candidate requesting his own nomination—reproduce
al-Ghazālī’s statements in the adab al-qāḍī chapter of al-Wajīz.413 Here it is clear that alʿAllāma is reading al-Ghazālī directly, since both al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī leave the
matter unresolved after some elaborate discussion of various legal views and opinions.414
Al-ʿAllāma further comments that if judges who meet all the qualifications for the
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judgeship become difficult to find, and the appointments are filled by immoral persons,
they would not carry out the legal rulings of one appointed by an illegitimate leader (lam
yunfidh ḥukm man wallāhu sāḥib al-shawka).415 This position is contrary to that of both
al-Rāfiʿī and al-Ghazālī, who state that the legal rulings of whomever the ṣāḥib alshawka appoints may be carried out “out of necessity (ḍarūra),” just as “a ruling from the
rebels (ḥukm al-bughāt)” may be carried out.416
By beginning with the discussion on appointment and relegating the
characteristics of the judge to the second section of his chapter, al-ʿAllāma’s main
sections in this kitāb al-qaḍāʾ are aligned more closely with al-Ghazālī’s chapter in his
al-Wajīz (an ordering also followed by his Shāfiʿite contemporaries al-Rāfiʿī and alNawawī) than that of al-Muḥaqqiq’s Sharāʾiʿ and al-Mukhtaṣar. He is much more
explicit in establishing the primacy of the Imam or his representative (nāʾib) in installing
a judge in a particular jurisdiction, stating that such a judge may not be legitimately
installed by whomever has the power to appoint in a given locale (ahl al-wilāya).417
Furthermore, a judge installed by the Imam or his representative could overrule a judicial
decision given to two litigants (khaṣmān) with his own, even if they had been satisfied
with the ruling of the first judge and dissatisfied with that of the second. Like alMuḥaqqiq, al-ʿAllāma considers it obligatory for the Imam to install a judge in a
jurisdiction that does not have one, and that if the inhabitants refused to bring cases
before that judge, it would be permitted (ḥalāl) for the Imam to fight them.
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During the state of the Imam’s occultation, it is only the jurist “who has [met] all
the conditions of giving fatwās,” and whose rulings are thus carried out; furthermore, AlʿAllāma warns that “whoever turns away from him to the illegitimate judges (quḍāt aljawr) is rebellious,”418 and therefore liable to be killed. As in his Taḥrīr, al-ʿAllāma
allows for situations in which a nominee who does not meet all the conditions may be
allowed to take up the judgeship when it is in the interest of the general public
(maṣlaḥa).419 In other cases, if there were multiple judges of equal merit, the plaintiff
may choose which judge to appear before, although the less-favored, “inferior” judge (almafḍūl) must refrain if both judges otherwise meet all the conditions equally. However,
in the case of the reappearance of the Imam, al-ʿAllāma also permits the selection of a
possibly “inferior” judge, the mafḍūl, instead of the afḍal, the best choice; this selection
is allowed because any mistakes such a judge might make would be amended by the
reappeared Imam, in which case the Imam’s fatwās regarding the matter would have to
be followed on the basis of taqlīd.420 Although al-ʿAllāma does not appear to directly
borrow the argument for permitting the selection of the mafḍūl from the al-Ghazālī–alRāfiʿī–al-Nawawī commentary thread, it does appear in their texts. (Incidentally, the
Shāfiʿite jurist al-Māwardī, who wrote a chapter on adjudication [“kitāb al-qaḍāʾ”]
chapter in his Kitāb al-ḥāwī as well as a manual on public law titled al-Aḥkām alsulṭaniyya, also permitted the choice of “a less excellent imām,”421 i.e. the mafḍūl.) Al-
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ʿAllāma’s position in this regard put him at odds with both al-Muḥaqqiq422 as well as alSharīf al-Murtaḍā,423 although al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī was silent on the matter.424
The discussions of fatwās in al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī concerns not only those who
had reached the rank of independent mujtahids but those who reached the rank of
conditional ijtihād, meaning their legal methodologies were bound by the precedents of
their legal schools and their ranks determined by their abilities to give fatwās. Since legal
schools were not a concern for al-ʿAllāma, his incorporation of fatwā-giving among the
judge’s required skills was understood in relation to authority delegated by a Shīʿī Imam,
whether present or absent; this contrasts with the authority of an eponymous madhhab
founder, which would require one to take the views of fellow jurists, particularly senior
ones who reached the ranks of ijtihād, into account.
In the conclusion to the discussion of the conditions of the judge’s appointment
(tawliya), al-ʿAllāma lays out the requirements of the skills of ijtihād and giving fatwās
in a manner clearly based on the discussions of al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī.425 In addition to
having knowledge of the legal effects of the “approximately 500 verses” of the Qurʾān
related to giving rulings and knowledge of their hermeneutical categories, the judge must
have relevant knowledge of the sunna, juristic consensus and disagreement, the rationally
ascertained sources of legal authority, Arabic lexicography, the theological principles of
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belief, legal theory, and rules for constructing syllogisms (al-sunna wa ‘l-ijmāʿ wa ‘lkhilāf, wa adillat al-ʿaql…wa lisān al-ʿarab wa uṣūl al-ʿaqāʾid wa uṣūl al-fiqh wa
sharāʾiṭ al-burhān).426 The judge’s knowledge of the sunna relevant to legal matters also
includes its hermeneutical categories, including the multiplicity/singularity of
transmission (tawātur/āḥād) and the reliability of narrators. Furthermore, “it is stipulated
that he be a capable person (dhā quwwa), able to derive rules from principles (istikhrāj
al-furūʿ min al-uṣūl); it is not sufficient for him to memorize that without the power of
derivation.”427
Here it is clear that al-ʿAllāma is reading al-Ghazālī through the lens of al-Rāfiʿī
and al-Nawawī, since the conditions of ijtihād delineated as specific kinds of training
regarding the Qurʾān, the sunna, and the Arabic language, among other kinds of
knowledge, are absent in al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz, and do not appear in that concise
formulation in any other of his writings.428 Even al-ʿAllāma’s section titled, “The
Permitted (mubīḥa) Conditions of Ijtihād and Giving Fatwās in Accordance with
Knowledge (fīʿl-ʿilm)” evokes al-Rāfiʿī’s citation of a Prophetic ḥadīth: “whoever is
asked and gives a fatwā without knowledge (ʿilm), verily he is led astray and has led
[others] astray.”429 Al-ʿAllāma, however, substitutes al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī’s
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stipulation of qiyās for Twelver formulations of inferential reasoning, adding the capacity
to derive rules from principles (istikhrāj al-furūʿ min al-uṣūl).
Despite well-established near-contemporary Shāfiʿite positions on the
apportioning of ijtihād into different levels and ranks, al-ʿAllāma presents ijtihād as a
doctrine that is nonetheless problematic and disputed in Twelver jurisprudence, although
he himself permits it.430 Indeed, al-ʿAllāma treats ijtihād as a fundamental condition for
adjudication, asserting that a ḥukm must be revoked if the judge “did not fulfill (lam
yastawfi) the conditions of ijtihād,” and thus may not be carried out, whether with the
judge’s knowledge or not.431 The judge must also not follow the adjudications (qaḍāyā)
of previous judges before him without properly examining them first.432 Al-ʿAllāma
includes consultation “with scholars” (al-ʿulamāʾ) “so that they may warn him of a
mistake if he made one, and to request clarification (yastawḍiḥ) in regard to anything that
is difficult for him, not in order to follow them on the basis of taqlīd (lā bi-an
yuqallidahum).”433 The inclusion of consulting with the judges’ peers is consistent in the
Wajīz–ʿAzīz–Rawḍa lineage, and al-ʿAllāma’s concern about inappropriate taqlīd, also
reflects, albeit much more tersely, Shāfiʿite concerns in their discussions of the judge and
ijtihād.
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Conclusion
The acute degree of integration of Sunnī, particularly Shāfiʿite, modes of juristic
thinking and categorization into Twelver jurisprudence has traditionally been considered
the major point of division between al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma and previous Twelver
jurists. Yet, despite the new requirement of the integration of ijtihād into Twelver judge’s
process of issuing rulings, there is not much juristic elaboration on it by either jurist
within their chapters on adjudication. While al-Muḥaqqiq only notes that the judge needs
to have the skill of giving fatwās, al-ʿAllāma details the skills needed for a judge to
obtain the rank of mujtahid, in line with the Shāfiʿites. However, both jurists spend little
time discussing appropriate occasions on which to apply ijtihād; rather, they merely
presume that the judge would be able to know when to properly apply it. As such, it is
true, as Devin Stewart observes, that during this integration of Shāfiʿite models “the
Shiites did not merely import the institution of the madhhab as it existed among the
Sunnis, nor did the Sunnis merely force the Shiites to conform to their system.”434
However, it would be an over-generalization to state that any integration during the
periods in this study was mainly due to pressure to respond to the Sunnī system. Twelver
jurists were responding to each other as well as their predecessors, and primarily
concerned with the tension between expanding the range of their jurisprudence to apply
to a wider range of cases while maintaining the integrity of their reliance on traditions.
Like all jurists, Twelvers borrowed from and responded to jurists from other traditions,
while anchoring the integration of new concepts to earlier Twelver juristic traditions.
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They did so with great discernment to the ways such borrowing would benefit the
positions they took on contested issues in their own juristic traditions as well as their
ability to engage with the jurists on the spectrum between rationalism and traditionism in
their own ranks.
Furthermore, in these chapters on adjudication, it becomes clear that despite the
importance of ijtihād in other areas of Twelver jurisprudence, such as legal theory (uṣūl
al-fiqh), al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma’s discussions of judges and judgeship remained
heavily invested in Twelver narrations and ḥadīth traditions as legal sources. However,
the debated validity of the judgeship and the pragmatic consideration of what appeared to
be long-established judicial customs necessitated some legal justifications. Since, after
Ibn Idrīs’ influential criticism of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, khabar wāḥids were no longer
acceptable to provide legal justification, al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma appealed to other
legal methods where there was no textual evidence to the contrary, or which could be
bolstered with textual evidence or narrations: both jurists made explicit appeals to public
welfare (maṣlaḥa) and utilized other methods whose legal force was based on their
widespread acknowledgment, particularly istifāḍa and ʿibra/iʿtibār, and even the legal
statements of “our scholars,”435 while al-ʿAllāma also made reference to consensus, much
like previous Twelver jurists.
In terms of the actual judicial process of a judge giving a ḥukm, neither alMuḥaqqiq nor al-ʿAllāma shared the Shāfiʿite concern with the tension between the
independent reasoning of the judge and his loyalty to his legal school. Their concern, like
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previous Twelver jurists, thus remains with the person of the judge and his own internal
process of giving a legal ruling. For al-Muḥaqqiq, the judge is the finder of law and is
able to give a ruling based on knowledge obtained in three ways: his own personal
knowledge of the litigants, which is unrestricted whether the case falls under ḥuqūq alnās and/or ḥuqūq Allāh; his ijtihād, which is given certainty on the level of prima facie
evidence; and his discovery of the ruling when the prima facie evidence renders it
“clear,” much like a muftī would find the law. However, unlike the Shāfiʿites, who
maintained a concept of the mujtahid jurist, al-Muḥaqqiq did not subscribe to the notion
of a multiplicity of correct rulings, since only the Shīʿī Imam could be infallible.436 As
such, he recommends consulting knowledgeable scholars to alert him to any possible
mistakes, although al-ʿAllāma is more cautious that the judge’s ijtihād not be based on
the legal opinion of another scholar. Al-Muḥaqqiq also introduces the concern of
amelioration as a fundamental part of the judge’s process of ruling in cases that entail
severe punishments. As such, he not only depicts the judge as a finder of fact and a finder
of law, but as one who can also fundamentally shape the facts out of concern for the
impact of his ruling on the defendant. Al-ʿAllāma closely follows al-Muḥaqqiq in his
discussions, elaborating with more detail as he sees fit without contradicting alMuḥaqqiq. In the same manner, judgeships taken up by Twelver jurists must be approved
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by a legitimate ruler (al-sulṭān al-ʿādil), an ambiguous formulation that leaves it open to
pragmatic interpretation.
Despite their central concern about the judge and the judgeship, both al-Muḥaqqiq
and al-ʿAllāma occasionally acknowledge the wider political context of the judicial
sphere and accordingly integrate various juristic checks to maintain Twelver
independence in non-Twelver judicial systems. Judicial appointees must be descended
from the ahl al-bayt, or if appointed by an illegitimate ruler, approved by the Imam, as alMuḥaqqiq states. Al-ʿAllāma, while not against the notion of a Twelver judge working
for an illegitimate ruler, draws a hard line at leaving one vulnerable to being coerced into
giving rulings to execute defendants. Furthermore, he regards Twelver defendants
bringing up cases to the judicial apparatus of illegitimate rulers as akin to the level of
engaging in idolatry, the harshest indictment possible. This characterization, along with
allowing Twelver judges unrestricted use of their personal knowledge in matters that
include ḥudūd penalties, demonstrates a keen awareness of how capital punishment can
be wielded as an expression of political power, as well as the necessity of Twelver
defendants having their cases heard by Twelver judges to maintain communal
independence and integrity.
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CHAPTER 4
Shāfiʿite Adab al-qāḍī, 9th-13th Centuries CE

The interaction of Twelver jurists with their wider intellectual environment is, by
now, an undisputed fact, and an analysis of their adab al-qāḍī writings would be remiss
without placing them in some kind of relationship with other non-Twelver scholarly
traditions. Devin Stewart has already commented upon the close connection Twelver
jurisprudence seems to have in particular with the Shāfiʿite madhhab in his Islamic Legal
Orthodoxy, but at least a few of the Twelver jurists included in his book also had deep
knowledge of the Ḥanbalite madhhab, indicating that juristic knowledge could be both
polyvalent and focused on a particular tradition, depending on social relevance and
location. Since extant adab al-qāḍī texts—whether as individual volumes or as standard
sections of furūʿ works—easily number in the hundreds, if not thousands, I chose a
Baghdadi-Khorasani Shāfiʿite lineage that would have been well-known to the Twelver
jurists of Iran, Iraq, and the Levant, due to the stature of the jurists who shaped the
lineage—particularly al-Rāfiʿī437—as well as the renown of the authors of their
underlying source texts, in particular, al-Ghazālī and al-Shāfiʿī. This lineage is also
particularly fruitful since the primary source text, al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-Umm, contains the
earliest extant adab al-qāḍī work;438 the development of the genre can thus be traced
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from its beginning to its development in a specific Shāfiʿite lineage. The lineage itself
consists of various combinations of summarizing, analyzing, and commenting, thus
emphasizing and elaborating particular legal concepts relating to judges and adjudication
over time.
I chose the particular commentary tradition determined mainly by al-Rāfiʿī’s alʿAzīz to examine the claim to which al-Muḥaqqiq’s Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām may be influenced
by al-ʿAzīz,439 and to determine at which points in such lineages Twelver and Shāfiʿite
jurists may have interacted with one another. The textual lineage determined by al-ʿAzīz
is as follows: al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-Umm, and al-Muzanī’s Mukhtaṣar of the text; alJuwaynī’s Nihāyat al-Maṭlab, which is a synthesizing work based on the Mukhtaṣar; alGhazālī’s Wajīz—a concise summarizing work—of the Nihāya; al-ʿAzīz, al-Rāfiʿī’s
commentary on the Wajīz; and al-Nawawī’s citation and commentary of al-ʿAzīz, known
as Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn.440 This lineage would also continue to hold great importance for
Shāfiʿite jurists in subsequent centuries,441 as these scholars were either the preeminent
jurists of their day or would later be recognized as such.442 Al-Nawawī would recognize
two of these texts—al-Mukhtaṣar and al-Wajīz—as part of the five most important
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Shāfiʿite books of his era, of which the other three are al-Shīrāzī’s al-Muhadhdhab and
al-Tanbīh, and al-Ghazālī’s al-Wasīṭ. 443

al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm

As a juristic work, the Kitāb al-Umm defies easy categorization, and as noted by
Ahmed El Shamsy, comes across as a “chaotic” text.444 In addition to mostly containing
volumes on substantive law (furūʿ), it also contains a “collection of discrete treatises,
including refutations and polemical works,” such as Ikhtilāf Mālik wa ‘l-Shāfiʿī, as well
as works of legal theory (uṣūl), such as al-Shāfiʿī’s famous al-Risāla.445 The sections that
fall under the chapter heading, Kitāb al-aqḍiya, “The Chapter on Judgments,” reflect a
form of discourse regarding judges and adjudication (qaḍāʾ) as they come up around
specific legal concerns that tend to cluster around property, marriage and slavewomen,
and testimony. El Shamsy describes this organization as “a succession of concise,
seemingly self-sufficient discussions on individual points of law (masāʾil, sing. masʾala),
which are grouped loosely according to the area of the law with which they deal.”446
While brief sub-sections on judgments titled “Bāb al-aqḍiya” occur throughout the
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various topics of substantive law in Kitāb al-Umm, it appears that this chapter is titled
Kitāb al-aqḍiya because of its inclusion of detailed sections on the various
responsibilities and duties of judges; these sub-sections are titled “Adab al-qāḍī
(Protocols of the Judge),” “Mushāwarat al-qāḍī (Judicial Consultation),” and “Ḥukm alqāḍī (the Judge’s Ruling).” However, other sections in the chapter that are related to
protocols, judicial consultation, and judicial procedures involving testimonial evidence
(bayyina), admissions (iqrār), and oaths (yamīn) are often separated by long sections on
testimony (shahādat) and the division of inherited estates (qisma); the section on claims
and evidence (al-daʿwā wa ‘l-bayyināt) is set apart as its own chapter. This style of
organization results in repetition of discussions, as well as leaving concepts to be more
explicated or fully developed at later points in the rather lengthy chapter. It thus appears
to reflect an originally oral transmission covering topics as they arise, rather than any
recourse to an established textual organization of substantive law. As such, it does not
begin with any discussions of justifications for the judgeship (also referred to as qaḍāʾ),
as later adab al-qāḍī texts do, or even the required characteristics of a judge, but with a
statement by al-Shāfiʿī regarding al-ḥukm bi ’l-ẓāhir, a ruling based on the prima facie
meaning of evidence.447 However, rather than beginning a discussion on the theoretical
principles involved in adjudication, al-Shāfiʿī launches into the very concrete issue of
paternity being determined by oath. Al-Shāfiʿī cites the CompanionʿUmar’s narration
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about the Prophet Muḥammad adjudicating the issue, but then segues into matters
regarding paternity, adultery (zinā), slavewomen who give birth to their master’s son
(umm walad), and inheritance for the children of such unions.448 Indeed, al-Shāfiʿī’s
Kitāb al-aqḍiya is reflective of his overall emphasis on the hierarchy of Qurʿān, sunna,
and qiyās in determining legal rulings (ḥukm).449 His emphasis on qiyās—analogical
reasoning—explains his inclusion of what appear to be highly specific and circumscribed
legal questions, such as those regarding slave mothers, since the judge would be expected
to be skilled in qiyās to be able to discern the legal principles in these examples and how
they would apply to a wider variety of cases. Khabars and athars—historical reports and
traditions—are thus peppered throughout the chapter as forms of legal precedents for how
the Prophet, ʿUmar, or other major authoritiative figures adjudicated a matter.
While al-Shāfiʿī does not make it clear in this section, his discussions are based
on the premise that the lack of a clear, explicit proof-text relevant to a ruling requires the
judge’s undertaking of ijtihād, “a specific kind of legal inference,” of which qiyās is the
necessary means of doing so.450 Otherwise, the judge must issue rulings based on a prima
facie understanding of his textual sources; he may utilize qiyās only when a single
interpretation is not clear, although al-Shāfiʿī also discusses at what points it is
appropriate for the judge to use ijtihād and the merits of doing so. As such, al-Shāfiʿī
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begins his discussion with the ḥadīth of the judge who endeavors to reach a legal ruling
through ijtihād: “if the judge gives a legal ruling and then undertakes ijtihād and is right,
then he earns two rewards; and if he gives a legal ruling and undertakes ijtihad and errs,
then he earns one reward.”451 This tradition appears again later in the chapter and is
consistently cited throughout both the Baghdadi Twelver and Baghdadi-Khorasani
Shāfiʿite lineages.452 Al-Shāfiʿī is careful to note that ijtihād does not mean one may
follow one’s own reasoning independently of the sources, citing legal opinions (qawl),453
Qurʿānic verses, and a long discussion of Saʿd ibn Muʿādh’s use of raʾy regarding the
Banū Qurayẓa in support of this view.454 Furthermore, he makes it clear that he prefers
for the judge to rely more heavily on qiyās455 and even juristic consensus on a specific
matter (amr mujtamaʿ ʿalayhi).456 The discussion of ijtihād gets picked up again in the
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section rather confusingly titled “Bāb al-aqḍiya,” as well as the following section,“Bāb
ijtihād al-ḥākim (The judge’s ijtihād),” both of which overlap consistently in content.457
In Bāb al-aqḍiya, al-Shāfiʿī begins with Q 38:26, in which God declares to
Dāwūd that He had made him a deputy (khalīfa) on earth to give correct legal rulings (bi
‘l-ḥaqq) for the people. It is clustered with other Qurʿānic verses about the Prophet giving
legal rulings among the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) and ruling fairly according to
“what God has revealed.”458 Having established the Qurʿānic basis for giving legal
rulings (sg. ḥukm), al-Shāfiʿī then cites another verse stating that “whoever obeys the
Prophet has obeyed God” (4:80), justifying his hierarchy of Qurʿān and sunna through
the primacy of the Qurʿān itself, and explicating that the Prophet Muḥammad knew that
ḥaqq—understood to be objective truth, which is also derived to refer to someone’s legal
right—“is the Book of God, then the sunna of his Prophet.”459 Interestingly, al-Shāfiʿī
also mentions muftīs and the process of giving fatwās in his discussion, although without
elaborating further.460 He merely states that both judges and muftīs may not issue fatwās,
or the judge his legal rulings, until they are knowledgeable in both the Qurʿān and sunna
and how to avoid contradicting them; such contradiction would be “to defy God (ʿāṣī li
’llāh)” and would result in a legal ruling being rejected (mardūd).461 However, whenever
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a Qurʿānic or sunnaic source relevant to a legal ruling cannot be found, al-Shāfiʿī defines
ijithād as the process of searching for two bases of comparison in order to make a proper
analogy, just as one would need to exercise ijtihād when determining the direction to
pray if one “could not see the bayt [i.e. the Kaʿba’].”462 In this analogy, the sighting of
the Kaʿba is parallel to a clear scriptural proof-text or “naṣṣ;” its lack of ambiguity
renders any reasoning or other forms of derivation of rules moot. However, if the rule is
not fully clear, ijtihād thus becomes the crucial legal method for determining what it is.
Bāb fī ijtihād al-ḥākim also begins with a Qurʾānic verse on Dāwūd, this time
along with Sulaymān, giving legal rulings (21:78).463 Al-Shāfiʿī utilizes this verse to
delineate the continuous nature of the act of giving legal rulings from the era of the
prophets onwards, although the linkage is not clear from the cited Qurʾānic passage. He
also repeats the Prophetic ḥadīth regarding rewards for the judge who gives a legal ruling
and undertakes ijtihād, which acts as a transition into a general discussion of ijtihād. He
elaborates on the crucial nature of the independence of the mujtahid—the person who
undertakes ijtihād—stating that “it is a duty (farḍ) for the mujtahid to undertake ijtihād
according to his own reasoning (raʾy) and not the legal opinions of someone else, and
that it become evident that no one should follow any of his contemporaries by submitting
to their authority on the matter (wa bayyinun annahu laysa li-aḥad an yuqallida aḥadan
min ahl zamānihi).”464 However, al-Shāfiʿī notes that a judge who undertook ijtihād and
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then realized that his ijtihād was in error or in contradiction to the Qurʾān, sunna, or
consensus465 should retract his ruling and not extend his ijtihād to another case (wa lā
yasaʿuhu ghayr dhālik).”466 However, if the result of his ijtihād could also be understood
as correct, then he must not retract his ruling.467 The rest of the section elaborates on
forms of qiyās and the ability of every person to arrive at the objective truth in ruling on
the law.
Al-Shāfiʿī’s concerns about taqlīd and independence in reasoning are also
reflected in his discussions on mushāwara, or consultation with legal experts, which are
divided among several separated sections: “Mushāwarat al-qāḍī,” “Mā yuradd min alqism,” and “Bāb al-mushāwara.” Mushāwara is a procedure al-Shāfiʿī puts forward for
the judge to be either directed to the khabars relevant to his case,468 or to be made to
understand how qiyās applies to what he already has before him. For al-Shāfiʿī, the legal
right that is determined through the ruling has to “become clear” (bāna lahu) to the
judge;469 as a result, judicial consultation becomes a crucial part of the adjudication
process. While al-Shāfiʿī notes that engaging in judicial consultation is the preferred
juristic position, he limits it to consulting those who are knowledgeable, meaning those
who are not only learned in the methods and principles applied to the Qurʿān, sunna,
reports (āthār), and issue-specific legal opinons, but who are also proficient in Arabic
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lexicography; furthermore, such scholars must also be truthful and pious.470 In the section
titled “Mushāwarat al-qāḍī,” al-Shāfiʿī states that the judge should resort to judicial
consultation when he is faced with “two views regarding the Qurʾān” or multiple
interpretations of the apparent (ẓāhir) meaning of a sunna; he may not act in accordance
with any legal viewpoint (wajh) until he finds the dalāla, or identify the legal indicant
(dalīl) in “the Book [Qurʾān], sunna, consensus, or qiyās.”471 Al-Shāfiʿī, true to his
prioritization of the Qurʿān and sunna as legal sources (uṣūl), also warns that the judge
must never act on qiyās unless it is more appropriate than the Qurʾān, sunna, or
consensus (a principle—aṣl—that takes priority over qiyās for the first time in the
chapter). As for the consultation with legal experts, al-Shāfiʿī notes that the judge must
not follow their explanations on the basis of taqlīd, but rather “the Book, sunna,
consensus, or qiyās they point him to, so that he understands it the way they understand
it.”472 Al-Shāfiʿī emphasizes this point in the relevant part of “Mā yuradd min al-qism,”
stating that the judge may not adjudicate until after the ḥaqq had become clear to him
through a khabar473 or qiyās; if it does not become evident to him, he may not give a
legal ruling and must appeal to the ahl al-raʾy, but again, he must make sure he
understands their explanation, otherwise he may not issue a ruling.474 “Bāb almushāwara” emphasizes the uṣūl in justifying consultation by citing a relevant Qurʾānic
verse (42:38, “wa amruhum shūrā baynahum”) and a ḥadīth that al-Shāfiʿī explains as the
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Prophet Muḥammad establishing the sunna of judicial consultation after him by his own
example. 475 It is also here that he adds the stipulation that the scholars being consulted
must not only be knowledgeable in the requisite uṣūl, but also “reliable (amīn)” so that
they do not lead the judge astray.476
The connection between the judge’s independence and issuing a legal ruling is a
consistently important point throughout al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-aqḍiya, particularly alShāfiʿī’s insistence that the judge must give a legal ruling on the basis of prima facie
evidence as a first resort.477 In the chapter section, “al-Iqrār wa ‘l-ijtihād wa ‘l-ḥukm bi
‘l-ẓāhir,” al-Shāfiʿī cites a Prophetic ḥadīth in which the Prophet Muḥammad states that
since he is “only a human being (innamā ana bashar)” and thus may be persuaded by
arguments that are more eloquently formulated than that of an opposing litigant, he
adjudicates based on the general approximation of what he hears from the litigants’
claims (wa laʿalla baʿḍukum an yakūn alḥana bi-ḥujjatihi min baʿḍ fa-aqḍī lahu ʿalā
naḥw mā asmaʿu minhu).478 Here al-Shāfiʿī makes an a fortiori argument that “if the
prophets, who enjoy legal authority and special divine favour, do not know the unseen (a
point attested in the Qurʾān), then how can lesser humans?”479 As such, judges must base
their adjudication on the prima facie meaning of what they hear in a case, specifically
based on the litigants’ speech (lafẓ).480 Furthermore, giving legal rulings based on the
opposite of the prima facie meaning, i.e. the bāṭin—the hidden objective truth—is
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prohibited, since “God alone lays claim to knowledge of the unseen (istaʿthara bi-ʿilm alghayb),” and even the Prophet, the “best of men,” adjudicated only according to what he
heard as evidence.481 However, ruling according to the bāṭin is acceptable if it is through
the litigant’s admission, since iqrār is a means by which a litigant reveals his intention
(niyya) as well as what he knows.
Al-Shāfiʿī’s discussions of how the judge accesses objective truth leads him to the
issue of the judge’s personal knowledge (ʿilm al-qāḍī), the same concept that would later
be referred to as al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm in Twelver texts. Al-Shāfiʿī notes that there are
different juristic positions regarding the judge’s personal knowledge and that only “one
of the legal opinions (qawl)” permit its use in adjudication.482 The legal opinion
supporting personal knowledge states that the judge should adjudicate according to
everything that he knew “before and after holding court” (qabl al-ḥukm wa baʿdahu) in
regard to civil matters (ḥuqūq al-adamiyīn), that is, the rights that are not claimed by God
and thus retained by the people. What al-Shāfiʿī may mean by “after the legal ruling” is
after the judge finds the legal principle to issue a ruling but before he formally
adjudicates. Regardless, al-Shāfiʿī asserts that this legal opinion is based on the premise
that if a judge accepted the prima facie evidence on the basis of two witnesses, then the
judge’s own knowledge must be greater than the testimony of two witnesses in order for
him to rule contrary to the testimonial evidence.483 It is not clear how al-Shāfiʿī comes to
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this conclusion, although it appears to be a result of some type of qiyās. The dissenting
opinion asserts that the judge cannot adjudicate by his personal knowledge unless two
witnesses testify to something similar (mithl) to what he knows. The judge’s personal
knowledge can only reinforce evidence, and he thus cannot rule by his personal
knowledge if it contradicts the testimony. Al-Shāfiʿī does not explicitly state which
opinion he is in agreement with, although he notes that there must be a distinction
between civil proceedings (ḥuqūq al-nās/adamiyīn) and penal cases (ḥudūd Allāh) in
regard to the permissibility of the judge’s use of personal knowledge.484
Unusually, al-Shāfiʿī introduces the knowledge of the litigants themselves and
their impact on carrying out the ruling. In fact, this discussion, embedded in the context
of ruling according to prima facie evidence, is how the beginning of Kitāb al-aqḍiya
opens. The judge is only required to give legal rulings according to the prima facie
meaning of the evidence presented before him, regardless of whether he errs regarding
the bāṭin—in this case, the objectively correct knowledge. However, if the litigant in
whose favor the judge ruled (al-maḥkūm lahu) knows that his own bāṭin knowledge of
the case nullified what the judge knew through the prima facie evidence, then the litigant
may not avail himself of the right (ḥaqq) granted to him in the ruling. In this case, the
litigant’s own knowledge of his transgression renders taking his judicially-justified legal
right forbidden (ḥarām); since the judge has already discharged his duty of giving a
ruling based on prima facie evidence, he “can be confident that God will punish
wrongdoers in the next life,” even if he erred in his ruling.485 There are thus two
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adjudicative processes that intersect: the first is the legal proceeding occurring before a
human judge, in which the judge can only be held accountable for his best effort; the
second is the proceeding that will presumably take place before God, who will hold the
litigants who knew the truth to account. Thus, once the judge makes a ruling and then the
litigant, with knowledge of his own fault, unfairly collects on the judgment in his favor,
he will be held accountable in the afterlife. The responsibility regarding who truly is
deserving of a favorable ruling in a case is thus redirected to both litigants, including the
one ruled against (al-maḥkūm ʿalayh) since “the licit (ḥalāl) and forbidden (ḥarām) are in
accord with what the maḥkūm lahu and maḥkūm ʿalayh know,” a principle which the text
notes as being further explained in the chapter on evidence established by a single
witness and an oath, Kitāb al-shāhid wa ‘l-yamīn.486
Al-Shāfiʿī’s approach to adjudication has thus mostly reflected his approach to the
sources (uṣūl) for jurisprudence. As we have seen, he may utilize Qurʿānic verses or
ḥadīths to establish the permissibility of general concepts relating to giving legal rulings
or establishing bayyina evidence as necessary for claims (daʿwā);487 he also includes
adjudication procedures that are based on a ḥujja—argumentative proof—of a Qurʾānic
verse, such as the swearing (ḥilf) of the muqirr (the one who gives an admission,
iqrār),488 or are based on specific ḥadīths, such as those regarding the admission of an
heir, that a judge would be expected to know.489 Al-Shāfiʿī does, however, make a
distinction between practices and legal methods for adjudication with a basis in some
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Quranic verses, sunna, qiyās, or argumentative proof, and protocols that are general
preferences or even his own preferences (e.g. “kāna aḥabba ilayya”490). For example, in
his appropriately titled section, “Adab al-qāḍī wa mā yustaḥabbu li ’l-qāḍī,” issues of
judicial protocol, such as a judge taking notes in the court’s register (diwān), are
described simply as things a judge “should” do.491 These recommendations include the
judge being accessible in a central area of a settlement, that there not be any dividers
between him and litigants, and that he adjudicate in places other than the mosque. Also, it
is loathsome for him to engage directly in buying and selling goods, and to not adjudicate
while angry, one of the few instances for which an explanation is given (because
“reasoning and understanding—al-ʿaql wa ‘l-fahm—are changed”).492 The judicial
protocols appear again in the section of Mā yuradd min al-qism bi-iddiʿāʾ baʿḍ almaqsūm, where al-Shāfiʿī states that “the judge should be just in his legal ruling” and
outlines the ways he should receive the litigants, including travelers, and how he should
listen to their arguments.493 In both sections al-Shāfiʿī asserts that it is only when the
ḥaqq becomes clear to the judge that he may rule decisively in accordance with it (matā
bāna lahu al-ḥaqq ʿalayhi qaṭaʿa bihi al-ḥukm);494 otherwise, he may not issue the legal
ruling. 495
In the section titled “Al-Daʿwā wa ‘l-bayyināt (Claims and Evidence)” al-Shafiʿī
presents definitions of basic terms, sometimes serving as relative distinctions regarding
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who has the burden of proof (such as man kāna al-mālik—who the owner is—and mā
kāna bi-yad al-mālik—what is in the possession of the owner.) Other definitions, such as
the one for plaintiff, serve more as brief clarifications (“the one who bears the burden of
proof”).496 In defining his legal terms, al-Shāfiʿī is unusual among both the Twelver and
Shāfiʿite jurists I survey; other than the occasional definition of plaintiff, the later jurists
all assume familiarity with their technical legal vocabulary. In the rest of the section, alShāfiʿī then elaborates on the burden of proof and judicial procedure for different types of
cases, such as loans, claims to property, emancipation of enslaved persons, claims
involving personal injury (dam), marriage, and claims to inheritance (al-daʿwā fī ’lmīrāth), which is placed in its own brief section.

Al-Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar Kitāb al-Umm

The lengthy, sprawling nature of al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-Umm makes it clear why
Ismāʿīl ibn Yaḥyā al-Muzanī (d. 264 H/877 CE), one of al-Shafiʿī’s most prominent
students and a major jurist in his own right, identified a need for producing a mukhtaṣar
of this work. Al-Muzanī, whose relevant chapter is titled “Adab al-qāḍī,” begins with the
location where the judge must hold court: in a prominent area, without a divider (ḥijāb),
and preferably not in a mosque because “of the frequency of petitioners and quarreling
(li-kathrat al-ghāshiya wa ‘l-mushātama).497 He then moves immediately to al-Shāfiʿī’s
discussion of the judge’s state of mind, the preference for the judge to attend social
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events (such as weddings and funerals), to visit the sick, to manage rowdy litigants in the
courtroom, and to consult with other scholars regarding legal matters. The rather
incongruous and wide range of topics is due to al-Muzanī arranging al-Shāfiʿī’s relevant
sections on judicial protocols from various parts of his Kitāb al-Umm into one section. In
doing so, he either cites or paraphrases al-Shāfiʿī but leaves much of the detail of the
original text out, along with the chains of transmission (isnād) for Prophetic ḥadīths,
including the one exhorting the judge not to adjudicate when angry. He also includes
short excerpts from Qurʾānic verses in favor of judicial consultation,498 and an
explanation of the Prophet’s establishing judicial consultation for the judges after him
from al-Shāfiʿī’s text, as well as the command to only consult with scholars
knowledgeable in the sources—the Qurʾān, sunna, binding historical reports (āthār),
scholars’ legal opinions (aqāwīl al-nās), qiyās, Arabic (lisan al-ʿarab)—and to not accept
their legal views until the judge understands it for himself.499 This elaboration then
segues into another statement by al-Shāfiʿī that God has not made it such that one should
follow anyone other than the Prophet by means of taqlīd,500 resulting in the necessity of
qiyās and an explanation of its different types. Al-Muzanī then returns to the topic of
establishing adjudication as a tradition established by Qurʾānic prophets; like al-Shāfiʿī,
he cites a Qurʾānic verse on Dāwūd and Sulaymān as justification. However, al-Muzanī
cites the verse that follows al-Shāfiʿī’s selection: “We gave its understanding to
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Sulaymān, and to each one We gave judgement and knowledge”501 (Q 21:79). He also
includes the statement that “were it not for this verse, I would have thought all the judges
had died out.”502 Al-Muzanī then continues with the Prophetic ḥadīth which states that a
judge is rewarded twice when he undertakes ijtihād and gets a ruling right, and once
when he gets it wrong, siding with al-Shāfiʿī’s interpretation that the judge is rewarded
for his effort rather than for getting the ruling correct.
The ensuing discussion addresses al-Shāfiʿī’s statement on the judge undertaking
ijtihād503 and then either realizing that he had erred or someone pointing out his error to
another judge. Al-Muzanī reproduces al-Shāfiʿī’s statements on the matter, as well as on
the issue of a non-Arabic speaker whose language the judge did not know, and the vetting
of witnesses, which leads to the discussion of other court personnel such as the secretary
(kātib), who is preferably a jurist, and the inherited estate distributor (qāsim) having the
same characteristics of the secretary in addition to knowledge of mathematical division
(ḥisāb). The discussion of organizing the court also leads al-Muzanī to discuss the
necessity of record-keeping and administration, where he makes references to utilizing
the court register (dīwān), recording testimonies, placing the legal arguments of litigants
in one place with their names and dates noted, and checking the seals of documents
before opening them.504
The next section, titled “Kitāb qāḍī ilā qāḍī (Judge-to-judge correspondence),”
continues with this emphasis on proper documentation to verify the content of the other
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judge’s correspondence, although al-Muzanī significantly condenses al-Shāfiʿī’s
discussion. Like al-Shāfiʿī, however, he exhibits no anxiety about relying on the legal
opinion of someone else in this context, only that the concomitant bayyina evidence and
the identity of the writer be confirmed. Al-Muzanī preserves al-Shāfiʿī’s parallel of
judge-to-judge correspondence with correspondence between the judge and the deputy
(khalīfa) as well as the judge and the local ruler (amīr), acknowledging the political
framework of the judgeship but not elaborating on it any further.505
After a brief section on inherited estate distributors, their status as mediators
(ḥukkām),506 their payment from the treasury, and the technicalities of estate distribution,
al-Muzanī returns to the protocols of the judge receiving litigants in court. These
procedures include treating the litigants equally and allowing them to present their cases,
prioritizing travelers over residents when feasible, and the exhortation against accepting
gifts. There is again a brief reference to the ruler (imām) who, in the interest of case
documentation, should set aside an allowance for the judge’s paper (li-qarāṭīsihi) so that
the petitioner (ṭālib) would not have to bear the cost, in addition to the judge’s own
recording of testimonies. The text then segues into weighing admission (iqrār) as
evidence and al-Muzanī paraphrasing al-Shāfiʿī’s statement in the Risāla: “I rule against
[someone] on the basis of my knowledge (bi-ʿilmī), and it is stronger than two
witnesses.”507 Al-Muzanī does not connect this concept of ʿilm to the judge’s personal

505

al-Muzanī, 9:467; al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm, 8:523–26.
Although both al-Muzanī and al-Shāfiʿī use ḥākim and qāḍī interchangeably to mean judge, it appears
here that ḥākim is being used in a much more limited sense of as an arbitrator of a specific issue.
507
al-Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar Kitāb al-Umm, 9:469. The Risāla has a longer passage: “I rule against someone
on the basis of personal knowledge that what is alleged against him is as alleged, or I rule on the basis of
his admission against interest. If I have no such knowledge, or he makes no such admission, then I would
rule against him on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, even though they might be mistaken or
speculating. My personal knowledge and his own admission are stronger evidence against him than the
506

174

knowledge, as is clear from al-Shāfiʿī’s original text, but rather to the assertion that
admission is more certain than (athbat min) testimony for particular cases.508 Al-Muzanī
then refers to a situation where the ruler appoints a man to adjudicate a member of his
family (man raʾā fī ’l-ṭaraf min aṭrāfihi), which al-Muzanī permits. However, if the judge
is removed (ʿuzila) after having given a judgment, his claim is rejected without witnesses
to the fact, just as a ruling on himself, his son or father, or anyone whose testimony is not
accepted, is rejected (rudda ḥukmuhu).
The rest of the chapter follows what El Shamsy had earlier characterized in Kitāb
al-Umm as points of law “grouped loosely according to the area of the law with which
they deal,”509 in this case, specific areas of testimony, oaths, emancipation of enslaved
persons, and other issues, all with their own sections and sub-sections. Here al-Muzanī
does not limit himself to Kitāb al-Umm but also draws from al-Shāfiʿī’s other writings,
such as Aḥkām al-Qurʾān. In the discussion on testimony which women are not permitted
to provide, al-Muzanī notes that “women are deficient in what men have obtained,” citing
Q 2:282 (“so that if one of the two women should forget, the other can remind her”),510
which is why men are made both rulers and judges over them. 511 Later, in the same
section, al-Muzanī includes the Prophetic command to adjudicate according to prima
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facie evidence, and to leave the unknown (al-sarāʾir) to God.512 He also includes
discussion on hearsay evidence (al-shahāda ʿalā’l-shahāda)513 and the case of using lots
(qurʿa) to determine unknown legal status, using the example of the Muslim and
Christian sons of a man who gave contradictory evidence regarding his religion. A
section titled “the Mukhtāsar from the chapter on testimonies and what al-Risāla contains
regarding it (Mukhtaṣar min kitāb al-shahadāt wa mā dakhalahu min al-Risāla),” has a
sub-section that includes the title adab al-qāḍī, but is actually about whose testimony the
judge may accept rather than anything referring to protocols or the judge himself.514 The
rest of the chapter refers to evidentiary procedures for various legal issues, including
topics dealt with under the rubric of disagreement (ikhtilāf) in al-Shāfiʿī’s writings.
Al-Muzanī’s Mukhtaṣar served an important role in gathering the range of alShāfiʿi’s writings on the judgeship, both in Kitāb al-Umm as well as his other texts, into a
much more accessible format. As El Shamsy notes, al-Muzanī “condenses and
reorganizes al-Shāfiʿi’s material in chapters of his own design, but he prefaces most
chapters by naming the part of al-Shāfiʿī’s work on which that chapter draws,” rendering
the Mukhtaṣar both an independent study text and reference, as well as guide to alShāfiʿī’s body of work.515 However, in staying close to al-Shāfiʿī’s topic structure in
Kitāb al-Umm, al-Mukhtasar does not fully avail itself of the opportunity to give
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“comprehensive knowledge”516 on the subject of the judgeship, since issues like
adjudicating by prima facie evidence are embedded within extensive discussions
regarding evidentiary procedures for other specific legal matters. Similarly, there is no
separate section on the qualifications of the judge, of which one, maleness, is embedded
in the section regarding women’s testimony. Al-Muzanī ‘s chapter does not extract legal
issues regarding the discourse on judgeship from al-Shāfiʿī’s texts to place them in a
clearer order; his authorial intent is unclear, although at points there appears to be a
logical transition between each sub-section’s content. As such, the section on witnesses is
linked to the section on judge-to-judge correspondence because of their use of
documentation, and the section on a judge not being able to give a ruling on his father,
his son, himself, and “whoever’s testimony is not permitted” leads into the section on
testimony and the cases in which women’s testimony is not allowed. In keeping the
plurality of authoritative legal opinions evident in al-Shāfiʿī’s text to a mostly single,
authoritative viewpoint in al-Mukhtaṣar, al-Muzanī heavily shapes the version of alShāfiʿī that he wishes to transmit. In this way, al-Mukhtaṣar is not only a more accessible
text, but an authoritative one, serving as the “literary basis” for the Shāfiʿite school “more
or less founded in the next century by Ibn Surayj,” who died in 918 CE.517
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Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya

Prior to moving on to al-Ghazālī, the next jurist in this Shāfiʿite juristic lineage, it
would be beneficial to understand ideas about the connection between the judgeship and
the political apparatus in which it is embedded by examining al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya of
Abū ’l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 450H/1058 CE). Al-Māwardī, a renowned Shāfiʿite jurist in
Baghdad, lived approximately contemporaneously with al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, who, as
noted in Chapter One, had written his own treatise on the relationship of scholars to
political authority.518 Al-Māwardī enjoyed good relations with the ʿAbbāsid caliph alQādir (r. 381-422 H/991-1031 CE) as well as the Būyids, and was given the title of chief
justice, or aqḍā al-quḍāt, in Baghdad in 1038 CE.519 His treatise on governance was the
best-known.
Al-Aḥkām al-sulṭaniyya is a work on public law, in which al-Māwardī “collected
the rules pertaining to all aspects of government—the imamate, vizierate, taxation,
judgeship, holy war, the treatment of rebels, market inspection, and more besides—from
a variety of genres and put them in a single book;520 it may reflect a perception that the
role of the caliphate had been diminished under Būyid rule.521 (Aḥkām in the title here
refers to ḥukm’s broader meaning of “principle,” with this title often translated as “The
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Ordinances of Government.”) As a work on public law—most likely written for the
Caliph al-Qādir (r. 381-422 H/991-1031 CE) or his successor, al-Qāʾim (r. 422-67
H/1031-1075 CE)522—the purpose of this text was “to give a legal exposition of the
theory of government speculatively derived from the basis of theology and to set out the
formal basis of government so that the ruler, knowing his rights and duties, might fulfil
the charge laid upon him.”523 The Aḥkām is thus based on the assumption that rulers may
set precedents, but that such precedents “did not rework historical patterns of governance
into legal principles.”524 In addressing the various military, administrative, economic, and
religious institutions of a ruling regime, al-Māwardī includes a chapter on judges and
adjudication titled “Regarding the Office of the Judgeship (Fī wilāyat al-qaḍāʾ),”525 since
the judge’s role was also integrated into a state’s administration. As such, al-Māwardī
discusses the similarities between political leaders and various officials, including judges,
in his first chapter, “Regarding the conferral of leadership (fī ʿaqd al-imāma).” He notes
that the appointment of a leader may not be completed except by the conferror (ʿāqid),
“just like the judgeship;” thus, even if only one person was found suitable to become a
judge, he still could not be recognized as one until he was formally appointed.526 The
main difference in appointing a political leader and a judge, however, is that judges are
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appointed by individuals, whereas leaders are invested by “electors” (ahl al-ikhtiyār),
who include scholars (ʿulamāʾ).
Al-Māwardī’s conception of leadership is one of hierarchies of delegated power,
in which the highest and most perfect form of power is that of God, then the Prophet
Muḥammad, then the rulers (imāms), and finally that of governors (wālīs), judges, and
other officials. In many ways, this conception is also similar to how the Twelver jurists
understood the delegation of power, with the particular exception of al-Māwardī’s
notions of delegation and consensus (ijmāʿ), since the Hidden Imam rendered both other
rulers, as well as communal authority of the kind implied by non-Twelver consensus,
illegitimate. However, the issue of delegation of power to judges remained a question for
all authors of adab al-qāḍī texts, although al-Māwardī’s chapter is not to be considered
an adab al-qāḍī text since it concerned itself mainly with the validity of the judge’s
appointment rather than his weighing of evidence and issuing of rulings. However, it is
clear that al-Māwardī drew heavily from adab al-qāḍī texts in his delineation of the role
of the judge within governmental structures, as well as in various aspects of the political
leadership (imāma).527
In the relevant chapter of al-Aḥkām, “Regarding the Office of the Judgeship,” alMāwardī understands the judgeship as either a general (ʿāmm) or specific (khāṣṣ)
appointment. The general appointment, in which the judge’s jurisdiction is also general
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and unrestricted (muṭlaq), is categorized into ten areas: resolution of disputes, restoration
of the usurped rights of those entitled to them, guardianship of minors and those mentally
compromised, attention to the maintenance of religious endowments (waqf), executing
wills in accordance with the lawful wishes of the testator, marrying off divorced and
widowed women (al-ayāmā), ruling on penal cases (ḥudūd), looking after the streets and
open areas of his district, examining his witnesses and guardians and choosing his
deputies, and judging justly between the strong and weak and those of unequal rank. In
four of these areas—restoring rights to those entitled, marrying off divorced and
widowed women, penal cases, and supervision of public areas—al-Māwardī indicates
where Abū Ḥanīfa’s juristic position differs from his own statements, a notable point
since he later posits an important relationship between the Ḥanafite and Shāfiʿite schools
within the context of judicial rulings. He also notes, regarding the second condition of
returning rights to those entitled, that Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī allowed the judge to rule on
the basis of his personal knowledge (ḥukmihi fīmā bi-ʿilmihi), while Abū Ḥanīfa only
allowed it on the basis of what the judge learned during his tenure in office.528
Al-Māwardī further elaborates various combinations of general and specific
competences529 for the judge, for example, wide in scope (ʿāmm al-naẓar) but specific in
function (khāṣṣ al-ʿamal), that is, limited by jurisdiction. This means the judge carries out
his powers in all the ten aforementioned areas but only within a physical area designated
by the ruling authority, which may be as large as a province or as small as his abode or
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mosque, where he would adjudicate for his visitors. He also notes that a judge’s authority
can be restricted to a particular dispute (ḥukūma) between two claimants that is limited to
only those two and for as long as their dispute continues, rendering his judgeship
temporary yet expedient.
However, al-Māwardī’s chapter begins with and is heavily framed by the
admonishment that one may only follow a judge who meets all the required conditions to
be followed by means of taqlīd in general, as well as for taking up the judgeship. The
conditions for the judgeship (qaḍāʾ) adhere to the list typically found in other adab alqāḍī texts, including maleness (dhukūriyya), maturity, sound mind, freedom, Islam,
soundness of hearing and vision, and scholarly knowledge of legal rulings (al-aḥkām alsharʿiyya),530 which includes their theoretical underpinnings as well as their substantive
law. Unlike the adab al-qāḍī texts, al-Māwardī spends some time elaborating on each
condition and its underlying reason, supplying multiple juristic positions for some while
presenting others as established rules.531 Furthermore, the last condition, regarding
knowledge of legal rulings, lays out al-Māwardī’s hierarchy of textual legal sources: the
Qurʾān, the Prophetic traditions, and the consensus of the Companions of the Prophet,
which is reinforced by the Muʿādh ḥadīth. Al-Māwardī then stipulates that the judge
should utilize his ijtihād for the issues on which the Companions disagreed, and qiyās in
order to be able to link unexplained discrete rules (furūʿ) to legal principles, until he
understands the reasoning (ʿilm) behind the legal rulings.532 By asserting this specific
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type of knowledge, he effectively limits the path to judgeship to a particular class of
people, i.e. the jurists. Al-Māwardī also asserts that the one who “applied his knowledge
to these four uṣūl regarding legal rulings becomes one of the ‘practitioners (ahl) of
ijtihād,’ in religion (dīn), and is permitted to give fatwās and to adjudicate.”533 However,
if the judge becomes deficient in some aspect of his knowledge, his reliance on someone
else’s judgment by means of taqlīd voids his legal ruling, whether he was correct or
not.534 Although al-Māwardī notes that Abū Ḥanīfa permitted taqlīd of the judgments and
legal rulings of one who was not of ahl al-ijtihād, “a majority of jurists (jumhūr alfuqahāʾ) consider his appointment invalid and reversible (mardūda).”535
In al-Māwardī’s conceptualization, a legal school can function as a distinct and
discrete school of thought which, in the case of legal rulings and adjudication, has
boundaries that are not only porous but are expected to be crossed based on the necessity
of ijithād.536 For him, it is key that the judge, in the process of his adjudication, engage in
ijtihād. If al-Māwardī’s Shāfiʿite judge cannot create a suitable foundation for his ijtihād
based on properly following the precedent established by novel cases and legal rulings
(taqlīd al-nawāzil wa ‘l-aḥkām) or the relevant legal opinion of al-Shāfiʿī, he may then
rely on Abū Ḥanīfa’s opinion to do so, because it is more commendable to reach a legal
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ruling through ijtihād by crossing the boundaries of legal schools than to remain within
his own school and be unable to do so. Similarly, he states that it is permissible for a
Ḥanafite judge to rely on al-Shāfiʿī’s opinion for the same reason. However, al-Māwardī
acknowledges that “some of the jurists” prohibited this kind of inter-madhhab
adjudication, and notes that the risk of going outside the madhhab could expose the judge
to accusations of bias. However, al-Māwardī assures us that the judge’s act would be less
subject to such accusations as long as he consistently based his rulings on the legal
opinions of a single doctrine.537 But again, al-Māwardī underscores that, despite other
jurists’ opinions, legal rulings (aḥkām al-sharʿ) do not compel the judge to submit to the
authority of his school on specific matters because there are cases in which taqlīd is
prohibited and others in which ijithād is necessitated. Here al-Māwardī argues against a
judge applying legal precedent by stating that if a similar case came before him after he
issued his ruling, he must reapply his ijtihād even if he ends up giving a different verdict,
citing a tradition about the Caliph ʿUmar to this effect.538 Ultimately, al-Māwardī’s own
permission for inter-madhhab legal appropriation is limited but presumes no controversy;
while he acknowledges the reality of a Shāfiʿite or Ḥanafite judge being ordered by a
ruler to issue a legal ruling only according to his own school, he states that this would be
an unlawful condition if it is asserted as a condition of the judge’s appointment.
However, the ruler has the power to forbid the judge to look into certain cases, and thus
restrict the judge’s subject matter jurisdiction.
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Expansion of the sphere of adjudication for the judge is key for al-Māwardī in
maintaining the flexibility of legal rulings so as to apply to a wide variety of cases. As
shown above, one way he dealt with this issue was by establishing the permission and
recommendation for a judge to undertake ijtihād through his own opinion regarding a
ruling (ijtihād bi-raʾyihi). Another principle he espouses is the necessity of issuing legal
opinions on the basis of the khabar wāḥid, stating that not doing so would discard the
principle (aṣl) established by the Companions that was used to expand the application of
legal rulings (aḥkām sharʿiyya).539 Al-Mawārdī registered his disapproval of the rejection
of qiyās for the same reason, that doing so would severely limit the scope of the law
based on the legal sources (uṣūl). Early Twelver jurists who were in favor of utilizing
khabar wāḥids, such as al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, were roughly coterminous with al-Māwardī,
while some later jurists, such as Ibn Idrīs, were against their use. Al-Māwardī’s outline
regarding judges requesting official positions entails language similar to that of al-Sharīf
al-Murtaḍā’s treatise on working for the government; although al-Māwardī mentions that
there were jurists who did not permit working for an “illegitimate” ruler (ẓālim), he
mentions others that stated that requesting judgeships was not a detestable act (makrūh)
and who were willing to permit such requests before an illegitimate ruler (ẓālim) if the
judge worked towards the attainment of objective truth (ʿamala bi ‘l-ḥaqq).540
Al-Māwardī’s approach to the judgeship in al-Aḥkām thus differed from adab alqāḍī texts in its focus on the legitimate appointment of the judge as well as the judge’s
use of ijtihād in applying the principles of the uṣūl to a wide variety of cases. Although
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al-Ghazālī and al-Rāfiʿī would both integrate these emphases and elaborate on them, alJuwaynī quite adamantly turns the adab al-qāḍī focus back to al-Shāfiʿī’s priorities,
although not without some influence from al-Māwardī.

Al-Juwaynī, Nihāyat al-maṭlab

ʿAbd al-Mālik ibn ʿAbdullāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī (d. 478 H/1085 CE), was a
renowned Saljūq-era jurist whose career spanned Nishapur and Baghdad, as well as
Mecca and Medina, leading to his title, “Imam al-Ḥaramayn.” As an “ʿAsharite
theologian of the Khorasani branch of the school,” al-Juwaynī maintained close contact
with scholars in Khorasan.541 He also wrote a political treatise, Ghiyāth al-umam fī
iltiyāth al-ẓulam, which exhibits similarities to that of al-Māwardī. The treatise embedded
theological qualifications for the office of imāma within the context of a political
argument for strong rule, all the while devaluing Qurayshī descent so that a Saljūq ruler
would be able to hold power legitimately.542 In spite of this, however, al-Juwaynī’s adab
al-qāḍī chapter sticks close to al-Shāfiʿī’s model, avoiding much of the discussions that
would later preoccupy his most famous student, al-Ghazālī.
Al-Juwaynī clearly saw a need for organizing the discussion on judges and
adjudication into a single chapter, with justifications for qaḍāʾ in the beginning of the
chapter, and then segueing into the more specific aspects of the judgeship. The topics that
al-Juwaynī covers are divided into what would be expected in adab al-qāḍī chapters from
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then on, including installation, dismissal, court procedure, and the various combinations
of evidence needed to adjudicate claims.
The chapter, titled Kitāb adab al-qaḍāʾ, opens with Qurʿānic verses relating to
giving legal rulings (5:44, 45, 47, 48), including the verses featuring Dāwūd and
Sulaymān’s adjudication (38:26, 21:78) which al-Shāfiʿī cites. Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Juwaynī
cites the Prophetic ḥadīth that states that the Messenger said to “give legal rulings
according to the prima facie meaning (ẓāhir).”543 Stating that adjudication is among “the
pillars of religion (arkān al-dīn),” al-Nihāya is the first of the texts in this lineage to refer
to adjudication not only as a collective duty (farḍ kifāya) but as among the most
important ones.544 Al-Juwaynī later states that he is in agreement with “the Iraqis,” i.e.
the Ḥanafites, on this issue.545 Furthermore, unlike al-Shāfiʿī, al-Juwaynī makes a clear
and early link to the undertaking of adjudication by Muslims and the demanding of
justice “for the victims of the oppressors (li ’l-maẓlūmīn min al-ẓālimīn),”546 a notion that
would also be reflected in the Twelver texts. He also underscores the crucial nature of the
judgeship by asserting that “it is of the rank (martaba) of holy war in the way of God.”547
Al-Juwaynī also connects this concept of justice through adjudication with worldly
leadership, asserting that legal maxims (qawāʿid) and discrete rules (furūʿ) lack the
proper authority to be enacted, since “the jurists” suffer from “inadequacy” (al-taqṣīr) in
authoritative leadership.548 As a result, for him, the highest rank is that “of the one who
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has comprehensive authority and leadership (al-manṣib al-aʿlā min ṣāḥib al-wilāya alimāma wa ‘l-zaʿāma al-ʿāmma).”549 Al-Juwaynī drives home the point with a Prophetic
ḥadīth in which the Messenger says, “one day under a just ruler (imām ʿādil) is better
than 60 years of worship, and the lawful application of the ḥadd punishment on earth is
purer than the rain of forty autumns.”550
Al-Juwaynī brings in elements that, although not evident in al-Shāfiʿī, are
reflected as concerns in the Twelver texts. These are concerns about giving legal rulings
unfairly or recklessly, which in turn will elicit punishment on the Day of Judgment. AlJuwaynī also includes traditions warning against engaging in the duty of adjudication,
particularly the Prophetic ḥadīth that taking up the judgeship was like being sacrificied
without a knife.551 Such warnings were typical components of Twelver discourse, and
indeed many of the issues al-Juwaynī brings up in his chapter are covered, if not further
developed, by the Twelver jurists of the 11th and 12th centuries CE.
After this initial discourse regarding the foundations of giving legal rulings as
well as the importance of an authority to enforce them, al-Juwaynī explains the
organization of the rest of his chapter as a recording of the most important points of
“what the jurists had mentioned (ʿuyūn mā dhakarahu al-fuqahāʾ),” from which he would

however, “even probity and scrupulous observance of the law (waraʿ) could be abandoned as long as the
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“clarify the path to truth (maslak al-ḥaqq).”552 Unlike al-Ṭūsī’s al-Nihāya, al-Juwaynī’s
text is not a compilation of legal positions he deems correct; he gives multiple viewpoints
on a single matter, sometimes leaving a clear juristic position on an issue unresolved. The
rest of the chapter is a selection of quotations of al-Shāfiʿī that are also cited by alMuzanī in the Mukhtaṣar, along with al-Juwaynī’s elaborations and clarifications, as well
as his investigations into al-Shāfiʿī’s own sources and whether the juristic tradition
properly understood al-Shāfiʿī’s points in the source material. To this end, al-Juwaynī
also draws from al-Shāfiʿī’s discussions in his other works, while also occasionally
including the positions of earlier major jurists, including “the Iraqis.”553 Even al-Muzanī
is not exempt from the occasional criticism; in the discussion regarding the permissibility
of adjudicating in the mosque, al-Juwaynī asserts that the apparent meaning (ẓāhir) of alMuzanī’s replication of al-Shāfiʿī’s unclear position on the matter presents it as
permissible, whereas al-Shāfiʿī’s discourse (kalām) in his other works clearly indicated
his aversion to it.554 To make his point, al-Juwaynī not only quotes from the text in
question but also gives an explanation for al-Shāfiʿī’s aversion.
While there is not sufficient information to point to al-Juwaynī as a source of
influence in regard to adab al-qāḍī discourse, it can at least be said that the Twelver
jurists were responding to an Iraqi-Shāfiʿite discursive juristic tradition, of which alJuwaynī was an example. His emphasis on the centrality of the amīr or leader, not only as
an authority in regard to laws but as someone worthy of taqlīd555 provides a parallel to
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the discussions of his Twelver counterparts regarding delegated authority from the one
true ruler, the Hidden Imam. Furthermore, his elaboration of when a potential appointee
can offer himself for the position receives similar treatment in the Twelver texts. At the
same time, al-Juwaynī is still very much embedded in the Shāfiʿite juristic tradition of
rulership as articulated by al-Māwardī, particularly in his discussion of the best-suited
(fāḍil) and lesser-suited (mafḍūl) candidate for judicial appointments.556
Al-Juwaynī appears relatively unconcerned with the judge’s process of
adjudication other than with the procedures for issuing a ruling that he scatters
throughout various sections of his chapter. Emphasizing the judge’s knowledge of
weighing evidence is an understandable focus for someone who also asserts that “hearing
evidence is one of the pillars of adjudication.”557 For this reason, al-Juwaynī’s inclusion
of a judge’s personal knowledge—ʿilm al-qāḍī—is subsumed under the discussion of
weighing oaths (sg. yamīn), admission (iqrār), and testimony (shahāda), although it also
occurs in several places in his text. After briefly listing the “three uṣūl” of jurisprudence
as the Qurʾān, sunna, and scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ),558 he declares that “our scholars
are in consensus that the judge adjudicates according to his knowledge of taʿdīl and
jarḥ,” that is, the status of witnesses.559 The permissibility of the judge’s personal
knowledge is also evident in determining the status of witnesses.560 However, al-Juwaynī
recognizes the complexity of the question when established juristic legal opinions differ
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in other categories in which the judge’s personal knowledge is acceptable.561 AlJuwaynī’s most sustained discussion on the question occurs as a response to a quote from
al-Shāfiʿī in a chapter on the judge’s dealings with litigants and witnesses, Bāb mā ʿalā
’l-qāḍī fī ’l-khuṣūm wa ‘l-shuhūd. Stating that the contents of the section is the discourse
on whether the judge may adjudicate according to his personal knowledge, he refers to
two contradictory statements made by al-Shāfiʿī.562 The first, which al-Juwaynī notes as
appearing in the Risāla,563 paraphrases al-Muzanī’s own paraphrase of al-Shāfiʿī: “I rule
on the basis of my knowledge (aqḍī bi-ʿilmī), and it is stronger than two witnesses (aqwā
min shāhidayn).”564 However, whereas al-Muzanī had associated ʿilm in this case with
the concealed knowledge that the judge would have gained through a litigant’s admission
(iqrār), al-Juwaynī restores the term to al-Shāfiʿī’s meaning of personal knowledge. AlJuwaynī elaborates on this statement by stating that if any doubt (ẓunūn) could be traced
back to the judge’s adjudication, and it would benefit from a witness’s testimony or a
plaintiff’s oath, then the judge can refer to his own personal certainty (presumably after
hearing the evidence), instead of referring to the evidence for certainty. Regarding a case
where the judge’s personal knowledge was in combination with the testimony of a single
witness, al-Juwaynī does later mention a viewpoint that such knowledge cannot decrease
with the addition of testimony, since ʿilm cannot be divided by degrees the way doubt
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(ẓunūn) can; as such, the acceptance of a judge’s knowledge in tandem with testimonial
evidence does not imply that the judge’s knowledge is not fully certain on its own.565
In contrast, al-Shāfiʿī’s second legal opinion states that the judge may not
adjudicate by his knowledge because it “opens the door to directing accusations at
judges” of partiality, which would undermine the legitimacy of the judicial system as a
whole; the judges would be particularly vulnerable if they weren’t subject to any outside
review, which would “arouse bitter feelings in people’s hearts” and incite opposition.566
Since the Twelver jurists in this analysis understood the judgeship as an extension of the
Hidden Imam’s prerogatives, they did not have any qualms about the judge’s personal
knowledge; as such, assured of the high levels of certainty of the judge’s personal
knowledge through this delegation, they were not as concerned as the Shāfiʿites with
limiting the areas in which the judge’s fallibility would have severe consequences, such
as in penal cases. However, they did share an anxiety that permitting the judge to rule by
his personal knowledge would appear to the public as arbitrary adjudication.
Furthermore, al-Juwaynī cites al-Shāfiʿī’s anxiety about not permitting the application of
personal knowledge by the “corrupt judges (quḍāt al-sūʾ),”567 an issue not relevant to the
Twelver jurists since their adab al-qāḍī discussions all presume delegation from the Just
Ruler, the Hidden Imam. After quoting al-Shāfiʿī’s entire section on the irrelevance of
place or time of jurisdiction to the nature of the judge’s knowledge, al-Juwaynī mentions
the various positions of other major Shāfiʿites (“our companions [aṣḥāb]”). He concludes
that there is no disagreement regarding refraining from adjudicating on the basis of
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personal knowledge, and as such it is better to refrain, all the more to counter accusations
of partiality.568
Much like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Juwaynī does not dedicate a focused discussion to the
judge’s ijtihād that would establish the relationship between general and specific
applications of ijtihād. Rather, the first mention of ijtihād occurs in the section regarding
the judge being free of hunger, thirst, illness, anger, or visible sadness. Since the judge
must give ijtihād its full due (“tawfiyat al-ijtihād ḥaqqahu”), these physical states would
undermine that ability because they diminish his mental acuity.569 Al-Juwaynī then leaves
that discussion until it comes up again in his analysis of al-Shāfiʿī’s statements in his
section on judicial consultation, where “al-Shāfiʿī hastened to explicate ijtihād in all its
aspects.”570 He then takes up early Islamic examples of revoking judgments (qaḍāʾ)
arrived at by ijtihād in the face of more certain evidence,571 and cites al-Shāfiʿī’s
narration from the Messenger regarding the reward for exercising ijtihād, which is
classed as a legal opinion, and the Qurʿānic verse on Dawūd and Sulaymān as proof of
the passing on of the institution of giving legal rulings.572 Al-Juwaynī examines the
various scholarly opinions on the reasoning behind revoking judgments, including the
relevance of the mujtahid’s good intentions. However, in a reference linking back to the
topic of judicial consultation, he states that if a judge made an error in his ijtihād and his
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error was pointed out to him, then it is incumbent upon him to revoke his ruling and make
every effort to rectify the matter.573
After a section on arbitration (taḥkīm), al-Juwaynī lists judicial qualifications in a
section at the end of his chapter titled “It is preferred that the Imam, when he appoints a
man to the judgeship, etc.”574 He states that such a person should be a muftī, free, and
male, but makes a point of stating that he did not mention that he should be a mujtahid,
“for the deviant (fāsiq) may be a mujtahid,” meaning the one who exerts ijtihād but has
dubious theological commitments.575 It is clear that al-Juwaynī here does not mean that a
judge should not be a mujtahid in general, since in an earlier section he stated that it was
a condition that the judge be “a mujtahid, according to the most sound argument (almaslak al-aṣaḥḥ);”576 rather, al-Juwaynī merely asserts that there is a suitable as well as
unsuitable kind of mujtahid. Furthermore, al-Juwaynī once again ties leadership to
adjudication through his notion of proper ijtihād, listing “independence in reasoning (alistiqlāl bi ‘l-amr)” and earnest exertion of the self as requirements to exercise it. He also
notes that such characteristics are similar to the prowess that is expected of a leader (wa
hādhā yuḍāhī min ṣifāt al-imām al-najda [sic]).”577
However, it is al-Juwaynī’s particular discussions of the issuing and executing of
legal rulings and the role of the judge’s ijtihād within the context of the legal school that
would become elaborate points of discussion for the later Shāfiʿite jurists al-Ghazālī, al-
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Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī. Like the aforementioned Twelver and Shāfiʿite jurists of previous
generations, al-Juwaynī uses the term madhhab to mean both a legal school of thought578
as well as the approach of a significant jurist or a group of jurists to a question.579 How
judges related to the madhhab remained for later Shāfiʿite jurists to elaborate, as alJuwaynī did not have a grand theory of the role of mujtahids in the legal school.580
Rather, he only mentions the mujtahid dealing with a masʾala, a previous case whose
basic details are preserved, to understand how to deal with similar cases. Rather than
applying the principles of the case by deriving discrete rules (tafrīʿ), he states that the
mujtahid should adjudicate according to the way the legal school approaches the issue,
for if it were not for the obligation of following a legal school, “everyone would be
individual in their madhhab.”581
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Al-Ghazālī, al-Wajīz

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058 CE-1111 CE) was
famous not only as a jurist but also as a theologian and mystic. Born in Ṭūs and later
educated in Nishapur under al-Juwaynī, he was eventually sent by the Saljūq vizier
Niẓām al-Mulk to Baghdad to teach at the Niẓamiyya madrasa. Al-Wajīz is the shortest
of his fiqh works and was completed in Ṭūs in 1101 CE.582 His chapter on adjudication,
titled “Kitāb adab al-qaḍāʾ,” is organized into four sections: a section on the judge’s
appointment and dismissal (al-tawliya wa ‘l-ʿazl), a second on judicial protocol (adab alqaḍāʾ), the third on adjudicating in a defendant’s absence (al-qaḍāʾ ʿalā al-ghāʾib), and a
final section on division of inherited estates (qisma), with each section containing further
subdivisions. The organization of ideas into digestible, concise sections, along with the
occasional set of legal examples (masʾala) or brief explanations of the relevant furūʿ at
the end, render this a text intended for student learning. Its organization and economy of
language essentially render it a handbook that could serve as a guide for delving into
either al-Ghazālī’s longer works on the topic, such as al-Wasīṭ, or the Shāfiʿite school’s
approach to adjudication in ways much more accessible than even al-Juwaynī’s Nihāyat
al-maṭlab. However, despite its conciseness, al-Ghazālī nonetheless preserves multiple
viewpoints for many of his discussions, although for the sake of brevity he may refrain
from elaborating all the details of those viewpoints.
Al-Ghazālī begins his chapter with a discussion of the process of how to appoint a
judge, rather than with legitimizing the institution of judgeship and its requisite
582
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characteristics. Much like al-Māwardī, he presents the judgeship as a collective duty (farḍ
ʿalā al-kifāya) in the same manner as political leadership (imāma) because both involve
human welfare (maṣāliḥ al-ʿibād).583 However, he does not directly discuss its place
within the hierarchy of political authority, where political leadership would be at the top;
the fact of its status as a collective duty, as well as its “great importance” (khaṭar), is
sufficient for al-Ghazālī to require great care in appointing a qualified judge who also
knows how to attain the position through appropriate means—such as when to request the
position and when to refrain from doing so584—and “does not fear malfeasance (khiyāna)
in himself,” which may refer to betraying the welfare of the people in the pursuit of
power and self-enrichment.585
Al-Ghazālī then briefly lists the required characteristics of a judge: free, male,
mujtahid, seeing (baṣīr), upright (ʿadl), mature (bāligh), adding that “the adjudication of
a woman, deaf person, minor, deviant, ignorant person (jāhil), or muqallid is not
permitted.”586 Al-Ghazālī elaborates that the judge should “be independent (an
yastaqilla) in his ijtihād,” noting that there is a viewpoint that one who undertakes ijtihād
“through the madhhab of one of the Imams who has a fatwā attributed to him,” or follows
a deceased imām587 by means of taqlīd, may not be appointed to the judgeship.588 Al-
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Ghazālī then briefly addresses the context of legitimate rule versus usurped power, a rare
acknowledgment of the existence of coercive powers outside of the judiciary, by
acknowledging that it could become difficult to find a judge with the aforementioned
characteristics when “deviant usurpers (mutaghallibūn fasaqa) take over governance (alwilāya).”589 He thus states that the legal rulings of the judge appointed by the de facto
ruler (ṣāḥib al-shawka) may be carried out “out of necessity (ḍarūra),” just as “a ruling
from the rebels (ḥukm al-bughāt)” may be carried out.590
The rest of the section pertains to hierarchies of power as manifested through the
judge’s appointment of deputies (istikhlāf) with restricted judicial competence, and
includes a discussion of the ruler’s ability to prevent the judge from appointing deputies.
Al-Ghazālī then follows up with a discussion of the issue of two judges installed in one
jurisdiction (balad), a question that is also taken up and expanded on by al-Rāfiʿī and alNawawī. However, unlike al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī shows a technical concern with an
abstract problem rather than with the complexities of overlap and jurisdictional tension
between two judges in one jurisdiction. He thus distills the argument into a specific and
limited discussion about the permissibility of two judges having their own jurisdiction in
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a particular region. Even so, al-Ghazālī does not permit the de facto ruler to coerce them
into agreeing on every ruling as a condition of their instatement, in order to underscore
the necessity of the judicial independence (istiqlāl) of each one in issuing rulings.
Al-Ghazālī assumes there is an authority to which the judge is subject and that can
restrict his ability to make legal decisions in certain spheres, but he does not explicitly
relate this authority to the bureaucracy or hierarchy of rulers; the judge is to be
understood as embedded in a generic, unidentified system. Stability of the system is more
a presumption in al-Ghazālī’s understanding, even as his main concern is the
technicalities of dismissal (al-ʿazl) of the judge; while the judge’s appointees must resign
with his dismissal (although there is disagreement in regard to whether that also
dismisses the judge’s representative, the nāʾib) judges do not resign upon the death of a
political leader.591 The issue of stability is also relevant to the judge’s claim after
dismissal to have issued a judgment; al-Ghazālī thus only refers to the kinds of evidence
by which the fact of the issuing of the judgment needs to be determined.
The contents of al-Ghazālī’s sections in his chapter “Fī adab al-qaḍāʾ” overlap
with Shāfiʿite and Twelver texts, although its particular ordering would influence the
organization of contemporaneous as well as later texts. The sections are arranged
according to the following expectations of what the judge must do upon being appointed:
announce his judgeship; inquire into the situation of those imprisoned; arrange his court
personnel, namely, secretaries, muzakkīs (experts who vet the witnesses), and translators,
and their method of payment. The judge must also set up a formal court, preferably not in
the masjid; maintain the requisite proper state of mind during the course of adjudication;
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and consult with other jurists “to rule out accusation (li-tantifiya al-tuhma)” of partiality.
Furthermore, he must refuse gifts and refrain from public commercial transactions;
rebuke a litigant with poor manners only outside the court; refrain from adjudicating in
favor of his child or against his enemy (ʿaduwwihi); and when hearing cases, treat the
litigants equally, discover any enmity between them or their witnesses, and know the
proper procedures for weighing different kinds of evidence at the appropriate points in
the case. Al-Ghazālī, stating that the judge should “not revoke his judgment or the
judgment of another,” cites the Ḥanafites as an example of those who regularly revoke
their rulings,592 implying the danger of such social instability allowed by their legal
school.
Al-Ghazālī discusses the practical means by which the judge acquires evidentiary
proof and elicits this type of information from his claimants. There is an emphasis on the
judge as part of a larger judicial apparatus which also needs to run smoothly in order to
arrive at a proper legal ruling. As such, al-Ghazālī carefully lays out the judge’s judicial
apparatus, acknowledging that the judge must ultimately rely on evidentiary proof (ḥujja)
ascertained by others, such as the muzakkī. Al-Ghazālī, in an unusual stance among the
Shāfiʿites in this juristic lineage, thus adopts “the sounder of two legal opinions” that the
judge “adjudicates on the basis of ḥujja and not by his own knowledge (wa lā yaqḍī biʿilm),” whether on its own or with a witness.593 Al-Ghazālī does acknowledge that the
judge may use outside knowledge in determining the status of court personnel, such as
the sinfulness (fisq) or dishonesty of a witness, but he would still require corroboration
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from the muzakkī. In this way, although al-Ghazālī does not state so explicitly, he adheres
to al-Shāfiʿī’s stipulation of adjudicating by the prima facie evidence, although he does
not include al-Shāfiʿī’s permissibility of the judge’s personal knowledge for issuing legal
rulings. Similarly, the judge must only adjudicate in accordance with a litigant’s
admission in court (majlis al-qaḍāʾ), regardless of whether the same person had
confessed to the judge secretly in another context. Al-Ghazālī’s commitment to
adjudication based on prima facie evidence is also evident in his section on tazkiya, the
vetting of witnesses. While the muzakkī is acknowledged as an important figure in the
process, the judge may also act on his own suspicions regarding a witness as an
additional check, especially when faced with conflicting testimony by a single witness.
The judge may go so far as to conduct his own inquiry (baḥth), in order to balance the
bayyina evidence in regard to the witness’s probity or lack thereof.
Al-Ghazālī has a separate, more detailed section on adjudicating the claim of a
litigant in absentia (al-qaḍāʾ ʿalā al-ghāʾib), which he divides into five components
(arkān): the claim, the plaintiff making the case against the absentee, the method of
concluding the legal ruling through communication with the judge in another jurisdiction,
the objects or property being claimed (al-maḥkūm bih), and the absentee against whom he
ruled. After delineating the formalities of establishing a claim and the evidence the judge
must require from the plaintiff, al-Ghazālī writes a long section on the method of
concluding the ruling through another judge in the absentee’s home province. This is an
interesting choice since other adab al-qāḍī writings of correspondence between judges
are often treated as independent topics rather than supporting elements of other adab alqāḍī sections. In this instance, al-Ghazālī is concerned with the process of the judge’s
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taking of testimony from two witnesses, as well as the proper identification of the
absentee in the claim, which is then to be communicated to this second judge. Judge-tojudge correspondence is discussed again in the section regarding default judgments
against someone (al-maḥkūm ʿalayh) where the issue of hearsay testimony is also
addressed for the first time in the chapter. The rest of the section on al-maḥkūm ʿalayh
addresses the practical responsibilities of the judge that later adab al-qāḍī authors would
refer to, including the status of admitted evidence after the dismissal of a judge, the status
of a secluded woman (mukhaddara) and the judicial procedures necessary to
accommodate her, the prohibition of marrying a woman outside of the judge’s
jurisdiction (wilāyatihi), and the means of supervising the property of an orphan.594
The long, final section of the chapter—on the division of inheritance shares of an
estate (qisma)—is a standard topic among adab al-qāḍī writers, who clearly see this as a
main or reigning concern and responsibility for the judge; although he is not cited as the
reason for the focus on qisma, al-Shāfiʿī had stated that estate distributors are judges (alqussām ḥukkām) in his Kitāb al-Umm, presumably in the limited sense of the distributor’s
decisions having the binding status of a judicial ruling.595 In response to whether it is
obligatory to stipulate the number of distributors (qāsim), al-Ghazālī mentions a
prevailing legal opinion regarding the judge and his own personal knowledge (ʿilmihi). In
this regard, al-Ghazālī makes a distinction, albeit a fine one, between the judge’s personal
knowledge and his discernment, stating that the judge may not divide property “with
probity according to his own discernment (bi ‘l-ʿadāla bi-baṣīrat nafsihi), even if we said
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he adjudicates according to his knowledge (wa-in qulnā yaqḍī bi-ʿilmihi).” 596 This
statement implies that it would not matter if a judge’s use of his own discernment crossed
into his personal knowledge (bi-ʿilmihi), because neither discernment nor personal
knowledge was required for qisma; rather, only superficial assessment (takhmīn) is
needed. He ends the section with two discrete rules (farʿān) on dealing with the qisma of
canals and bathhouses (ḥamām), and the exemption of the judge from qisma when a
group provides no bayyina evidence for ownership.
Despite its deceptively straightforward appearance, al-Ghazālī’s adab al-qāḍī
chapter, with its neatly ordered sections, was instrumental as a teaching tool. Al-Rāfiʿī’s
commentary, closely following al-Ghazālī’s form, would cement that legacy even as he
developed his own juristic emphases.

Al-Rāfiʿī, al-ʿAzīz

ʿAbd al-Karīm Abū ’l -Qāsim al-Rāfīʿī (d. 623 H/1226 CE) was born in Qazwīn
and was a prolific Shāfiʿite jurist; his commentary on al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz served as a
blueprint for the conception of the judgeship within the Shāfiʿite school. In this work, alRāfiʿī usually proceeds by citing a statement by al-Ghazālī (designated by “al-Ghazalī
said—qāla al-Ghazālī”) as it appears in al-Wajīz; al-Rāfiʿī then adds his own rather
extensive comments. Through his comments, al-Rāfiʿī may clarify al-Ghazālī’s
statements or provide justifications for them with source-texts, go into detail on multiple
viewpoints, and sometimes even provide his own conclusions.
596
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Whereas al-Ghazālī did not elaborate on why the judgeship was a collective duty,
al-Rāfiʿī found it necessary to justify that claim through various Qurʾān verses that
referred to God commanding various figures to adjudicate among the people.597 In
addition, al-Rāfiʿī cites Prophetic ḥadīths encouraging the practice, including the wellknown narration about the judge receiving one reward for an incorrect ruling arrived at
by using his ijthād, and two for a correct ruling.598 He also cites the ḥadīth where the
Prophet dispatched ʿAlī as a judge to Yemen, as well as the Muʿādh ḥadīth which
outlines the three sources of adjudication—the Qurʾān, the Prophetic sunna, and
ijithād.599 Furthermore, since previous adab al-qāḍī texts took the institution of the
judgeship for granted, al-Rāfiʿī carefully defines what the judge does in the most
fundamental terms by connecting it to Qurʿānic verses. In order to do so, he cites
Qurʿānic verses which utilize some form of the triliteral roots ḥ-k-m and q-ḍ-y to
demonstrate the legitimacy of the process of adjudication and issuing legal rulings, noting
the observations of “major lexicographers and jurists (aʿimmat al-lugha wa ‘l-fiqh)” to
prove his point. He even takes great pains to connect the meaning of qaḍā as “to kill” in
Q 28:15 (“Moses struck him with his fist and killed him,”600 [fa-wakazahu Mūsā fa-qaḍā
ʿalayhi])” to “adjudication” because both entail the act of disposing of something with
finality: “‘Qāḍī’, i.e. ‘killer’, so adjudication is called qaḍāʾ because the judge completes
a command by means of a decision, and concludes and disposes of it, and it is called a
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legal ruling when some aspect of it prohibits the wrongdoer from wrongdoing; [the noun]
“al-ḥakama [restraint]” is derived from it.”601
Al-Rāfiʿī then gives some brief observations on the arrangement of al-Ghazālī’s
chapters, explaining that the first sections on adjudication (qaḍāʾ) and judicial conduct
(adab) were placed together because adjudication is validly conferred only by “the ruling
authority (wilāya) which establishes it by appointment (bi ‘l-tawliya); it ceases through
dismissal at times and by resignation at other times (wa tazūl bi ‘l-ʿazl tāratan wa bi ‘linʿizāl ukhrā).”602 Since these sections comprise discussions regarding adjudication for
litigants who were present (ḥāḍir), al-Rāfiʿī shows that al-Ghazālī would naturally follow
with a chapter specifically on adjudicating against an absentee (ghāʾib). The inclusion of
a final, separate chapter on division of inherited estates (qisma) is explained as a
formality established by al-Shāfiʿī and his disciples, who would decide the shares during
or after judgments.603 Al-Rāfiʿī connects the judge’s responsibilities to estate allotment
by arguing that is among the duties of a judge; thus, “it is befitting for the discourse
(kalām) on inheritance to be placed alongside that concerning judgments (al-aqḍiya).”604
He even elaborates on al-Shāfiʿī’s statement that “estate distributors are judges” by
noting that judges are in need of estate distributors in order to divide jointly owned
property (qismat al-mushtarakāt), although he does modify al-Shāfiʿī’s statement to
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“estate distributors are like a judge (al-qussām ka ’l-ḥākim)” rather than making the two
directly equivalent.605
Returning to the justifications of both the judgeship and political leadership, alRāfiʿī asserts that consensus upholds them as collective duties because people’s souls
incline to wrong-doing; a restraining power, such as a judge, is thus needed to demand
justice for the victims, to command right and forbid wrong, and to safeguard the rights of
the weak. Al-Rāfiʿī points to the reports (akhbār) that dissenters use to make their
arguments, which include the well-known Prophetic ḥadīths that “being made a judge is
like being sacrificed without a knife” and the admonishment that true justice would bring
a judge to such reckoning in the afterlife that he would wish he had never adjudicated
between two people on so much as a date. However, al-Rāfiʿī states that the main
position of the Shāfiʿite legal school on these ḥadīths is not to dismiss all adjudication as
detestable; while a judge who deviates in his adjudication would thus be damned
(halaka), a judge who acted justly would gain great rewards in the afterlife (fāza bi-khayr
kathīr). The reports are thus to be understood as a caution for committing severe error in
adjudication, as well as a warning, for the person who requests the judgeship of its risks.
Al-Rāfiʿī goes on to state that the main position of the Shāfiʿite school is that a few of the
righteous (baʿḍ al-ṣāliḥīn) taking up the judgeship discharges the duty from the rest, but
if everyone refrained from the judgeship, then all would have sinned. As a result, the
ruler may compel one of them to take up the judgeship in order avoid suspending public
welfare (kaylā tataʿaṭṭal al-maṣāliḥ), so that it does not become an individual duty (li-
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Al-Shāfiʿī has the phrase as al-qussām ḥukkām (al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm, 7:526).

206

allā yaltaḥiq farḍ al-kifāya al-ʿayn).606 Al-Rāfiʿī states that of the two views on the
matter, the first, in which the ruler compels a qualified person to take up the judgeship, is
the most appropriate. In this way, al-Rāfiʿī tries to balance caution in regard to someone
who requests the judgeship out of a desire for worldly gain against the injustice that
would occur if all qualified persons refrained from taking up the position.
Al-Rāfiʿī’s trepidations concerning the judge’s ability to serve the public interest
become more clear as his commentary elaborates on his conception of authority (wilāya)
as an inherently corrupting influence: “it is something that even a soul only slightly
inclined to evil will take on to take revenge on an enemy, and to look out for a friend (alnaẓar li ’l-ṣādiq) as corrupted intentions follow.”607 Here al-Rāfiʿī is aware of the irony
of expecting the maintainance of social order from an office that itself is open to the
corrupting influence of power by virtue of wielding it. In contrast, al-Ghazālī does not
ask any ethical questions regarding a judge and his actions in al-Wajīz; al-Ghazālī’s judge
is merely one who is tasked with ascertaining and weighing different forms of evidence
in a court of law to arrive at a legal ruling.
Next, al-Rāfiʿī sets out the discussion of whether it is permissible to appoint
someone who requests the judgeship. Whereas al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz only mentions that
there were two views on a subject, without further detail, al-Rāfīʿī gives multiple
hypothetical situations (ḥāl) and views, and not only identifies “the most correct” of the
statements in detail but also cites Shāfiʿite texts and scholars in support of his arguments.
He even cites al-Ghazālī’s own al-Wasīṭ to clarify al-Wajīz on the question of requesting
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the office of judgeship, although the majority position (al-aẓhar) is identified as being in
al-Māwardī’s al-Tahdhīb. In citing such a wide array of sources, al-Rāfiʿī acts as
architect in the shaping of the genealogy of the Shāfiʿite school, through his sifting of the
legal opinions of previous Shāfiʿite jurists who also happened to have been judges, such
as Ibn al-Qāṣṣ (d. 336 H/947 CE ), Abū ’l-Qāsim al-Ṣaymarī (d. 4th/10th c. CE), al-Qāḍī
Abū Ṭayyib (d. 450 H/1058 CE), al-Qāḍī al-Rūyānī (d. circa 502 H/1108 CE), and
others.608
Al-Rāfiʿī, furthermore, expands greatly on al-Ghazālī’s reference to a judge not
being reliant on other jurists’ legal opinions for his own legal reasoning by discussing the
nature and definition of ijtihād within the context of the judgeship. Interestingly, although
al-Rāfiʿī cites the well-known ḥadīth about judges who end up in hell as a result of giving
wrong judgments intentionally as well in ignorance, he contextualizes it as relating
specifically to ijthād instead of the judgeship in general.609 He also elaborates on alGhazālī’s prohibition of women taking up the judgeship by stating that Abū Ḥanīfa’s
(restricted) permissibility was in contrast to the general Shāfiʿite position of prohibition,
which is based on a ḥadīth found in al-Bukhārī’s ḥadīth collection al-Ṣaḥīḥ.610 This
implied critique of Abū Ḥanīfa serves as a transition into al-Rāfiʿī’s response to Abū
Ḥanīfa’s permitting a layman to take up the position and ask for scholarly guidance in
giving judgments.611
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In the discussion of a layman taking up a judicial appointment, al-Rāfiʿī again
strikes a careful balance of practical expectations with the necessary requirements of the
office. He begins by stating that the current members of the Shāfiʿite school objected to
Abū Ḥanīfa’s statement; since issuing a fatwā is not allowed through reliance on another
jurist’s opinion (taqlīd), then a layman’s issuing of a judgment (qaḍāʾ) cannot be based
on such reliance either. Al-Rāfiʿī reinforces the Shāfiʿite position, stating that their
position is all the more appropriate due to the fact that even more factors have to be taken
into consideration when issuing judgements than when issuing fatwās.612
For al-Rāfiʿī, the qualification of ijtihād is linked with the ability to derive rules
from the sources, which he lists in a hierarchy: the Qurʾān (“the book of God”), the
progenitor (jadduhu) of relevant knowledge; the sunna of the Messenger of God; the
legal opinions of the Companions (al-ṣaḥāba) and “those that came after them (fa-man
baʿdahum);” qiyās; and Arabic lexicography, “for the sharīʿa was revealed (waradat) in
Arabic.”613 However, he is explicit that neither the Qurʾān nor the sunna provides all the
knowledge necessary by which to adjudicate all cases. As such, ijtihād consists of
knowing how Qurʾānic verses and sunna traditions relate to legal rulings, and knowledge
of the various hermeneutical categories into which such sunna traditions fall (general and
specific, abrogating, etc.). As for qiyās, the judge must know how to distinguish a correct
analogical method from a false one (al-fāsid), as well as be familiar with its various
forms. However, al-Rāfiʿī notes that contemporary Shāfiʿites acknowlege that skill in all
these areas is not practical and so believe that having general knowledge (jumal) of all
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the hermeneutical categories would suffice. As for general knowledge of ḥadīth, al-Rāfiʿī
deems it sufficient that judges have access to a written collection of ḥadīths pertinent to
legal rulings, such as the Sunan of Abū Dawūd.”614
Al-Rāfiʿī cites al-Ghazālī’s (infamous) statement in al-Wasīṭ that the expectation
of one person attaining all these conditions “is impractical in our age because of our age’s
lack of an independent mujtahid” as a pragmatic view accommodating the appointments
of the ruling administration.615 That is, if the most qualified person does not exist,
carrying out the judgment of a judge appointed by the ruler—even if the judge were
ignorant or corrupt and obstructed the welfare of the people—is acceptable by virtue of
its necessity (ḍarūra), even if the judge was drawn from rebels (ahl al-baghy), although
there were also varying positions regarding the permissibility of appointing such a
person. Al-Rāfiʿī also quotes al-Māwardī’s view in saying that one who discards qiyās
and who does not subscribe to the validity of consensus or khabar wāḥids is not allowed
to be appointed. Al-Rāfiʿī understands this statement to refer to people who reject qiyās,
i.e. “the Shīʿīs, who do not advocate ijtihād as a principle but rather follow the explicit,
revealed texts, and, not finding [a legal ruling], look for it in the sayings of their pious
predecessors (salaf),” that is, their Imams.616 Nonetheless, Twelver reliance on the legal
opinions of the Imams is still permitted in cases in which the Shīʿī Imams could be
deemed to be “undertaking ijtihād” regarding the general import of the revealed texts and
their indicants (ʿumūm al-nuṣūṣ wa isharātihā), especially since some of them, such as
Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and his father Muḥammad al-Bāqir, were acknowledged by Sunnīs as
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early Medinese jurists.617 As such, Twelvers would be following the mujtahid-Imams by
means of taqlīd in such cases, which is permitted.
Al-Rāfiʿī does not raise the question of whether one may rely on the juristic
opinions of a deceased mujtahid, an issue brought up by al-Ghazālī; it is already assumed
to be permissible, although to what extent one may do so remains an open question. The
“correct opinion” understands such reliance to be similar to both testimony of a witness
who later dies (which still leads to a legal ruling) as well as the principle that the
acceptance of consensus (ijmāʿ) is not nullified upon the death of those who engendered
it. Therefore, “those in agreement with [the idea that there is] a lack of mujtahids
nowadays” would not be able to forbid reliance on a dead mujtahid.618 Thus, the
eponymous, foundational leaders of the legal schools which he cites—Mālik, Ibn Ḥanbal,
and Abū Ḥanīfa—are mujtahids who may not submit to the legal opinion of another
mujtahid in any mattter, whether to act in accordance with it or to use as a basis for a
fatwā. Since, according to al-Rāfiʿī, mujtahids of the rank of al-Shāfiʿī no longer exist,
contemporary jurists cannot reach the level of fully independent ijtihād and possibly
engender a new legal school.619 Rather, they conform to the approach (ṭarīqa) of a
deceased mujtahid in addressing the principles of the law and the use of textual indicants.
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Al-Rāfiʿī does not make any sweeping statements about the necessity or
impermissibility of taqlīd; rather, he is concerned only with its practical nuances. He thus
establishes a hierarchy of permissibility of taqlīd that is also connected to the legal
school’s cohesion and identity. His conception of taqlīd, established legal opinions
(qawl), and prevailing legal opinions (mashhūr) ties them into a cohesive understanding
of the madhhab,620 of which the very basis is the reliance on the legal authority of a
mujtahid, whether deceased or not.621 This is the foundational theory al-Rāfiʿī makes
explicit as to explain why there exist eponymous legal schools that follow the legal
opinions of al-Shāfiʿī, Mālik, and Abū Ḥanīfa, tracing this acceptance of reliance on
mujtahids back to al-Shāfiʿī himself, as well as “others.”622
Al-Rāfiʿī then concerns himself with the “layman (ʿāmmī),” that is, a scholar who
has not reached the rank of undertaking ijtihād,623 in order to establish his typology of
scholars and jurists within a legal school. He begins by comparing the contemporary legal
schools of the Shāfiʿites, Ḥanafites, and Mālikites, stating that they have three such
categories. In addition to the layman and those who have reached the rank of ijtihad
within the legal school, there are the intermediary jurists (al-mutawassiṭūn), those who
rank between these first two categories. These jurists are those who did not reach the
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level of ijtihād in regard to the principles of the law (fī ʿaṣl al-sharʿ) but rather apply the
principles of the foundational madhhab leader with whom they are associated through
their mastery of qiyās. 624 Since persons in this last category would ostensibly issue legal
opinions, al-Rāfiʿī then parses out two ways to understand whose legal authority the
layman is actually submitting to when he submits to the legal opinions of the
intermediary jurist: 1) that of the “prevailing opinion” (al-mashhūr), which is that a
layman would not be following the individual taqlīd of a intermediary jurist because the
jurist himself is submitting to the authority of a mujtahid, and 2) a contrasting
explanation by Abū ’l-Fatḥ al-Harawī, a “companion of the Imam Shāfiʿī,”625 which
states that the “doctrine (madhhab) of most of our colleagues (ʿāmmat aṣḥābinā) is that
they have no doctrine of their own (lā madhhab lahu).” Thus, by conceptualizing
individual juristic authority as diffused through adherence to authority within the legal
school, the layman may outwardly rely on the mutawassiṭ jurist’s legal opinions, and is
thereby understood as submitting to the legal opinions of the mujtahid jurist through
him.626
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In his review of the process of requesting a fatwā (i.e. al-istiftāʾ), al-Rāfiʿī
outlines the conduct of the petitioner as well as the muftī, an especially important figure
since the mutawassiṭ jurists of the legal school depend on his fatwā for various juridical
processes. The problem of how to choose among multiple muftīs is resolved by
ascertaining who is the most knowledgeable, especially through the process of inquiry
and research (baḥth) into the matter, since this process of selection itself constitutes a
form of ijtihād.627 The fatwā also becomes a focal point for al-Rāfiʿī’s discussion of the
intersections of reliance on another legal authority (taqlīd), scholarly consensus, and
analogical reasoning (qiyās). If the mustaftī, a requester of a fatwā—in this case, not a
layperson but a mutawassiṭ jurist in the legal school—found an answer, and the situation
occurred again, if the basis of the answer (istinād al-jawāb) was juristic consensus or a
known text, then there was no need to ask again. If it was a question of relying on the
legal opinions of someone, presumably a mujtahid, who then became deceased, then it
was also not an issue.628 However, if the basis was the analogical reasoning of raʾy or
qiyās, or it was doubted that the one being followed on the basis of taqlīd was alive, “the
most correct” position is “that he must ask the question again.”629 Here he also refers to
his earlier discussions on whether the mujtahid had to renew his ijtihād if either an
incident occurred again or he was asked about it again.630
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In the case of a second answer (to the same case or question) being in
disagreement with the first, al-Rāfiʿī shows that, once the precautions are taken regarding
inquiring about the most knowledgable person and relying on their legal opinions, the
juristic viewpoints al-Rāfiʿī presents are so varied as to give the petitioner the entire
range of options: to adhere to the fatwā of his choice, to adhere to the more severe one
(aghlaẓ), or alternatively, to the less severe of the two, or to go along with the legal
opinion that was based on a report (athar).631 Alternatively, al-Rāfīʿī cites a viewpoint
that states that the petitioner must follow the legal opinon of whomever he asked first,
“because it binds him at the time of asking (li-annahu lazimahu ḥīna saʾala),”632 to
prevent a petitioner who is dissatisfied with a fatwā from a jurist to ask others the same
question.
Al-Rāfiʿī also establishes the muftī’s protocol (receiving a request for a fatwā,
considering it, and responding to it), stating that the petitioner must not “request the legal
proof (ḥujja) for the response (jawāb), and if he wanted knowledge of the proof, he must
ask for it another time.” However, should the muftī’s response include proof from a
Qurʾānic verse and a tradition (khabar), “it is no problem.”633 Even then, however, the
muftī “must not become accustomed to mentioning qiyās and the methods of ijtihād; but
if the fatwā is for a judge (law taʿallaqa al-fatwā bi-qāḍī) it is fitting to indicate the
method (ṭarīq) of ijtihād.”634 However, the muftī must have discretion in issuing his
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fatwā, particularly since “it is advisable for him to consult about the response (jawāb)”
with scholars in his vicinity.
Al-Ghazālī had asserted that the judge had to be independent in his ijtihād while
undertaking this ijthād within a legal school of one of the imāms who have a fatwā
attributed to them, making him a muqallid of a deceased imām. Al-Rāfiʿī asks the
question: does this then make the judge the one who is followed by means of taqlīd? AlRāfiʿī gives neither a clear nor direct answer, rather focusing on the question of whether
the judge is a mujtahid of the legal school, which, as he states, “is not a necessity.”
However, if the judge were such, al-Rāfiʿī cites al-Ghazālī’s al-Wasīṭ in saying that a
judge who was a mujtahid madhhab must be preferred over one who had not reached the
level of ijtihād “within the madhhab.”635
Al-Rāfiʿī’s understanding of the cohesion of the legal school, with its various
ranks, undergirds his understanding of inter-madhhab relations. Such cohesion comes up
as an issue in regard to the appointment of deputy judges (khalīfas), which has “the same
requirements as the judge.”636 Despite the usual assumption in adab al-qāḍī texts of an
idealized, single-madhhab judicial system, al-Rāfiʿī assumes situations in which judges
from different legal schools are appointed as each others’ judicial representatives (nāʾib).
He cites the example of a Ḥanafite judge appointing a Shāfiʿīte judge as his
representative in “the Ḥanafite doctrine” (bi-madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa) regarding a specific
legal matter. The question is, what happens when a judge is ordered to “to go against his
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own ijtihād and rule according to the ijtihād of the one delegating him” (an yukhālifa
ijtihādahu wa yaḥkuma bi-ijtihād al-munīb) as a condition of his appointment as
representative? Al-Rāfiʿi states that it is not permitted.637 So in the case that the
representative did disagree on the basis of ijtihād, and “the Ḥanafite” had stipulated that
his Shāfiʿīte representative rule in accordance with the Ḥanafite doctrine, al-Rāfiʿī (citing
al-Ghazālī’s al-Wasīṭ) notes that a Shāfiʿite representative may rule on cases in which
there are agreements on certain cases “between the two imāms” (lahu al-ḥukm fī almasāʾil al-muttafaqa bayn al-imāmayn), meaning al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfa. However,
in legal matters where the two eponymous founders disagree, the judicial representative
may not rule—because the doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa contradicts his beliefs (muʿtaqadihi)
as well as because he is not permitted to rule in accordance with the doctrine of al-Shāfiʿī
by his appointer on a specific legal matter, effectively leaving a legal lacuna.
However, because Shāfiʿites and Ḥanafites differ on the admissibility of the
testimony of a single witness supported by an oath, 638 the Shāfiʿite judicial representative
is permitted to disregard the stipulations of a Ḥanafite ruler (imām) who directs him to
not adjudicate by such evidence; instead, he may adjudicate according to wherever his
own ijtihād leads him. Al-Rāfiʿī, citing “Chief Justice (aqḍā al-quḍāt)” al-Māwardī, alShīrāzī’s al-Muhadhdhab, and “others,” states that the stipulation that a Shāfiʿite
representative refrain from adjudicating on a matter according to Shāfiʿite doctrine is
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void, and that a Shāfiʿite judge may thus not request such an appointment.639 This is
distinct from a situation, as described by al-Māwardī, in which the ruler invests the judge
with authority only to rule in accordance with a particular doctrine and not another.640
The ruler is also permitted to direct the judge not to rule on other cases where Shāfiʿites
and Ḥanafites fundamentally disagree on burdens of proof, such as when a Muslim is
killed by an “unbeliever (kāfir)” or a freeman killed by a slave.
Al-Rāfiʿī touches on the relationship between ruler and judge in his discussion of
the issue of whether two litigants can appoint their own arbitrator regarding matters such
as property, the marriage contract (nikāḥ), and punishments in cases of torts (dam),
retaliation in kind (qiṣāṣ), and capital punishment (ḥudūd).641 While acknowledging that
arbitration (taḥkīm) is permitted in property matters “according to the weakest
statement,” and that there is disagreement regarding the marriage contract, al-Rāfiʿī’s
position is that arbitration should not take place if a judge is present in a jurisdiction: “if
we permitted [such things], then [the judge] would not have the power of arrest (laysa
lahu al-ḥabs), and the carrying out of punishment (wa istīfāʾ al-ʿuqūbāt), and his legal
ruling would not apply to anyone other than those who are satisfied with it.”642 He cites
one of two opinions that states that people may not appoint their own arbitrator because
only the ruler has the right of judicial appointment since, in addition to granting the judge
authority, arbitration “consists of depriving the judge of his competence (tafwīt alḥukūmāt).” 643 He also records an opinion that states that the arbitrator’s decision is not
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binding like that of a judge, because authorizing the reliance on someone else’s
adjudication “is one of the prerogatives of the ruler, and does not settle upon anyone, and
because it consists of the transmission of authority of judicial rulings to the judge, as well
as the transmission of his views and opinions regarding them.”644 The section goes on at
length to discuss numerous juristic viewpoints regarding both the permissibility of
arbitration and to which legal issues it may apply.
In terms of appropriate judicial appointments by the ruler himself, al-Rāfiʿī states
that it is permitted for the imām to give the judgeship to the governor of a region (wālī aliqlīm) or the municipal administrator of a province (wa amīn al-balda).645 He places his
understanding of the administrative aspects of the role of judge squarely within the
context of al-Māwardī’s al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya, which he cites.646 Thus, in al-Rāfiʿi’s
reading of al-Māwardī, the concept of appointment to the judgeship (tawliyat al-qaḍāʾ) is
linked according to principles of agency (wakāla) by oral articulation (al-mushāfaha bi
‘l-lafẓ), correspondence (al-murāsala), and written notification (al-mukātaba ʿind alghayba).
Futhermore, al-Rāfiʿī specifies the nature of the formal act of appointment: “the
ruler (imām) must write a decree of appointment (kitāb al-ʿahd) for whomever he
authorizes to adjudicate”, modeling it on the sunna of what the Prophet Muḥammad
“wrote to ʿAmr Ibn Ḥazm when he dispatched him to Yemen” and what Abū Bakr wrote
to Anas when dispatched him to Bahrain and ʿUmar to Ibn Masʿūd (may God be pleased
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with him), when he dispatched him as a judge to Kūfa.”647 Furthermore, if the judge was
sent to another district (balad ākhar) where he was not well-known, then two witnesses
must testify to the appointment in person, “which is corroborated by writing, and which
the ruler must read out loud to them both.”648 Whereas the notion of derivations of power
have been evident throughout al-Rāfiʿī’s chapter, here he is explicit in connecting the
judiciary’s authority as being directly delegated by the ruler.
Perhaps most interesting in al-Rāfiʿī’s conception of the madhhabs is his rather
terse commentary on al-Ghazālī’s sixth point, that the judge should consult with other
jurists to rule out accusations (li-tantafiya al-tuhma) of arbitrariness. Al-Rāfiʿī, after
outlining Qurʾānic and sunnaic justification for judicial consultation, describes the
preferred form of consultation as gathering together “adherents of different legal schools
(aṣḥāb al-madhāhib al-mukhtalifa).” In this way, each consulting jurist can “mention the
legal indicant (dalīl) of his legal school (madhhab) for the judge to ask about and take the
most preferred [opinion] from them.” 649 However, there is no need for judicial
consultation in a case where the legal ruling is understood on the basis of a text,
consensus, or qiyās.
After al-Ghazālī’s tenth condition, al-Rāfiʿī sets out his delineation of the
qawāʿid, or rather, the established rules of the madhhab, which “need exposition.”650 He
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begins with the principles (al-uṣūl) “according to which the judge adjudicates and the
muftī issues fatwās”, which he identifies as the Qurʾān (“the book of God Most High”),
the sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, and “ijmāʿ and qiyās, which are limited to the
Book and sunna;” “ijmāʿ derives from one of those two (yaṣḍur ʿan aḥadihimā), and
qiyās involves resorting to one of the two (al-radd ilā aḥadihimā), so they are both legal
sources (uṣūl).” 651 Al-Rāfiʿī then demonstrates how to resolve various questions under
this rule when there is preserved an old (qadīm) and new (jadīd) viewpoint from alShāfiʿī regarding a Companion’s legal opinion (qawl), or when the Companions take up
opposing positions, which he renders analogous to the process by which mujtahids arrive
at contradictory conclusions.652
Although al-Rāfiʿī acknowledges the doctrine according to which “every mujtahid
is correct (muṣīb),” he adheres to the juristic position that is based on the Prophetic
ḥadīth of the mujtahid being rewarded twice for his ijithād when correct and once when
wrong. He maintains that, since this ḥadīth states that the mujtahid can be said to be
mistaken, then there can only be one objective truth that exists. Furthermore, since the
mujtahid gets rewarded nonetheless, he cannot sin by making a mistake in the course of
his ijtihād.653 Al-Rāfiʿī’s focus on the judge’s ijtihād and its relationship both to the four
uṣūl as well as the legal school leaves him rather uninterested in elaborating on the
judge’s personal knowledge beyond what had been covered in the previous Shāfiʿite adab
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al-qāḍī texts. However, in his commentary on al-Ghazālī’s stance against al-qaḍāʾ bi ’lʿilm in al-Wajīz’s section, “Fī mustanad qaḍāʾihi,” al-Rāfiʿī refers to al-Shāfiʿī’s
position in the Risāla that it is “stronger than two witnesses” in order to render the
judge’s personal knowledge a possible option in cases of vetting witnesses.654 Al-Rāfīʿī
asserts that al-Shāfiʿī would have allowed judges to adjudicate according to their personal
knowledge, presumably in an unrestricted sense, had it not been for his fear of “corrupt
judges (al-quḍāt al-suʾ)” while also noting that Abū Ḥanīfa allowed it if the judge’s
personal knowledge pertained to the period of his judicial authority.655 Meanwhile, alRāfiʿī notes the dissenting opinion of Mālik ibn Anas and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal: they do not
allow for it because of the risk of accusation of bias or arbitrariness.656 However, al-Rāfiʿī
does not try to fully resolve the issue of al-qaḍāʾ bi ’l-ʿilm since he is only interested in it
in the most restricted sense, such as in the vetting of witnesses and prisoners,657 rather
than as a process that impacts the judge’s legal ruling generally, the way ijtihād would,
stating that “the judge is the prisoner of evidence” (asīr al-bayyina).”658
Writing a commentary on the condensed, minimalist format of al-Ghazālī’s alWajīz allowed al-Rāfiʿī to integrate his own lengthy discussions on complex issues such
as rulership (imāma), ijtihād, and madhhab cohesion into the treatment of judgeship,
while legitimating these connections through the Shāfiʿite madhhab itself. Al-Nawawī

654

al-Rāfiʿī, al-ʿAzīz, 12:486.
al-Rāfiʿī, al-ʿAzīz, 12:487.
656
al-Rāfiʿī, al-ʿAzīz, 12:486.
657
al-Rāfiʿī, al-ʿAzīz, 12:453.
658
al-Rāfiʿī, al-ʿAzīz, 12:472. There is a similar construction, “the judge is the prisoner of the witness (asīr
al-shāhid),” that the 13th century Mālikite al-Qarāfī uses in his work al-Furūq (Rebstock, “A Qāḍī’s
Errors,” 26).
655

222

would build on al-Rāfiʿī’s achievement by refining these notions through his own
supercommentary, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn.

Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn

Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 676 H/1277 CE)659 was born in
Nawā, south of Damascus, and would later train in Damascus itself, where he would also
teach under the Mamlūks. During the period of the Mongol invasions, he declared, in the
introduction of his copy of Ibn al-Ṣalāh’s Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, that “legal standards had
declined because [jurists] had failed to develop an understanding of legal history,
especially the lives of the great jurists of the past in the contexts of their own times,”660
whereas “ḥadīth scholars have long appreciated the truth of this.”661 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, al-Nawawī himself was known as a major scholar of ḥadīth with “even
stricter standards than later Islam,” 662 as well as a jurist who played an important role in
the Shāfiʿite school by reconciling its Iraqi and Khorasani interpretative traditions.663 Al-
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Nawawī’s Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn wa ʿumdat al-muftīn, which he also describes as a
“mukhtaṣar,” is a supercommentary on al-Rāfiʿī’s al-ʿAzīz,.664 However, as a mukhtaṣar
it is not precise in reproducing its source text; rather, al-Nawawī may quote al-Rāfiʿī’s
shorter statements while summarizing his more extended ones, before adding his own
comments and elaborating on the legal issues at hand. This format follows al-Rāfiʿī’s
ordering and divisions, although al-Nawawī regularly punctuates his discussions with
what he deems the relevant rules of substantive law, which he titles, “farʿ.” However,
these sections do sometimes appear to be more like example cases (masʾala) or fatwās
rather than clear rules, and are sometimes indistinguishable from the rest of the text.
Al-Nawawī’s chapter, titled “Kitāb al-qaḍāʾ,” begins with the appointment
(tawliya) and dismissal (ʿazl) of the judge. Like al-Ghazālī, al-Nawawī asserts that
adjudication, like leadership (al-imāma), is a collective duty; like al-Rāfiʿī, he asserts that
its status as a collective duty is conferred by consensus (ijmāʿ). Al-Nawawī also connects
the office of the judgeship more explicitly to the state apparatus (the “highest political
authority, [al-imāma al-uẓmā]”),665 particularly within the context of how a qualified
candidate for the office of judge becomes the preferred choice as a result of the ruler’s
decision.666
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Al-Nawawī’s list of the qualifications of the judge (and the muftī, who is included
as having all the conditions necessary for a judge) consists of maleness, freedom, ijtihād,
sight, legal majority, moral probity, the abilities to speak and hear, and self-sufficiency
(al-kifāya) as a result of a lack of afflictions due to age or illness.667 Of these eight
conditions, the longest exposition is on the required capacity for ijtihād, which includes
“knowledge of the sources (uṣūl)” mentioned in the previous Shāfiʿite adab al-qāḍī texts.
The judge must know “the issues (umūr)” regarding the legal sources, “one of them being
the book of God Most High” as well as the sunna of the Prophet and all their
hermeneutical categories, the legal opinions of the scholars among the Companions (and
their successors), and the various types of qiyās. The judge must also know Arabic, “in
both vocabulary and syntax” (lughatan wa ʿirāban), “because the Law (al-sharʿ)
appeared in Arabic” —a quoting of al-Juwaynī and al-Rāfiʿī,668 although it is not
attributed to them.669 However, like al-Rāfiʿī, al-Nawawī remains practical; he
acknowledges that the Shāfiʿites state that it is not a condition for the judge to know
every aspect of the sources, nor to have memorized them, but rather only to know those
relevant to his legal rulings (bi-mā yataʿallaq bi ‘l-aḥkām).670 Al-Nawawī, in true
Shāfiʿite form, also emphasizes the importance of the judge’s ability to identify prima
facie evidence prior to resorting to analogical reasoning. If a person does not retain these
abilities, he is deemed ignorant (jāhil) and “not permitted to be appointed to give legal
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rulings in which he relies on the legal opinions of someone else.”671 In fact, al-Nawawī
sidesteps the entire discourse on ijtihād brought up by al-Rāfiʿī by merely equating it
with knowledge of the sources of the law; instead, he links ijtihād with the ability to give
fatwās.
Unlike al-Rāfiʿī, who is more concerned with the ranking of the mujtahids relative
to each other within the madhhab, al-Nawawī is more explicitly concerned with the judge
(with an implied lower-ranking in the ability to conduct ijtihād) as not contradicting the
established methods of the madhhab. Al-Nawawī does, however, put forth his own ideas
of acceptable sources of ḥadīth collections in true ḥadīth scholar fashion, contradicting
al-Ghazālī’s assertion that that the Sunān of Abū Dawūd is a reliable source of ḥadīths
relevant to legal rulings: “And how many ḥukmī ḥadīths are in the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukharī
and Muslim that are not in the Sunan of Abū Dawūd? And as for the two books of alTirmidhī and al-Nisāʾī and others, they are among the reliable books.”672 Again, the judge
is not expected to memorize every detail of the law, but he should know enough legal
cases so that his fatwās do not contradict scholarly consensus or make other errors. Here
al-Nawawī already assumes that a qualification of the judge is being a muftī, although he
does not explicitly state so until he begins his section on the muftī.
While still discussing the judge, al-Nawawī describes the fully independent
mujtahid (“mujtahid muṭlaq”), who gives fatwās in all areas of the law (jamīʿ abwāb alsharʿ), as the one who has command of all the sciences which he is required to know
(anna ijtimāʿa hādhihi ’l-ʿulūm innamā yashtariṭu fī ’l-mujtahid al-muṭlaq).673 However,
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for the lower-ranking scholar (ʿālim), it is permitted for him “to have the qualification
(manṣib) of ijithād in one area and not another (bāb dūn bāb).” Furthermore, al-Nawawī
states that the Shāfiʿites added knowledge of the principles of belief (uṣūl al-ʿitiqād) as a
condition of ijtihād, along with al-Rāfiʿī’s statement that al-Ghazālī had been satisfied if
the person undertaking ijtihād had firm belief (ʿitiqād jāzim) even without the capacity to
do a formal proof of the existence of God.674
Al-Nawawī is decisive in his shaping of al-Rāfiʿī’s discussion of ijtihād and taqlīd
within the context of al-Ghazālī’s infamous statement “there is no mujtahid nowadays.”
Al-Nawawī states that this point appears to be agreed upon by consensus (al-nās al-yawm
ka ’l-mujmiʿīn ʿalā annahu lā mujtahida al-yawm).675 As a result, his view is that relying
on the legal opinions of a deceased mujtahid is permitted so that people have access to
the proper sources of guidance. Al-Nawawī follows al-Rāfiʿī’s prohibition of reliance on
the legal opinions of a non-mujtahid jurist (ʿāmmī)—the category of scholar who had not
yet attained a level of ijtihād676— through taqlīd and fatwās. In terms of pragmatism
regarding judicial appointments by a political leader, al-Nawawī relies on al-Rāfiʿī by
simply reproducing the entirety of his commentary on the masʾala of a Ḥanafite judge
stipulating that a Shāfiʿite must rule in accordance with the Ḥanafite doctrine in certain
legal matters, while the judge is expected to exercise his ijtihād in everything else.677
Al-Nawawī also comments on al-Rāfiʿī’s posed question and answer: “Does the
mujtahid have to undertake ijtihād over again if the same situation (ḥāditha) occurred
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again? There are two viewpoints, just as there were regarding the qibla,” with al-Nawawī
adding, “I said: the requisite re-issuing of ijtihād is the most correct of the two.”678 He
mostly retains the entire segment of al-Rāfiʿī’s typology of the ranks of the scholars
within the madhhab according to their ijtihād.679 This segment includes a category of
mutawassiṭūn (in-betweeners) who “have not attained the rank of ijtihād in the principles
of law (uṣūl al-sharʿ).”680 Al-Nawawī only excises the part where al-Rāfiʿī states that alMālik was a companion of al-Shāfiʿī because of their agreement regarding a particular
Prophetic sunna.681
Unlike al-Rāfiʿī, who brings up the question of whether the ʿammī has an
affiliation with a legal school, al-Nawawī weaves the discussion through various other
Shāfiʿite viewpoints regarding whether it is a condition that the ʿāmmī be attached to a
legal school (hal yalzamuhu al-taqayyud bi-madhhab muʿayyan).682 Rather than
providing a concise answer, al-Nawawī further examines the question of
“tamadhdhhub”—adherence to a madhhab—of a non-mujtahid jurist by delving into the
issue of whether an unaffiliated ʿāmmī may choose a muftī, and if so, which one, and
does his petitioning of a muftī obligate him to adhere to his fatwā. Interestingly, alNawawī actually acknowledges his lengthy detour on the question by assuring the reader
that although his explanation was long for “this mukhtaṣar,” it was short relative to his
commentary on al-Shīrāzī’s Muhadhdhab, from which it was drawn.683
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Prior to discussing al-Rāfiʿī’s treatment of the judge’s ijtihād in the section titled
“fī jāmiʿ ādāb al-qaḍāʾ,” al-Nawawī cites al-Rāfiʿī’s discussion on whether every
mujtahid is correct (kull mujtahid muṣīb) or only one can obtain a correct result (al-muṣīb
wāḥid).684 Al-Nawawī fleshes out the discussion by presenting a longer timeline of
Shāfiʿite viewpoints on the question. Acknowledging those who adhered to the latter
position, al-Nawawī (like al-Rāfiʿī) notes al-Muzanī as choosing the former position
through his statement that that the mujtahid is rewarded for his effort rather than the
correctness of his ijtihād (yuʿjar ʿalā qaṣdihi al-ṣawāb wa lā yuʿjar ʿalā al-ijtihād).685 AlNawawī then reproduces al-Rāfiʿis question: if every mujtahid is correct, are there are as
many correct legal rulings and objectively correct answers (ḥaqq) as there are mujtahids,
or is there only one truth? Like al-Rāfiʿī, al-Nawawī states that al-Ghazālī adhered to the
former position, while “the Iraqis” (i.e. the Ḥanafites) adhered to the latter. Like al-Rāfiʿī,
al-Nawawī does not present his own decisive position on the question. Although al-Rāfiʿī
then transitions into the various methodological mistakes that would lead to a revocation
of a judge’s ruling, al-Nawawī analyzes in detail how ijtihād in particular affects the
judge’s legal ruling.
In al-ʿAzīz, al-Rāfiʿī had taken the opportunity in his Kitāb adab al-quḍāt chapter
to expand on the muftī’s characteristics, protocol, and position, in a way similar to that of
the judge and effectively creating an adab al-muftī section.686Al-Nawawī further
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elaborates on this topic through his commentary.687 Like al-Rāfiʿī, al-Nawawī only treats
the muftī as a jurisconsult to a judge, including the non-mujtahid jurist (as opposed to a
jurisconsult for laymen) and is thus concerned with the muftī’s level of ijtihād and the
manner in which he presents his responses to a judge lesser-skilled in ijtihād than
himself. For example, the muftī may give the petitioning judge a severe interpretation of a
legal statement if he saw the benefit (maṣlaḥa) of doing so, since the judge may be
misled because of a lack of knowledge of how to interpret it properly.688 Al-Nawawī also
states that it is preferred that the muftī, as a teacher, deal kindly with his petitioner, the
learner, so that he (in this case, the judge) may gain understanding from him.689
However, al-Nawawī does state that the muftī’s fatwās have no coercive power if they
contradict the judge’s ruling.690Al-Nawawī also brings up the common situation of the
judge being a muftī himself,691 and presents the view that while it is not detestable for
him to give fatwās, he may only give fatwās on matters of worship and other topics, and
not on subjects relating to legal decisions (al-aḥkām).
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Al-Nawawī notes several times that he had elaborated on the topic of the muftī in
his commentary on al-Shīrāzī’s al-Muhadhdhab,692 titled al-Majmūʿ. While al-Rāfiʿī
takes the opportunity to elaborate on the muftī in his commentary, al-Nawawī actually
commandeers al-Rafiʿī’s discussion of the ranking of muqallids and mujtahids for judges
by defining them solely in terms of his typology of muftīs. Since al-Nawawī, like alRāfiʿī, also engaged with the issue of madhhab cohesion and adherence, it appears that
this integration of passages from his al-Majmuʿ is based more on his focus on al-Shafiʿī
as the contemporary locus of the Shāfiʿite school in the 13th century, in light of alGhazālī’s assertion that there is no mujtahid for his age. As Norman Calder states, “alShāfiʿī, qua scholar and author, was an independent mujtahid; in so for as he made
himself available to respond to specific questions, he was an independent muftī.”693
Whereas al-Rāfiʿī developed the topic of the judgeship through the texts of Shāfiʿite
fuqahāʾ, many of whom were practicing judges, al-Nawawī clearly felt that, despite the
persistence of the adab al-qāḍī genre, the office of the highly-skilled muftī was the true
pillar of madhhab law, whereas the judge was merely secondary, rather than vice versa.
Al-Nawawī thus utilized the framework of al-Rāfiʿī’s discussions of judges to structure
his own discussion on muftīs and to elaborate them in much more detail. Although
previous adab al-qāḍī texts would occasionally mention the muftī in some capacity, they
came nowhere near al-Nawawī’s very extensive treatment of the muftī as a necessary
complement to the judiciary.

692

Abū Isḥāq al-Shirāzī (d. 476 H/1083 CE) was a Baghdadi jurist whose al-Muhadhdhab “was one of the
main sources of fatwās until the era of al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī” (Spevack, The Archetypal Sunni Scholar,
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Conclusion

In addition to the procedural elements of adjudication and the descriptions of the
judge and his court protocol that define the adab al-qāḍī genre, this key BaghdadiKhorasani Shāfiʿite lineage maintained some consistent juristic concerns that developed
in salience over time. The Qurʿanic verses referring to the adjudication of Dāwūd, or
Dāwūd and Sulaymān (38:26, 21:78) were present in every text as justification for the act
of adjudication itself; by contrast, such a reference appeared only once in the Twelver
texts with al-Shaykh al-Mufīd. Starting with al-Shāfiʿī, the judge’s exercise of ijtihād was
always a given, even if it ranged from being restricted to specific legal instances to being
exercised across a wider scope. Furthermore, the judge’s use of ijtihād became even more
sophisticated after it came to be believed that mujtahids no longer existed. This concept
would be understood by al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī as the disappearance of fully
independent mujtahids but not ijtihād itself, which now had to be interpreted within the
context of its counterpart, taqlīd.694
Despite the fact that modern historians of Islamic law present ijtihād and taqlīd as
diametric poles, Shāfiʿite jurists conceived of multiple hierarches of ijtihād and taqlīd
that went beyond even a single “middle position.”695 Ijithād and taqlīd also became
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closely tied with the notion of cohesion of the legal school, which created a more
dominant framework in relation to the judiciary starting with al-Juwaynī, since the
Shāfiʿite madhhab did not fully crystallize as a legal school until well after the period of
al-Shāfiʿī and al-Muzanī.696 With the acceptance of the lack of fully independent
mujtahids in their time, the juristic typologies employed by al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī
reframed ijtihād to restrict it to the doctrines of their legal school and taqlīd to give them
cohesion. However, the necessity of a judge to preserve his independence in issuing legal
rulings nonetheless rendered taqlīd as a site of anxiety. The question of the judge’s ability
to exercise ijtihād and his adherence to the legal school thus led to the further elaboration
of the relationship between judges and muftīs, which starts with al-Shāfiʿī and is shaped
into a fundamentally complementary relationship by al-Nawawī. The attempts at
integrating judges into existing juristic typologies eventually became a dominant
framework in this lineage and set its authors apart from the Twelver jurists’ concept of
the judge; al-Nawawī was particularly invested in assimilating the judge to the muftī who
exercised ijtihād, although the relationship between judge and the jurists in the typology
were not fully delineated. Hallaq, noting the typical omission of judges from typologies
of jurists according to their levels of ijtihād, states that this omission is due to the fact that
“the office of the qāḍī, as a legal role, was not deemed a province of legal reasoning and
hermeneutical activity” and thus not properly integrated into theoretical works.697 While
it is true that the judge was not addressed through any overarching theoretical framework,
an analysis of the adab al-qāḍī genre demonstrates that the jurists were very much
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engaged with the judge’s process of legal reasoning, which they understood to be much
more sophisticated than merely applying “the law much as a bureaucrat applies
administrative rules.” 698 Even al-Nawawī, in his attempt to make the muftī the locus of
issuing judgments, acknowledges the range of hermeneutical reasoning judges may
engage in. One of the reasons for the omitting of judges in these typologies may be due to
the difficulty of balancing the judge’s judicial independence in issuing rulings with their
adherence and loyalty to a legal school. Furthermore, in adab al-qāḍī texts the distinction
between judge and muftī is not often clear, as the highly-learned judge can also act as a
muftī in different situations.
Twelver jurists, particularly Ibn Idrīs, rejected the notion of the judge’s recourse
to ijtihād until the writings of al-Muḥaqqiq. Instead, Twelver consensus—ijmāʿ—
weighed heavily in their adab al-qāḍī discourse, whereas for the Shāfiʿite jurists, it was
madhhab cohesion, with its hierarchies of taqlīd and ijtihād, that would ensure both
stability and the proper application of the laws. The notion of al-qaḍāʾ bi ’l-ʿilm is not
seen as a threat by the Shāfiʿite jurists, although perhaps unsurprisingly, it was not
developed as a wide-ranging legal competence the way al-ḥukm bi ’l-ʿilm would be for
the Twelvers. Judicial consultation, seen as both a good juristic practice as well as a way
to ward off accusations of partiality, ranges from acknowledgment to encouragement;
there is little controversy on the subject. Ruling on a specific matter according to the
doctrine of another legal school was a consistent point of discussion in both Shāfiʿite and
Twelver texts; much like al-qaḍāʾ bi ’l-ʿilm, its circumscribed application did not render
it a major threat to Shāfiʿite madhhab cohesion or the integrity of the Twelver
698
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community; it certainly played a role in regulating Shāfiʿite participation in multiconfessional jurisdictions, as would be formally institutionalized the Mamlūk period.699
Al-Shāfiʿī’s hierarchy of uṣūl was consistently articulated in great detail, even in an
extremely condensed format such as that of al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz, as well as al-Shāfiʿī’s
insistence on adjudicating according to prima facie evidence (al-ẓāhir) as a first resort.
Unsurprisingly, al-Māwardī’s al-Ahkām, not being an adab al-qāḍī text, deviates from
these observations in some significant ways but had an undeniable impact; al-Rāfiʿī and
al-Nawawī cite him and his work in their adab al-qāḍī chapters, and, along with alJuwaynī, integrate notions of coercive power and the judge’s subordination to political
rule into their analysis of the judgeship; even al-Ghazālī retained some echoes of ideas of
legitimate versus usurped rule in his Wajīz. By weaving these concerns throughout their
texts, our Shāfiʿite jurists were thus able to utilize their inherited legacies to paint their
visions of the judiciary on the canvas of adab al-qāḍī.
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CONCLUSION

The appearance of Twelver adab al-qāḍī texts coincided with the rise of treatises
on the relationship between the ruling power and the interpreters of the law, such as the
jurists and judges. Al-Māwardī’s al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya, as well as al-Sharīf alMurtaḍā’s contemporaneous Fī ’l ʿamal maʿa ’l-sulṭān, had a direct impact on the
subsequent adab al-qāḍī texts within their lineages and how they understood the judge
and the judiciary functioning within a political apparatus. Yet, as adab al-qāḍī literature
evolved in remarkable ways over time, it would remain resistant to acknowledging
contemporary historical judicial structures and administrative hierarchies; the political
and administrative enforcement of the judge’s legal rulings are rarely referenced, and
even then only in the briefest of terms. As such, the impact of these two treatises
remained squarely within the question of the legitimacy of the judge’s appointment and
authority.
The appearance of treatises on public law intersected with long-standing
theological issues among Twelver jurists regarding holding public offices in the absence
of the Imam; however, the issue would remain unresolved even in the works of alMuḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma. Both Shāfiʿite and Twelver jurists utilized a variety of legal
sources to justify the judgeship; in many ways, this process encompasses the greatest
variety of approaches within an adab al-qāḍī text. However, Twelver adab al-qāḍī texts
were distinct in preserving consistently equivocal positions on the judgeship, even as
their authors clearly accepted its validity.
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As a legal genre, adab al-qāḍī texts are not merely prescriptive or descriptive, but
draw from a history of judicial practice in order to create a vision of a working judiciary
that is expressed through the law. As such, they can encompass a variety of styles and
formats, but remain nonetheless constrained by their subject matter: the judge’s
qualifications, and his duties and responsibilities in court. The multiple approaches to this
subject, however, engendered the distinct variations seen in this study, much of which
conforms to the Twelver-Shāfiʿite division. Some developments, like the focus on the
judge’s ijtihād in Shāfiʿite texts, were closely linked with the development of the
Shāfiʿite madhhab into a legal school, whereas the Twelver jurists of this period adhered
to the understanding of madhhab as the personal doctrine of an established jurist. As
such, Shāfiʿite adab al-qāḍī texts exhibited an anxiety in asserting the judge’s
independence in giving rulings while maintaining the necessity of his adherence to the
doctrines of his legal school. The doctrine of “there is no mujtahid nowadays” was a
fundamental component of redefining ijtihād entirely within the context of the legal
school, since only the eponymous founders of the legal schools were now interpreted to
be fully independent mujtahids. However, unlike the tradition of the typology of muftīs
organized according to their levels of ijtihād within the Sunnī schools, no similar
typology existed for judges. Al-Rāfiʿī’s commentary in his adab al-qāḍī chapter thus
engaged in the project of integrating judges into a similar model of relative levels of
adherence to ijtihād and taqlīd levels. Al-Nawawī, however, would not be satisfied until
the judge and muftī categories overlapped through the requirements of fatwā-giving; even
then, al-Nawawī was keen to subordinate the judge to the muftī in terms of his legal
acumen.
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Twelver jurists contested the concept of the judge’s ijtihād throughout the
centuries leading to the adab al-qāḍī texts of al-Muḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma. For the jurists
who were against it, like Ibn Idrīs, the reliance on appropriately transmitted
ḥadīths/khabars, along with the consensus of the community, were sufficient in
maintaining the integrity of the jurisprudential tradition. Furthermore, despite alMuḥaqqiq and al-ʿAllāma’s acknowledgment of the judge’s ijithād, their conception of it
did not extend to the adage that “every mujtahid is correct.” In this way, they actually fell
in line with Ibn Idrīs’ traditionist position of the judge as fallible, maintaining the
continuity of Twelver ideas by different means. At the same time, they also agreed with
al-Rāfiʿī, who adhered to the notion of the fallibility of the mujtahid.
The notion of the judge’s personal knowledge, however, was a consistent topic in
both Twelver and Shāfiʿite works; acknowledged as a valid form of evidence, the
Shāfiʿites and Twelvers only disagreed on the areas of the law in which it could be
utilized, and to a lesser extent, what encompassed personal knowledge. The Twelver
permission for the judge to utilize his personal knowledge in penal cases is due to the
extension of his office as the prerogative of the Imam. Although the Twelver jurists never
explain how a judge can obtain the Imam’s level of certainty through his personal
knowledge, the conflation of judge and Imam created a fairly straightforward position in
regard to its application. The Shāfiʿite’s concern regarding probability in knowledge,
rather than certainty, led them to circumscribe it more severely than the Twelvers.
However, despite the centrality of oaths, testimony, and admission to the notion of
evidence in the adab al-qāḍī texts, the judge’s personal knowledge was never contested
as evidence. Furthermore, even though Twelver jurists viewed personal knowledge as a
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way for the judge to maintain independence from pressure from a non-Twelver
administrative apparatus, Shāfiʿite texts did not develop this notion to the same extent,
choosing to focus on the nature of the judge’s ijtihād.
However, the intersections between Twelver and Shāfiʿite adab al-qāḍī texts do
not only occur at the level of their content. The Twelver adab al-qāḍī works in this study
are all in the form of legal compendia, while some of the Shāfiʿite texts, such as alGhazālī’s al-Wajīz, in addition to being commentaries, also appear in this form. Legal
compendia span a variety of styles and methodologies, and function as creative works
that move beyond the stodgy image of mere compilation or abridgment of previous
works. Instead, they function as a vehicle for prominent jurists to put forth their own
vision of the enactment of sharīʿa, God’s will in the world, through the furūʿ. The
Twelver jurists of the Saljūq period, despite discarding al-Muqniʿa and al-Nihāya as
models and choosing instead to follow Abū ’l-Ṣalāḥ’s unstructured style, still adhered to
the lineage of al-Mufīd and al-Ṭūsī by continuing to produce legal compendia of furūʿ,
while at the same time restating the foundations of the furūʿ. Legal compendia could also
be complex interrogations into the entire body of work of a predecessor, as in the case of
Ibn Idrīs’ Kitāb al-sarāʾir, which served to refine and strengthen the juristic standards
needed for a legal compendium by expertly critiquing a previous one. Alternatively, the
complexity of a legal compendium could be carefully managed as an educational tool, as
demonstrated by al-Muḥaqqiq’s works. At all points, the legal compendia of furūʿ had
complex yet indirect associations with uṣūl al-fiqh works, whether to justify or discard
the authority of a jurist to write a legal compendium of furūʿ in the first place; as a way to
use a predecessor’s texts as bases for a new work of substantive law (Ibn Idrīs), or to
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intend the legal compendium as a stepping stone to the further study of uṣūl. In this way,
legal compendia are not the mere step-children of higher order legal reasoning, but rather
a crucial and integrated component of the whole project of medieval Islamic
jurisprudence. An analysis of the role of legal compendia in the interaction between
Shāfiʿite and Twelver jurists reveals multiple layers of engagement, such as al-ʿAllāma’s
direct reading of al-Ghazālī’s al-Wajīz in addition to his reception of it through the lens
of al-Rāfiʿī’s commentary.
These multiple layers of engagement also extend to the context in which these
texts were created. Works of substantive law are not produced in a vacuum; the
observations made here are on the basis of the texts analyzed in this study, and as such
cannot be a definitive declaration of the nature of the adab al-qāḍī genre. The analysis of
multiple texts in their entirety is an intensive process, and it is hoped that more scholars
will engage in the systematic research of adab al-qāḍī texts across more geographies,
periods, and legal schools/scholarly lineages to widen the purview of the kinds of
discourse these adab al-qāḍī texts contain. However, even limiting oneself to the prolific
jurists in this study would be a major endeavor; the uṣūl works of these jurists provide
important context for the furūʿ works that they produced, and are necessary to help
clarify or elaborate on statements that may receive only perfunctory treatment in a text. A
jurist’s other works of substantive law are also crucial elements for understanding a furūʿ
text, since jurists often expand on or abridge their previous works, in addition to the
works of other jurists. The adab al-qāḍī genre is thus a complex literature whose
historical development is a map of inter-communal interactions, both through its furūʿ
form as well as its focus on an office at the intersection of judicial and administrative
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authority. It is hoped that future analyses of a wider array of adab al-qāḍī texts will
demonstrate the variety of communities that engaged with each other in issues of the
judgeship and jurisprudence, and help move the field of the history of Islamic law beyond
a strictly sectarian lens.
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